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 An industrial cluster is a group of firms that are specialized by sector, located 
in close geographic proximity and consist of mostly small and medium sized 
enterprises.  An introduction to these clusters is provided in Chapter One. 
Chapter Two develops a model to examine the conditions under which 
clustered firms in a less developed country may cooperate in a “joint action” to 
market their output in a developed country, eliminating the role of an intermediary 
firm in the developed country. The clustered firms are heterogeneous in expected 
quality of output and know the quality type of other firms, but the foreign 
intermediary does not. The intermediary, however, has a lower marketing cost than 
the clustered firms.  The main result of the model is that joint action can occur among 
high quality type firms, but the low quality firms always use the foreign intermediary 
to distribute their output.  
Chapter Three examines empirically two aspects of collective efficiency, one 
passive and one active, through the analysis of a survey of the surgical instrument 
  
cluster in Sialkot, Pakistan.  First, I test an idea from relational contracting theory that 
informal relationships can substitute for formal enforcement through the judicial 
system.  Inter-firm trust is measured as the amount of trade credit offered to 
customers.  The results show that suppliers are more likely to offer trade credit when 
they believe in the effectiveness of formal contract enforcement and when they 
participate in business networks (proxied by inter-firm communication).  Customer 
lock-in helps to develop inter-firm trust since firms give more credit when 
relationships are of longer duration.  This is because locked-in customers are less able 
to find alternate suppliers.  
Chapter Three also examines the firm-level characteristics that determine the 
firms’ interest in intra-cluster cooperation to market their own goods.  The results 
demonstrate that firms are more likely to be interested in such initiatives once they 
have already had some direct experience in marketing, and when firms have a lower 
opportunity cost of leaving their current customers, where opportunity cost is 
measured by the length of the trading relationship. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to Industrial Clusters in Developing Countries 
 
1.1 Introduction 
An industrial cluster is a group of firms that are specialized by sector, located in 
close geographic proximity and consists of mostly small and medium sized enterprises.  In 
recent years, clusters of small firms have been viewed optimistically as a source of growth 
in developing countries.  Despite the small size of many of the firms, these clusters make 
sizeable contributions to developing countries’ economies in terms of employment, 
output, and exports.  Therefore clustering is an important aspect of the economies of 
developing countries and deserves further study.   
In the past, there has been some doubt whether small firms could be a potential 
source of growth in developing countries. A leading undergraduate development textbook 
is only guardedly optimistic about the potential of small firms in developing countries: 
Small scale industry does indeed serve as a breeding ground for potential 
entrepreneurs…Some firms have the potential to grow to medium or even large 
enterprises.  It is important, however, not to yield to romanticism.  Statistically, 
very few small firms even survive over long periods of time, let alone grow up to be 
medium or large enterprises.1 
 
While this statement does not preclude the growth of small firms in developing 
countries, the authors do not seem very confident about their potential. The same textbook 
cites a positive correlation between GNP per capita and the average size of industrial 
plants.2  This statement seems to imply that there is not much place for small firms in a 
                                                 
1 Gillis, Perkins, Roemer, Snodgrass (1996), pg. 498. 
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more developed economy.  It overlooks the possibility that new types of industrial 
organization, such as clustering of small firms, can exist in a modern, industrialized 
economy.  While small firms may suffer certain disadvantages, clustering may mitigate 
some of these difficulties.  For instance, the Sinos Valley, Brazil footwear cluster has at 
least 75 large manufacturers (each with more than 500 employees) that grew from being 
small firms over the last 25 years.3  Clearly, clustering is an aspect of small firm dynamics 
in developing countries that has not received sufficient attention.   
Evidence proves that clusters of firms make sizeable contributions to developing 
countries’ economies despite the small size of many of most of the individual firms (see 
Table 1.1 for more details), and therefore clustering is a topic worthy of inquiry.  The 
subject of this investigation, however, is not the growth potential of clusters, but the 
potential for clustering to aid or hinder firms in dealing with export markets and the 
contract enforcement environment. 
 
The Export Environment Faced By Clusters 
Many clusters have become major exporters by selling their goods through foreign 
agents to large firms from developed countries.  There has been concern expressed by 
some authors in the “global commodity chain” literature (to be discussed in more detail in 
Section 1.5) that developing country firms that produce goods for large multinational 
firms will be trapped in a subordinate role of low value added production while the 
multinationals that produce the designs and do the marketing and retailing will reap most 
                                                                                                                                                 
2 Ibid, pg. 496. 
 
3 Schmitz (1995), pg. 13. 
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of the profits.  However, since the firms being studied here are geographically clustered, 
specialized in the same sector, and often have their own business associations, the 
possibility arises that clustered firms may be able to cooperate in order to break away from 
the foreign buyers and produce their own designs or do their own marketing.  The model 
in the second chapter will examine the conditions under which clustered firms can 
cooperate, or undertake a joint action in order to market their own goods directly to 
consumers. 
 
The Contract Enforcement Environment in Developing Countries 
Weak contract enforcement institutions characterize many of the developing 
countries where industrial clusters are found.  In environments where an effective legal 
system or formal system of contract enforcement is lacking, individuals and firms rely on 
informal means to enforce agreements, also referred to as relational contracting.4  The 
three major methods for informal contract enforcement include: i) dealing only with 
trusted parties such as friends and family members, ii) contracting repeatedly with the 
same parties (so that the value of the relationship prevents cheating), and iii) community 
enforcement (where the threat of sanction by a third party ensures that an agreement is 
upheld).5  Depending on the characteristics of a particular geographic area or grouping of 
agents, one of these methods may be more effective than the others in supporting contract 
enforcement.  For example, since clustered firms all produce similar goods and are 
geographically concentrated, community enforcement might be a stronger force than 
                                                 
4 Relational contracting or informal enforcement may not necessarily be a substitute for the judicial system; 
in fact they might be complements.   
 
5 Community enforcement requires that information about cheaters is known throughout the community, 
and that members of the community refuse to trade with known cheaters. 
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bilateral relationships.  If community enforcement is not present, the threat of sanction by 
an individual supplier in the cluster would most likely be ineffective since there are many 
other similar suppliers.  The third chapter will empirically analyze the factors that support 
the development of inter-firm trust among clustered firms, where trust is proxied by trade 
credit offered to customers by suppliers.  The data was obtained through a survey of the 
surgical goods industry located in Sialkot, Pakistan. 
 
Organization of Chapter One 
Sections 1.2 and 1.3 of this chapter define industrial clusters and summarize some 
of their common characteristics as described in the case study literature.  Section 1.4 
discusses the theorized benefits of clustering, referred to as active and passive collective 
efficiency.  Section 1.5 presents some of the economic literature related to the study of 
clusters.  A brief roadmap (as well as summary results) for the remaining two chapters of 
the dissertation are described in Section 1.6. 
 
1.2 Defining Clusters 
The major characteristics of the industrial model, as clusters are sometimes called, 
are described in Rabellotti (1995) as: 
• Geographically grouped small and medium sized firms which are specialized by 
sector; 
• Forward and backward linkages based on market and non-market exchanges of goods, 
information, and people; 
  5 
 
• Common cultural and social background linking economic agents and creating a 
behavioral code, sometimes explicit but often implicit; 
• Network of public and private local institutions supporting the economic agents acting 
within the cluster; 
For purposes of this chapter, a cluster will be defined as a group of firms located in 
the same geographic area, such as an industrial district, town, or small region, where there 
are a significant number of firms specialized in producing inputs for and manufacturing 
the same type of good.  For example, clusters in Sinos Valley (Brazil), Agra (India), and 
Guadalajara and Leon (Mexico) all produce footwear.  Some of the other clusters that 
have been studied specialize in the production of textiles, leather goods, and surgical 
instruments.  Within a mature cluster, there are some vertically integrated enterprises, but 
for the most part, production does not generally take place within one firm.  Various 
separate firms carry out the production process, which includes input production, 
manufacturing, and complementary services.  Many clusters, especially the mature ones, 
have local business associations as well.   
 
1.3 Characteristics of Clusters 
Clusters are Widespread in Developing Countries 
There are a growing number of case studies detailing the characteristics and 
growth paths of clusters in developing countries.  These case studies provide one with a 
wealth of information about the functioning of clusters, but more fundamentally they 
demonstrate the prevalence of clusters across sectors and countries.  Among the clusters 
that have been studied include footwear in Sinos Valley, Brazil, cotton knitwear in 
  6 
 
Tiruppur, India, woolen knitwear in Ludhiana, India, garments in Eastlands, Kenya, 
metal products in Kamukunji, Kenya, vehicle repair in Ziwani, Kenya, fish in Lake 
Victoria, vehicle repair and metal work in Suame, Ghana, clothing in Western Cape, 
South Africa, shoes in Guadalajara and Leon, Mexico, footwear in Agra, India, clothing 
in Gamarra, Peru, textiles, ceramic tiles, and metal engineering in Santa Catarina, Brazil, 
tanneries in Palar Valley, India, blue jeans in Torreon, Mexico, and surgical instruments 
in Sialkot, Pakistan.6 
 
Economic Importance of Clusters 
Clusters produce a significant amount of output, with a great deal of this output 
bound for the export market.  A few key figures give an indication of the economic 
importance of clusters in developing countries (more information is provided in Table 
1.1).  Pakistan’s Sialkot cluster exported $125 million worth of surgical instruments in 
1995-96.7  Brazil exported 200 million pairs of shoes in 1993, most of which came from 
the Sinos Valley footwear cluster.8  In Mexico, the two clusters of Guadalajara and Leon 
                                                 
6 Two issues of the journal World Development [Vol. 23, No. 1 (1995) and Vol. 27, No. 9 (1999)] were 
dedicated to the study of clusters in developing countries and each contain a number of case studies.  For 
the Sinos Valley, Brazil, see Schmitz (1995) and (1999); for cotton knitwear in Tiruppur, India, see 
Cawthorne (1995); for woolen knitwear in Ludhiana, India, see Tewari (1999); for garments in Eastlands, 
Kenya, metal products in Kamukunji, Kenya, vehicle repair in Ziwani, Kenya, fish in Lake Victoria, 
vehicle repair and metal work in Suame, Ghana, clothing in Western Cape, South Africa, see McCormick 
(1999); for shoes in Guadalajara and Leon, Mexico, see Rabelloti (1995) and (1999); for footwear in Agra, 
India, see Knorringa (1999); for clothing in Gamarra, Peru, see Visser (1999); for textiles, ceramic tiles, 
and metal engineering in Santa Catarina, Brazil, see Meyer-Stamer (1998), for tanneries in Palar Valley, 
India, see Kennedy (1999); for blue jeans in Torreon, Mexico, see Bair and Gereffi (2001); and for surgical 
instruments in Sialkot, Pakistan, see Nadvi (1999). 
 
7 Nadvi (1999), pg. 1611.   
 
8 Schmitz (1998), pg. 12. 
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comprised 2900 of the 4500 shoe enterprises in Mexico in 1991.9  The cluster in 
Guadalajara alone accounted for 27 percent of the 172.4 million pairs produced in Mexico 
in 1994.10  In Tiruppur, India, there were at least 2000 clustered cotton knitwear firms in 
1995, and they produced about 70 percent of India’s exports of this commodity.11  In 
Ludhiana, India, there were 10,000 firms and 200,000 workers producing Rs 241 billion12 
(almost $10 billion in U.S. 1991 dollars) of woolen knitwear in 1991.   The Ludhiana 
cluster contained four-fifths of all woolen knitwear firms in India, producing 90 percent of 
the country’s output of woolen and acrylic knitwear (and 95 percent of the country’s 
exports of this product).13  In Agra, India, 5000 clustered firms were producing 300,000 
pairs of shoes per day in 1991-92.14  Forty-five percent of India's leather is produced in 
Palar Valley, where there are at least 600 tanneries in five clusters.  Table 1.1 summarizes 
some of the information regarding the economic significance of the individual clusters. 
 
                                                 
9 Rabellotti (1995), pg. 33. 
 
10 Rabellotti (1999), pg. 1574. 
 
11 Banerjee and Munshi (2000), pg. 1, 17. 
 
12 Tewari (1999), pg. 1653. 
 
13 Tewari (1999), pg. 1652. 
 
14 Knorringa (1999), pg. 1590. 
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Table 1.1: Economic Significance of Clusters 
Cluster Exports Production Employment 
Sialkot, Pakistan  
(Surgical Instruments) 
$125 million of 
exports in 1995-1996 
Most of production 
exported 
300 manufacturers, 
2,500 firms total 
related to surgical 
instrument industry 
Ludhiana, India 
(Woolen Knitwear) 
$121 million in 
exports in 1996-97 
Produced 90% of 
India’s woolen and 
acrylic knitwear 
10,000 firms, 200,000 
workers 
Tiruppur, India 
(Cotton Knitwear) 
70% of India's cotton 
knitwear exports 
2.5 billion Rupees 
turnover in 1985 
2000 firms in 1995 
Agra, India 
(Footwear) 
n.a. 300,000 pairs of shoes 
per day in 1991-92 
5,000 firms and 60,000 
employees 
Palar Valley, India 
(Leather Tanning) 
Expected exports in 
2000-2001 are 80 
billion Rupees 
 
n.a. 
600 firms 
Sinos Valley, Brazil 
(Footwear) 
$1.5 Billion in exports 
in 1997 (current 
prices) 
from Brazil, most 
from Sinos Valley, in 
1990, Brazil 
accounted for 12.3% 
of world leather shoe 
exports; Sinos Valley 
exported 70% of 
output in 1991. 
Approximately 142 
million pairs of shoes 
produced in 1991 
391 firms and 83,800 
workers in 1996 in 
footwear; 1673 firms 
and 170,500 workers 
in cluster (footwear 
and related industries)
Guadalajara, Mexico 
(Footwear) 
 
n.a. 
Accounted for 27% of 
the 172.4 million (or 
about 46.5 million) 
pairs of shoes 
produced in Mexico 
In 1990, 23% of 
footwear employment 
in Mexico in the state 
of Jalisco, mostly in 
the city of 
Guadalajara.  In 1993, 
there were 1,100 firms 
and 25,000 employees 
in Guadalajara alone. 
Leon, Mexico 
(Footwear) 
 
n.a. 
 
n.a. 
In 1990, 50% of 
footwear employment 
in Mexico was in state 
of Guanajuato, mostly 
in city of Leon 
Gamarra (Lima), Peru 
(Clothing) 
 
n.a. 
In 1993, estimated 
turnover was $800 
million 
In 1993, number of 
firms estimated 
between 6800 and 
8000 
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Non-Vertically Integrated Production 
Various separate firms in the cluster carry out the production process in stages, 
which includes input production, manufacturing, and complementary services.  In 
general, production of a final good is not carried out in a single, vertically integrated firm.  
For example, shoe production in the Sinos Valley (Brazil) takes place in stages that are 
often carried out in different firms, although some firms were vertically integrated.15  In 
the Sinos Valley, there are suppliers that produce a variety of goods and services 
including raw materials, components, machinery, and services such as freelance design 
and transport.  There also was an extensive use of subcontracting in the Sinos Valley, 
usually to small firms.  In Sialkot (Pakistan), in addition to the cluster’s core producers, 
there were various process specialized subcontractors and suppliers of locally 
manufactured scrap steel.16  In the Agra (India) footwear cluster, there are many input 
suppliers that produce different components, such as lasts, tools, leather board, soles, 
laces, stiffeners, and chemicals.17  Manufacturers in the footwear clusters of Guadalajara 
and Leon (Mexico) buy their leather and soles from supplier firms.18 
 
Exports Are Vital to Clusters 
Clusters often export a great deal of their output.  The Indian clusters of Agra and 
Ludhiana used to export a large proportion of their output to the USSR.  Exports to the 
                                                 
15 Schmitz (1999), pg. 17. 
 
16 Nadvi (1999), pg. 1610. 
 
17 Knorriga (1999), pg. 1590. 
 
18 Rabellotti (1999), pg. 1575. 
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Soviet Union were arranged through government-to-government contracts, and 50 percent 
of output from the Ludhiana cluster went there.  This export channel collapsed along with 
the Soviet regime, but the clusters recovered quickly by finding new export markets in 
Europe and North America.  In Ludhiana, exports grew from $32 million in 1991/1992 to 
$121 million in 1996/1997.  Pakistan’s Sialkot surgical instrument cluster exports virtually 
all of its output to North America and Europe.  For other data pertaining to cluster exports, 
refer to Table 1.1. 
 
Common Cultural Background 
In many clusters, there is common cultural and social background linking 
economic agents and creating a behavioral code, sometimes explicit but often implicit.  
This may help to reduce transaction costs and increase the likelihood of cooperation and 
transfer of knowledge.  The case studies of the Mexican footwear clusters in Guadalajara 
and Leon found that technological cooperation was most likely to occur among firms that 
were linked by family ties.  These firms would trade technological information and 
exchange machinery.  Informal relationships among the firms in Guadalajara and Leon led 
to subcontracting orders when there was excess demand, so that firms jointly sold 
products and recovered credits.19  Informal contacts were also deemed important in the 
Brazilian cluster, as information was diffused among friends, family, neighborhood, and 
church.20   A common cultural background and long history also characterize the Palar 
                                                 
19 Rabellotti (1995) 
 
20 Ibid, pg. 12. 
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Valley (India) leather tanning cluster.  It has been in existence since the 19th century, and 
is dominated by the local Muslim community.21   
 
Business Associations 
Many clusters (especially the mature ones) have local business associations. The 
local trade associations in Guadalajara and in Leon, Mexico (both called Camara del 
Calzado) promoted the local trade fair, organized the participation of cluster firms in 
international exhibitions, and sponsored market studies.  Sialkot (Pakistan) has three 
support institutions, the Metal Industries Development Centre, the Sialkot Dry Port Trust, 
and the Surgical Instrument Manufacturer’s Association (SIMA).  These business 
associations are important because they have a role in assisting the cluster firms to 
cooperate in matters of common interest. 
 
Nature of Relationships in International Markets 
For the most part, the design, marketing, and retailing of goods such as those 
produced by clusters have taken place (and remained) in the developed countries.  Cluster 
firms’ goods are sold through various channels, including domestic agents, wholesalers, 
and foreign agents.22  In the case of Torreon (Mexico), a textiles cluster that has 
experienced a significant expansion since the introduction of NAFTA, cluster firms have 
taken over all parts of the production process except design and product development, 
marketing, and retailing.  It is believed that the U.S. “lead firms” view these activities as 
their core competencies, that there are significant barriers to entry, and that these are the 
                                                 
21 Kennedy (1999).  
 
22 Cawthorne (1995), pg. 50. 
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highest value-added activities of the production process.23  The small cotton knitwear 
firms in Tiruppur, India sold their goods to agents.  These agents gave the small producers 
access to larger markets than would be otherwise accessible to them, but at the same time 
blocked the small firms from having direct access to markets as well as exercising control 
over prices.24   
Many of the clusters have ties to large firms in developed countries.  Some 
German international surgical instrument manufacturers subcontract work to the Sialkot 
cluster firms.25  After trade liberalization and the loss of the guaranteed Soviet market, 
many foreign buyers from U.S. and European retail firms came to Ludhiana (India) to 
purchase wool knitwear.26  The footwear exports of Guadalajara have also been dominated 
by U.S. agents.27 
 
 
Shocks to Cluster Exports 
In recent years, many clusters have experienced export shocks.  In the late 1980s, 
trade liberalization in Mexico had a dramatic impact on the footwear industry.  Imports 
increased from 200,000 pairs of shoes in 1987 to 107 million pairs in 1991, and domestic 
production (in all of Mexico) fell from 245.2 to 199.6 million pairs of shoes.28  The Indian 
clusters at Tiruppur and Ludhiana had to deal with liberalization of the trade regime 
                                                 
23 Bair and Gereffi (2001), pg. 1895. 
 
24 Cawthorne (1995), pg. 50. 
 
25 Nadvi (1999), pg. 1609. 
 
26 Tewari (1999), pg. 1654. 
 
27 Rabellotti (1999), pg. 1578. 
 
28 Rabellotti (1999), pg. 1571. 
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beginning in 1991.  Average tariffs fell from 142 percent to 40 percent on knitwear within 
a few years.  Trade liberalization also affected Agra’s footwear industry.  Agra and 
Ludhiana had an additional challenge in the early 1990s when they lost a large segment of 
their market consisting of exports to the USSR.  Pakistan’s Sialkot surgical instrument 
cluster faced a crisis situation in 1994 when the United States' FDA (Food and Drug 
Administration) restricted imports of surgical instruments from Pakistan because they did 
not meet quality assurance standards (including ISO 9000 certification).  These quality 
assurance standards are intended to ensure the implementation of standardized and 
accountable quality control processes at each stage of the production process, including 
design, development, manufacturing, and distribution.29  Since the late 1980s, the Sinos 
Valley footwear cluster in Brazil has had to deal with changes in the external environment 
that have involved great challenges for the cluster.  One of these challenges has been 
increased global competition from China for U.S. buyers.  In ten years, U.S. footwear 
imports from China grew 17 times their 1987 levels.30  At around the same time, U.S. 
retailers began to place smaller orders to the Sinos Valley firms so that they could 
maintain smaller inventories.  In addition, high inflation in Brazil followed by a currency 
anchor to the U.S. dollar led to a fall in exporters' receipts.31 
 
Cooperation in Clusters 
Cooperation is also an important characteristic of firm clusters.  To illustrate, in 
1994 when the U.S. FDA restricted imports from Pakistan, SIMA, the local business 
                                                 
29 Nadvi (1999), pg. 1606. 
 
30 Schmitz (1998), pg. 11. 
 
31 Schmitz (1998), pg. 11. 
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association in Sialkot, Pakistan, acquired the services of a U.S. quality assurance 
consultancy (with the financial assistance of the government) to give other cluster firms 
the training necessary for obtaining quality assurance certification.  By the end of 1997, 
208 firms were certified as complying with the quality assurance standards, and 153 more 
firms were either undergoing training or awaiting certification from the FDA.32  A major 
attempt at horizontal cooperation was attempted, but failed in the Sinos Valley, Brazil 
cluster.  An initiative called the "Shoes from Brazil Programme" was implemented to 
take action on marketing abroad and in Brazil, reorganize production at the firm level, 
and improve relationships within the supply chain.33   In the Palar Valley, India, two-
thirds of the leather tanneries were operating within four years after the Supreme Court 
issued its order to halt production due to pollution; 80 percent of the tanneries cooperated 
to build and operate common effluent (pollution) treatment plants.  In Guadalajara, 
Mexico, the local trade association successfully lobbied the Mexican government for a 
temporary increase in tariffs when rapid trade liberalization took its toll on the cluster’s 
sales.34  Also in Guadalajara there is a group of exporting firms that exchanges technical 
information, machinery, and technicians, and discusses availability of inputs.35   
                                                 
32 Nadvi (1999), pg. 1610. 
 
33 Schmitz (1998), pg. 31. 
 
34 Rabellotti (1999), pg. 1579. 
 
35 Rabellotti (1999) pg. 1579. 
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1.4 Benefits of Clustering: Passive and Active Collective Efficiency 
The notion that small firms could benefit from clustering is not a new idea.  Alfred 
Marshall recognized that the grouping together of firms involved in related activities 
resulted in positive externalities.36  These positive externalities include various perceived 
benefits from clustering, sometimes referred to as active and passive collective efficiency.  
Passive collective efficiency refers to benefits accruing to a firm by virtue of being in a 
cluster, such as market access, access to a large pool of skilled labor, technological 
spillovers, flexible specialization, reduced transaction costs, and the ability for firms to 
grow in “riskable steps.”  
Each case study article about clusters presents a slightly different list, but the  
"passive" benefits of clustering can be summarized as follows.  Firms in clusters often 
benefit from market access, referring to the fact that clusters often attract the attention of 
buyers, which improves the chances for firms to sell their products.  As a result of the 
large number of firms operating in the same geographical area, firms have access to a 
large pool of (usually skilled) labor.  Technological spillovers may occur because 
technical information can be easily diffused among producers.  Specialization and division 
of the production process by phases leads to flexibility that allows firms to take advantage 
of different economies of scale afforded at different stages of production.  This flexible 
specialization also leads to higher social welfare when firms face idiosyncratic demand 
uncertainty, as described by Kranton and Minehart (2000).  There is also potential for 
                                                 
36 As quoted in Schmitz and Nadvi (1999), pg. 1504. 
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reduced transaction costs within the cluster due to the availability of alternate suppliers, 
repeated interactions between firms, and ease of conveying information on cheaters.  
Other perceived benefits of clustering are that it helps firms to grow in "riskable steps."37  
Since clusters consist of manufacturers as well as suppliers dedicated to the production of 
specialized inputs, a firm starting up within the cluster can start small and focus on a 
particular stage of the production process or produce a single specialized input for other 
firms.38  This significantly reduces start-up costs and lowers barriers to entry from credit 
constraints. 
Active collective efficiency, on the other hand, stems from purposeful cooperation 
between the firms of the cluster and can be further divided into the sub-categories of 
horizontal cooperation (also called joint action) and vertical cooperation.39  Many clusters 
have business associations whose role it is to support the cluster, and these associations 
may have a role in fostering cooperation within the cluster.  Due to the shocks to exports 
faced by many of the clusters, there has been a need for upgrading within the clusters.40  
There are three major ways that individual firms or clusters may upgrade, and the firms’ 
capacity to upgrade is often dependent on their ability to cooperate or engage in active 
collective efficiency.  
First, firms may engage in process upgrading, which consists of reducing costs 
either by re-organizing production or by implementing new technology.  The second type 
of upgrading is referred to as functional upgrading, leading to a greater involvement of 
                                                 
37 Schmitz and Nadvi, pg. 1503. 
 
38 Ibid, pg. 1505. 
 
39 Ibid, pg. 1504-5. 
 
40 Ibid, pg. 1507. 
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manufacturers in the design and marketing process.  The last category of upgrading, 
product upgrading, entails producing more sophisticated (higher value-added) goods.   
 The first type of upgrading, process upgrading, can involve a transformation of 
firms' relationships with their suppliers, which can also be described as “vertical 
cooperation.”  Upgrading may take the form of introducing new production technologies 
(such as new machines) or may be a reorganization of production relationships using the 
same production technology.  Whatever forms the upgrading takes, the desired result is 
generally higher and more reliable quality and shorter delivery times in the processing of 
orders which often come from foreign buyers. 
The second and third type of upgrading may necessitate joint action or "horizontal 
cooperation" between the firms of the cluster.  This is especially true in the case of 
clusters because most of the firms are too small to make the necessary investments to 
carry out the activities of product development, marketing, and retailing individually.  
One must also consider the fact that international buyers are already established members 
of the market structure.  Joint action by the cluster to break into the activities traditionally 
carried out by foreign buyers is likely to be opposed. 
 
 
1.5 Literature Review 
General Literature 
 There is a substantial case study literature on firm clusters in developing countries.  
A long list of these case studies was enumerated in Section 1.3 of the chapter.   
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 The study of clusters is also related to the literature on production networks.  
Kranton and Minehart have made several contributions to the literature on network 
industrial structures.  Their definition of networks is “manufacturers procure specialized 
inputs from suppliers that, in turn, sell to several other manufacturers.”41  Kranton and 
Minehart (2000) present a theoretical model describing the benefits of network 
relationships in terms of capacity sharing.  When firms face large idiosyncratic demand 
shocks, networks lead to higher social surplus.  In this model, manufacturers can choose to 
be vertically integrated by producing a specialized asset themselves, or they can build a 
link to a supplier who can sell to many manufacturers.  Each supplier can only produce 
one specialized input, and once manufacturers' demands have been realized, the highest 
possible gains from trade are obtained.  Since manufacturers have uncertain demand for 
the specialized input, they may regret building capacity to produce their own specialized 
input if they face a negative demand shock.   
 
Case Studies on Active Collective Efficiency 
The majority of the case studies on industrial districts or clusters stress the need for 
joint action to overcome the new commercial pressures that many of the clusters have 
faced due to trade liberalization (Mexico, India), quality or environmental standards 
(Pakistan, Palar Valley India), increased global competition (Brazil), or loss of traditional 
markets (India).42   
In her case study of woolen knitwear in Ludhiana, Tewari attributed the recovery 
of the cluster (after the collapse of the Soviet market) to the cluster’s strong presence in 
                                                 
41 Kranton and Minehart (2000), pg. 1. 
 
42 Schmitz and Nadvi (1999). 
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the domestic market.  The large and medium sized firms created brands of their own for 
the domestic market that were of higher quality than those exported to the Soviet Union.  
This attention to design and quality for the up-scale domestic market made for an easier 
transition to exporting to the developed nations.  In addition, production for the Indian 
domestic market functioned as an insurance mechanism for firms attempting to enter new 
export markets.  Therefore, according to Tewari’s interpretation, the domestic market can 
play an important role as both a learning opportunity as well as an assured market for its 
goods (at least until trade liberalization progresses further).  
Rabellotti (1995, 1999) examined clusters of shoe producers in Mexico.  The first 
study (1995) compared shoe clusters in Guadalajara and Leon to clustered shoe producers 
in Italy.  She found backward linkages (or relationships between manufacturers and their 
suppliers) to be stronger in Italy than in Mexico, but found that forward linkages (into 
marketing and commercialization) were weak in both Mexico and Italy.  Her case study 
also determined that informal relationships took on a greater significance in the Mexican 
clusters than in the clusters in Italy.  In Rabelloti’s second study (1999) she focused on 
the Guadalajara cluster and how inter-firm relationships were affected by trade 
liberalization.  This study found (using subjective survey instruments) that firm 
performance was positively correlated with vertical and horizontal cooperation.  She 
found that approximately half of firms cooperated with their suppliers in matters such as 
information exchange, negotiation of payment and delivery conditions, joint product 
development, quality improvement, and delivery time.43  On the other hand, there was 
evidence that vertical cooperation was still lacking in many respects, despite the 
                                                 
43 Rabellotti, (1999) pg. 1575. 
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pressures of increased competition in international markets.  For example, the survey 
found that manufacturers continued to have delivery problems with suppliers.   
 Schmitz (1995, 1999) investigated issues of cooperation in the Brazilian footwear 
cluster of the Sinos Valley.  The first case study documented the history and growth of the 
cluster from the 1960s to the 1990s.  During this period, the cluster grew from a protected 
infant industry producing for the domestic market into a powerhouse exporter with a 
substantial share of the world market for shoes.44  Export agents, especially from the 
United States, played a large role in the development of the cluster as a major exporter.  
Cooperation among the firms has ebbed and flowed over the last thirty years.  Prior to the 
1970s, trust and cooperation founded in a common social identity (German emigrant 
heritage) was strong.  During the 70s and 80s, this cooperation waned as the cluster 
experienced rapid growth, but then re-emerged in the 1990s.  The second study (1999) 
explored the recent initiatives for cooperation in the Sinos Valley in more detail.  Greater 
cooperation between manufacturers and intermediate input producers improved the quality 
of goods and decreased delivery times and batch sizes of the footwear in response to the 
demands of foreign buyers in the U.S.  A joint action initiative intended to take action on 
marketing abroad and in Brazil failed because the five largest exporting firms (which were 
vertically integrated and had a close relationship with the largest U.S. buyer) defeated the 
plan by exerting their influence in the shoe manufacturer's association, Abicalcados.45 
While these case studies provide descriptions of the clusters and their major 
characteristics, none of them present theoretical models of the interactions that take place 
                                                 
44 Brazil’s exports claimed over 12 percent of the world footwear market, and the Sinos Valley produced 
the majority of these exports. 
 
45 Schmitz (1998), pg. 34. 
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within clusters.  Regressions were performed and correlations calculated in some cases, 
but the samples were generally small and were based on subjective survey instruments.  
For instance, the survey questions in many cases asked firm owners whether or not 
cooperation had increased in the cluster.  While these case studies offer a wealth of 
descriptions and historical accounts of the clusters' progress, a theoretical analysis of 
cluster functioning is necessary in order to aggregate the various experiences of clusters 
into a single framework and understand them collectively.  The purpose of the theoretical 
section of this study (see Chapter Two) is to provide a theoretical framework through 
which the process of intra-cluster cooperation can be better understood. 
 A related area of research is the study of Global Commodity Chains.  Global 
Commodity Chain (GCC) or global value chain analysis46 takes into account the fact that 
the design, production, and marketing of products is a chain of activities that do not 
necessarily occur within the same firm.  While this definition refers to a general 
phenomenon, GCC and global value chain analysis have also been applied to the 
relationships between clusters and foreign buyers.  In some cases, such as the ones 
examined here, the value chain extends across national borders.  Developing country 
clusters are often part of “buyer-driven commodity chains,” as defined by Gereffi.  
According to him: 
Buyer-driven commodity chains refer to those industries in which large retailers, 
marketers, and branded manufacturers play the pivotal roles in setting up 
decentralized production networks in a variety of exporting countries, typically 
located in the third world.  This pattern of trade-led industrialization has become 
common in labor-intensive, consumer goods industries such as garments, footwear, 
toys, housewares, consumer electronics and a variety of handicrafts.  Production is 
generally carried out by tiered networks of third world contractors that make 
finished goods for foreign buyers.  The specifications are supplied by the large 
                                                 
46 Gereffi uses the term "Global Commodity Chain" while Humphrey and Schmitz use the term "global 
value chain". 
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retailers or marketers that order the goods…these companies design and/or market 
– but do not make – the branded products they order.  They are part of a new breed 
of ‘manufacturers without factories’ that separate the physical production of goods 
from the design and marketing stages of the production process.47 
 
The implication in the previous quote is that developed country firms “govern” or 
basically exercise control over the global commodity chain, even in the absence of 
ownership of the stage firms.  The question then arises: Do the buyers (usually from 
developed countries) control the value chain to an extent that inhibits upgrading of the 
cluster into the services of marketing and retailing?  Some of the authors who have written 
about industrial clusters in developing countries have expressed concern that the clustered 
firms producing goods for large multinational firms will become trapped in a subordinate 
role of low value added production while the multinationals that produce the designs and 
do the marketing and retailing will take the majority of the profits.  These questions will 
receive greater attention in Chapter Two. 
 The literature on cluster case studies and the literature on value chain analysis has 
evolved differently.  According to Humphrey and Schmitz (2000), the cluster case studies 
have focused on interactions within the cluster, such as local level governance and 
cooperation, while value chain analysis emphasizes links with the outside world and pays 
less attention to the role of local cooperation between firms.  Chapter Two combines 
elements from both these literatures, presenting a model where links with global buyers 
influence the decision of the cluster firms to cooperate locally. 
 
                                                 
47 Gereffi (1999), pg. 4. 
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Literature on Transaction Costs, Relational Contracting, and Passive Collective 
Efficiency 
  Banerjee and Munshi (2000) present a theoretical model and empirical testing of 
social network-based lending, comparing the investment and earnings profiles of migrants 
and established producers in the Tiruppur knitwear cluster.  They find that the established 
producers belonging the Gounders caste, with access to cheaper informal credit through a 
social lending network, have lower output growth but invest more at all levels of 
experience as compared to the migrants.  The migrants, with less access to informal credit 
networks, invest less even though they have higher ability.   
 Papers by McMillan and Woodruff (1999) and Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff 
(2002) empirically test for the existence of relational contracting in countries where third 
party contract enforcement is either weak or not fully developed, using trade credit as a 
measure of inter-firm trust.  In relational contracting, informal relationships can substitute 
for enforcement through the court system, as was described in the first section of the 
chapter.  Using Tobit analysis, they found in their (1999) study of Vietnam that the 
amount of trade credit given to a customer was positively related to customer “lock-in” 
(the difficulty of the customer finding a new supplier), visits from suppliers, longer 
duration trading relationships, and participation in business networks.  Johnson, 
McMillan, and Woodruff’s (2002) survey of Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Russia, and 
Ukraine also found support for relational contracting.  In addition, the second study 
showed that confidence in the court system made firms more likely to offer trade credit 
and lowered switching costs.  The effect of courts was strongest at the beginning of a 
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trading relationship, demonstrating the role of the judiciary in encouraging firms to try 
new, lower cost suppliers. 
 Woodruff has also studied clustered firms in the Mexican footwear industry.  His 
1998 study summarized the results of surveys conducted in Guadalajara and Leon and 
provided a qualitative analysis of the effect of trade liberalization on contract enforcement 
in the two clusters.  He found that prior to trade liberalization, manufacturers relied on 
reputation mechanisms rather than the courts to enforce agreements with retailers.  Once 
trade liberalization was underway, manufacturers were powerless to use sanctions to 
enforce contracts with retailers because the retailers had access to alternate supplies 
through the world market.  Retailers cancelled orders, causing some of the cluster firms to 
go bankrupt since there was no longer a need for the retailers to maintain a good 
reputation in the cluster.  In this way, trade liberalization weakened relational contracting. 
 
 
1.6 Roadmap of Chapters Two and Three 
The theme that connects the subsequent chapters is cooperation among firms that 
are clustered.  The analysis will focus on two of the benefits from clustering: the ability of 
firms to cooperate in order to upgrade, and the potential for reduced transaction costs.  The 
first, cooperation for upgrading, is an aspect of “active collective efficiency,” while 
reduced transaction costs would be considered a benefit of “passive collective efficiency.” 
Active collective efficiency, as described earlier, entails purposeful cooperation between 
firms in the cluster, while passive collective efficiency comprises the benefits that accrue 
to firms by virtue of being part of a cluster.   
  25 
 
Chapter Two will develop a theoretical model of “joint action” among clustered 
firms.  In the context of this model, joint action takes the form of clustered manufacturers 
sharing the fixed cost of entering into marketing activities in order to directly sell goods to 
customers in a developed country.  Cooperation is needed because the cluster firms are too 
small to pay the high initial investment cost.  One must also consider that the firm from 
the developed country, who would like to buy goods from the cluster and market them in 
the developed country, is likely to oppose efforts of the cluster firms to break into 
activities that it has traditionally carried out.  The model will examine the conditions under 
which clustered firms from a less developed country (that are heterogeneous in expected 
quality of output) can cooperate, or undertake a joint action in order to eliminate a foreign 
company from a developed country acting as an intermediary between the clustered 
manufacturers and the final market for the goods.   
The theoretical model in Chapter Two will prove that joint action can potentially 
occur among high quality firms, but never with the participation of the low quality firms.  
The low quality firms always sell their goods to the foreign intermediary that in turn 
markets their output in the developed country.  The high quality firms do not need to be in 
the majority for joint action to take place, although a critical mass of high quality firms 
must exist as a necessary condition.  Joint action is more likely to take place in larger 
clusters, when the probability of producing high quality by the high quality firms and the 
final market price of the good are high, and when the marketing cost is low.  All clustered 
firms can potentially benefit from the prospect of joint action even if it does not actually 
take place, and regardless of the proportions of high and low quality firms.  Joint action is 
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inefficient due to the fixed cost that the clustered firms must pay to break into the final 
goods market (which does not have to be paid by the established developed country firm).   
In Chapter Three, we use the empirical analysis of a survey conducted of the 
surgical instrument cluster in Sialkot, Pakistan to examine one aspect each of passive and 
active collective efficiency.  In the first part, we study the transaction costs that the 
clustered firms encounter in their dealings with customers and suppliers, which is one 
aspect of passive collective efficiency.  In the second part, we determine which firm and 
cluster characteristics contribute to firms’ interest in intra-cluster cooperation for 
functional upgrading (a form of active collective efficiency) to market their own goods. 
The first part of Chapter Three will examine aspects of relational contracting in the 
context of a cluster and in an institutional environment where third party enforcement is 
weak.  We will utilize the survey instrument developed by McMillan and Woodruff 
(1999) in their study of Vietnam to study mechanisms of contract enforcement in 
Pakistan’s surgical instrument cluster to see under what conditions relational contracting 
can occur in a cluster.48  One of McMillan and Woodruff’s results in Vietnam was that 
firms are more likely to trust customers (and therefore offer trade credit) the more difficult 
it is for that customer to find an alternate supplier, in other words when there is “lock-in.”  
Since clustered manufacturers have numerous alternate suppliers of intermediate inputs, 
we hypothesize that information sharing and network effects are more likely to be 
significant determinants of trust and contract enforcement than customer lock-in when 
firms are clustered.   
                                                 
48 This survey instrument was used in McMillan and Woodruff, “Interfirm Relationships and Informal 
Credit in Vietnam,” Quarterly Journal of Economics (1999) and Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff, “Courts 
and Relational Contracts”  Journal of Law, Economics and Organization (2002). 
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The empirical results in the first part of Chapter Three show that firms are more 
likely to offer trade credit to their customers when firms believe that the judicial system 
can enforce contracts.  In contrast to what we initially hypothesized about clusters, 
customer lock-in plays a role in developing inter-firm trust, since trade credit is positively 
associated with trading relationships of longer duration.  Firms are also more likely to 
offer trade credit to customers when they participate in, and obtain information through 
business networks.  These networks can be used both for information gathering about 
customers and for community enforcement of informal contracts.  On the other hand, if a 
firm is visited by a supplier before the first trade, it is less likely to receive trade credit.  A 
visit from the supplier before the first sale may indicate that the firm’s manager is 
unknown to the supplier and therefore not fully trusted. 
The second part of Chapter Three attempts to determine whether firm level 
characteristics affect the decision of exporting firms to engage in a joint initiative to 
market their own goods.  According to the theoretical model developed in Chapter Two, 
an important determinant of whether this “joint action” occurs is the opportunity cost of 
cooperative marketing, where the opportunity cost is measured as the price that the 
middleman is willing to pay for the cluster’s goods.  We use simple probit and logit 
regressions to determine how firm characteristics affect the decision of a firm to 
participate in a joint marketing initiative.  The dependent variable was based on questions 
in the survey about the exporting firms’ interest in engaging in a hypothetical joint 
marketing initiative.   
The regressions in the second part of Chapter Three on joint action for the 
cluster to market their own goods show that when firms have already had some 
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direct experience in marketing (for example, selling products under their own 
brand name and selling directly to hospitals), they view joint marketing initiatives 
more favorably.  Relationships with customers of longer duration tend to dampen 
firms’ interest in joint action.  This is because the opportunity cost of joint 
marketing is greater, due to the high value current trading relationships. 
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Chapter 2: Cooperation in Developing Country Industrial Clusters: 
Marketing in an Age of Globalization 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In recent years, there has been an increase in interest in clusters of small firms in 
developing countries.  A cluster is defined as a group of firms specialized by sector, 
located in close geographic proximity, and comprised of mostly small and medium sized 
enterprises.49  Many clusters have become major exporters by selling their goods through 
foreign agents to large firms from developed countries who then market the goods to 
consumers in developed countries.  These clusters merit greater attention in view of the 
fact that, despite their small size, they make sizeable contributions to developing 
countries’ economies in terms of employment, output, and exports.50   
The benefits to firms from clustering are sometimes referred to as “collective 
efficiency.”  Passive collective efficiency refers to benefits accruing to a firm by virtue of 
being in a cluster.51  Active collective efficiency, on the other hand, stems from 
                                                 
49 For example, clusters in Sinos Valley (Brazil), Agra (India), and Guadalajara and Leon (Mexico) all 
produce footwear.  Other clusters that have been studied specialize in the production of textiles, leather 
goods, and surgical instruments. 
 
50 Clusters produce a significant amount of output, with a great deal of this output bound for the export 
market. For example, India’s Palar Valley clusters produce 45 percent of the country’s leather, where there 
are at least 600 tanneries in five clusters.  In Tiruppur, India, there were at least 2000 clustered cotton 
knitwear firms in 1995, which produced about 70 percent of India’s exports of this commodity (Banerjee 
and Munshi (2000)).  In Ludhiana, India, there were 10,000 firms and 200,000 workers producing Rs 241 
billion (almost $10 billion in U.S. 1991 dollars) of woolen knitwear in 1991 (Tewari (1999)).  In Agra, 
India, 5000 clustered firms were producing 300,000 pairs of shoes per day in 1991-92 (Knorringa (1999)). 
 
51 The perceived benefits of passive collective efficiency include access to credit, market access, access to a 
large pool of skilled labor, technological spillovers, flexible specialization, and reduced transaction costs. 
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purposeful cooperation between firms to upgrade the cluster’s production by streamlining 
production processes, producing higher value-added goods, or entering into design and 
marketing activities.52   
This chapter focuses on one aspect of active collective efficiency and develops a 
model to examine the conditions under which clustered firms in a less developed country 
may cooperate to carry out a “joint action” initiative to market their output in a developed 
country, rather than sell it through a middleman.  The joint action initiative eliminates the 
role of an intermediary firm in the developed country.  Cooperation among the clustered 
firms is necessary since they are too small individually to make the investments required 
to carry out a successful marketing campaign.  The firms in the cluster are modeled as 
heterogeneous in expected quality of output.  There are two types of firms, high and low 
quality, and the high quality firms have a greater probability of producing high quality 
output than the low quality firms.  In the model, clustered firms know the quality type of 
other firms, but the foreign intermediary does not.  The foreign intermediary, however, 
has a lower marketing cost than the clustered firms.  The main result of the model is that 
joint action can occur among high quality firms, but the low quality firms always use the 
foreign intermediary to distribute their output.  In the equilibrium where the high quality 
firms carry out the joint marketing initiative, the cluster firms receive a larger share of the 
smaller total producer surplus. 
 
Organization of Chapter Two 
Section 2.2 of this chapter discusses some of the economic literature related to the 
                                                 
52 Schmitz and Nadvi (1999), pg. 1504. 
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study of clusters and presents two case studies pertinent to the discussion of joint action.  
Section 2.3 introduces the model’s fundamentals and assumptions.  Section 2.4 describes 
how the model is solved.  In Section 2.5, equilibrium refinements are introduced and 
several propositions are derived.  The welfare implications of joint action are briefly 
discussed in Section 2.6, and conclusions are presented in Section 2.7. 
 
2.2 Literature and Case Studies 
Since we present a model of a large multinational firm potentially buying goods 
from a cluster consisting of many heterogeneous producers, the adverse selection 
framework provides a useful starting point.53  In this context, we assume that the cluster 
maintains a local information advantage about the probability with which each firm in the 
cluster produces high quality output.  However, our model differs somewhat from the 
standard model of adverse selection where there is typically a competitive market with 
many buyers, because our model features a monopsonist purchaser of goods.54 
Most models of vertical control in the industrial organization literature assume 
that an upstream firm (a manufacturer) exerts control over downstream firms 
(wholesalers or retailers) through vertical restraints, such as franchise fees or resale-price 
maintenance.55  The upstream firm’s bargaining power is derived from its ability to set a 
                                                 
53 Information asymmetry about quality was first formalized by Akerlof (1970) in his seminal work on 
market for “lemons.”  Since then, adverse selection has been applied to a variety of economic problems, 
particularly in the study of credit and insurance markets (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Rothschild and Stiglitz 
(1976)). 
 
54 Barriers to entry due to language, culture, government restrictions, information or other fixed costs may 
restrict the number of developed country firms operating in the developing country and purchasing from the 
cluster.  Such barriers to entry or economies of scale make the competitive consumer market consistent 
with profits being made by the developed country retailer. 
 
55 See Rey and Tirole (1986a) and (1986b). 
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“take it or leave it” price.  In our model, the direction of control is reversed, and the 
downstream firm, a large multinational retailer from a developed country, exerts control 
over upstream firms, who are small clustered manufacturers in a less developed 
country.56  
There are also various studies that have focused on the benefits of clustering.  The 
literature on economic geography has focused on the process of agglomeration, where 
low transport costs and economies of scale can lead to geographic concentration of 
manufacturing in equilibrium.57  A substantial case study literature on clusters in 
developing countries has stressed the role of inter-firm cooperation to overcome 
problems that clustered exporters have collectively encountered.58  In addition, some 
have suggested that clustered firms may be able to cooperate in order to “break out” of 
the relationship with foreign buyers and carry out their own design and marketing in 
order to gain a greater share of producer surplus.59,60  The industrial clusters in the Sinos 
Valley (Brazil) and Sialkot (Pakistan) have both attempted joint action initiatives, with 
mixed results: 
                                                 
56  In addition, our model simplifies the final goods market by assuming a fixed price in the retail market, 
eliminating the externalities caused by double (price) marginalization that typically lead to contraction of 
consumer demand in vertical control models (Spengler (1950)).The assumption of a fixed price in the 
consumer market can be justified in the context of this model.  For the goods that clusters typically produce 
(such as shoes and textiles), the consumer market is generally highly competitive.  
 
57 See Krugman (1991) and Krugman and Venables (1995). 
 
58 Problems that clusters have collectively experienced have been due to trade liberalization (Mexico, 
India), quality or environmental standards (Pakistan, Palar Valley India), increased global competition 
(Brazil), or loss of traditional markets (India). 
 
59 See Humphrey and Schmitz (2000), Kaplinsky (2000), Schmitz (1999). 
 
60 A related area of research, called Global Commodity Chain (GCC) analysis, documents “buyer-driven 
commodity chains” where multinationals in developed countries design and market goods produced in third 
world factories (Gereffi (1994)).  
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Sinos Valley, Brazil61: As of 1991, the Sinos Valley shoe cluster (Brazil) consisted of 
more than 1,800 firms and 153,000 employees, which included shoe manufacturers, 
suppliers, marketing firms, and other specialized service firms.  Since the late 1980s, the 
cluster has been faced with increased competition from China for U.S. buyers.  The 
"Shoes from Brazil Programme," a major joint action initiative to improve marketing 
abroad, failed because the largest five exporting firms (that were vertically integrated and 
had a close relationship with the largest U.S. buyer) opposed the plan and undermined it 
by exerting their influence in the shoe manufacturer's association, Abicalcados. 
Sialkot, Pakistan62: A cluster of firms consisting of approximately 220 producers and 
1500 subcontractors in Pakistan produce surgical instruments mainly for foreign markets 
in the United States and Western Europe.  The cluster exported $124 million worth of 
goods in 2000-2001.63  Since doctors and hospitals in the U.S. often purchase disposable 
surgical instrument as “kits,” or packages of surgical instruments that are sterilized and 
specialized for use in particular medical procedures, a new joint action initiative has been 
proposed including a plan for these kits to be produced locally and sold directly to 
hospitals, rather than through a third party.  This is precisely the type of joint action that 
this chapter wishes to examine. 
While many studies have focused on the benefits of clustering, others, such as 
Ilias (2001) and Banerjee and Munshi (2000), have pointed out the distortionary effects 
of social network-based relationships in clusters.64  Although industrial clusters in 
                                                 
61 Schmitz (1995), (1998). 
 
62 Nadvi (1999). 
 
63 SMEDA (2001), pg. 13. 
 
64 Ilias (2001) focuses on the role of family labor in the Sialkot surgical instrument cluster and the 
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developing countries have generated interest as an instrument for promoting employment 
and growth in poor countries, these studies highlight the need to consider both their 
advantages and drawbacks. 
Firm-level characteristics that determine clustered firms’ interest in intra-cluster 
cooperation are empirically examined in Chapter Three, using the responses of firms in 
the Sialkot surgical instrument cluster about a hypothetical “joint action” initiative to 
market their own goods.  The results demonstrate that firms are more likely to be 
interested in such initiatives when: i) they have already had some direct experience in 
marketing, and ii) firms have a lower opportunity cost of leaving their current customers, 
where opportunity cost is measured by the length of the trading relationship. 
 
2.3 Features of the Model 
The “joint action” model presented in this chapter incorporates two key 
assumptions.  First, the cluster firms (or LDC firms) maintain a local information 
advantage about the probability of the individual cluster firms producing high quality.  
Given that many clusters consist of hundreds of producers, this is a reasonable 
assumption.  Second, the developed country firm has an established marketing and 
distribution network through which it can sell the cluster’s output, but it does not have 
                                                                                                                                                 
distortionary effects of the decision to use family versus non-family labor.  He concludes that there exists a 
labor market distortion such that family managers are preferred to non-family and therefore firm output is 
correlated with family size.  Banerjee and Munshi (2000) present a theoretical model and empirical testing 
of social network based lending, comparing the investment and earnings profiles of migrants and 
established producers (a caste called the Gounders) in the Tiruppur knitwear cluster in India.  They find 
that the established producers, with access to cheaper informal credit through a social lending network, 
have lower output growth but invest more at all levels of experience as compared to the migrants.  
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manufacturing capacity of its own.65  We consider a model where the cluster firms must 
decide between selling their output to the developed country firm (or DC firm) or 
marketing their goods themselves, where the DC firm has a cost advantage in marketing.  
Production capacity, consumer demand, and consumer prices are fixed.66   
Information Structure and Timing of the Model 
There will be two types of firms in the cluster, type A or “high quality” firms and 
type B or “low quality” firms.  The numbers of high quality and low quality firms in the 
cluster are fixed and predetermined.  High quality firms have a higher probability of 
producing high quality goods than the low quality firms.  Quality of the output is 
important since only high quality goods can be sold to consumers.  Each LDC firm has 
perfect information about its type as well as the type and output quality of all other firms 
in the cluster.  The DC firm only knows NA  and NB, the numbers of high and low quality 
firms respectively that exist in the cluster.  It cannot distinguish the quality type of 
individual firms and only observes the quality of goods after they have been purchased 
from the cluster. 
The model takes place in three periods.  In the first period, the DC firm announces 
a price, p, that it is willing to pay for the goods from the cluster, and will buy one unit 
                                                 
65 In the case of Torreon (Mexico) a textiles cluster that has experienced a significant expansion since the 
introduction of NAFTA, cluster firms have taken over all parts of the production process except design and 
product development, marketing, and retailing (Bair and Gereffi (2001)).  Almost 100 percent of Sialkot’s 
(Pakistan) surgical instruments exported to Europe and North America as subcontracting work for large 
firms or sold through agents in the U.S.  Towards the late 1980s, about half of Sinos Valley’s (Brazil) shoe 
production was exported, mostly through American export agents.   
 
66 In equilibrium, the least expected profit that a cluster firm can receive is zero, the same that it would earn 
if it did not produce.  Since the firms are risk neutral, it is harmless to assume that each cluster firm always 
produces one unit (full capacity). 
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from each LDC firm that is willing to sell to it at that price.67  Each cluster firm’s 
production capacity is one unit of the good.  Since the DC firm cannot observe the quality 
of the goods until after they have purchased them from the cluster, it must offer the same 
price for the goods of all LDC firms, regardless of the LDC firm’s type.  In the second 
period, each LDC firm simultaneously decides to participate in a joint action initiative by 
paying a share of the total joint action cost, M, or to sell to the DC firm at the price 
announced in the first period.  The cost of joint action, M, is known by all participants.  
Firms participating in the joint action initiative sell their goods directly to consumers in 
the developed country market.68  In the final period, production takes place in the cluster 
and each LDC firm sells its output according to its decision in the second period, either to 
the DC firm (who then sell the goods to consumers in its home market) or directly to 
consumers in the developed country through the joint action initiative.69  In the developed 
country, high quality goods are sold to consumers (either by the DC firm or the LDC 
firms who market their own goods) at a price R  per unit and low quality goods cannot be 
sold.70  Information about the unit cost of production, c, and the price paid by consumers 
                                                 
67 The DC firm exercises a degree of vertical control over the cluster firms since it offers them a “take it or 
leave it” price at which it is willing to purchase the cluster’s output.  There is evidence that this structure 
reflects the relations between clustered firms and their customers.  A case study of the Sinos Valley 
described how there used to be an auction system of taking orders by the foreign buyers (Schmitz (1999)). 
 
68 It is possible that some cluster firms engage in joint action while at the same time others sell their goods 
to the DC firm.  Only those firms participating in the joint action pay a portion of the joint action cost. 
 
69 Since no strategic action takes place in the third period, we can incorporate the payoff functions into the 
second period so that we effectively have a two-period game. 
 
70 The reader may note that with this ordering of the stages, the DC firm commits to a price before 
production takes place in the cluster.  If production took place first, then only the firms that produced low 
quality output would want to sell to the DC firm, leading to market failure similar to the result obtained in 
Akerlof’s (1970) lemons model.  In addition, the DC firm announces its price before the cluster firms make 
a decision about joint action so that the DC firm does not have an opportunity to respond to the cluster’s 
decision for or against joint action.  If the DC firm were given the opportunity to respond with a counter-
offer price (if, for instance the cluster decided to carry out joint action), the results would be very similar to 
those obtained in the present model.   
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of high quality goods, R, is publicly known.  Each cluster firm that sells to the DC firm 
receives p, regardless of the quality of its output.  On the other hand, a cluster firm that 
markets its output through the joint action receives R only if its output is high quality.   
 
The Less Developed Country (LDC)/Cluster Firms 
The cluster consists of N firms.  Each firm in the cluster (also referred to as an 
LDC firm) produces the same good, and has a production capacity of one unit of the 
good.  Firms are risk neutral and maximize expected profit.  There are two types of firms, 
A and B, and they have uncertain quality of output.  Each type of firm can produce two 
levels of quality, V.  Type A or “high quality” firms produce low quality, VLOW, with 
probability Aθ , and type B or “low quality” firms produce low quality with probability 
Bθ  where Aθ < Bθ .71  The number of high quality and low quality firms are fixed before 
any action takes place in the model.  Let j = 1, …, NA denote the high quality firms and k 
= 1, …, NB denote the low quality firms where NA + NB =N.  Then α = NA/N is the 
proportion of high quality firms, and α−1  = NB/N is the proportion of low quality firms 
in the cluster.  Each cluster firm knows its type and the types of all other firms in the 
cluster.  All LDC firms face the same unit cost of production, c.  
In the second stage, the cluster firms simultaneously choose either to sell their 
goods either to a monopsonist buyer from a developed country (the DC firm) at a price, p, 
or pay a fixed cost, M, to engage in “joint action” and market the goods themselves as a 
cooperative, eliminating the DC firm as the middle-man.72  The action space is therefore 
                                                 
71 Type A firms will also be referred to as “high quality firms” and type B as “low quality firms.” We can 
set VLOW=0 without loss of generality. 
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si∈{0, 1} for each cluster firm i=1, …, N, where 0 denotes that the LDC firm sells to the 
DC firm and 1 signifies that the firm participates in the joint action initiative.  Let the 
type A firms’ choice of action in the second stage, given  p announced by the DC firm, be 
defined as sj(p) for j = 1, …, NA  and type B firms’ strategies as sk(p) for k = 1, …, NB.  
The collective decisions of the cluster generate λ (p), the proportion of all cluster firms 
that participate in joint action in response to p.  Then, λ (p)=
N
1

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==
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λ (p) can also be expressed as α Aλ (p) + (1-α ) Bλ (p) where Aλ (p) and Bλ (p) are the 
proportions of type A and type B cluster firms participating in joint action respectively. 
The cost of joint action is modeled as a fixed cost because it represents the large 
up-front investments required to set up a distribution network and marketing campaign.  
Equal division of this cost among the participating cluster firms is appealing from a 
“fairness” perspective since each firm markets one unit of the good.73  Each cluster firm 
is too small to pay the cost of developing a marketing and distribution network itself so 
that 0)1( ≤−−− cMR Aθ ; in other words, it is never profitable for a single cluster firm 
to market its output alone.  We assume that the unit cost of production, c, is always 
positive, and represents the costs of raw materials and labor.74 
Since cluster firms are risk neutral, they maximize their utility by maximizing 
                                                                                                                                                 
72 While it is theoretically possible for there to be multiple joint action initiatives taking place 
simultaneously, we will only allow a single joint action to occur. This assumption simplifies analysis of the 
model and is the most efficient given the strong economies of scale derived from the high fixed cost, M, of 
joint action. 
 
73 Equal division of M also simplifies the solution of the model. However, even if there were an unequal 
division of the cost between the high and low quality firms, it would not change the main results of the 
model such that the DC firm would still always purchase the output of low quality firms in equilibrium. 
 
74 We assume that it is always efficient for all firms to produce so that 0)1( >−− cR Bθ . 
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expected profit.  Profit maximization takes place by weighing the benefits of joint action 
against the opportunity cost of selling to the DC firm.  Each LDC firm would earn 
cpLDCi −=Π , where i=A,B by selling to the DC firm, and by engaging in joint action, 
each firm in expectation would earn E
)(
)1(
pN
McR i
LDC
i λθ −−−=Π  for i=A,B.  Since 
cluster firms receive the actual price at which their output is sold, then with probability 
iθ  each cluster firm receives R – c – )( pN
M
λ   and with probability (1- iθ ) receives – c – 
)( pN
M
λ  since low quality goods cannot be sold.
75  If a firm receives the same expected 
payoff from joint action as selling to the DC firm, we assume that it sells to the DC firm, 
even though cluster firms are risk neutral. 
In order to focus on the most interesting cases, we will limit most of the analysis 
to cases where joint action is potentially profitable for all cluster firms, so that 
c
N
MR B ≥−− )1( θ  (Assumption A).  Later we consider cases where Assumption A fails 
but joint action is still potentially profitable for type A firms.76 
 
The Developed Country (DC) Firm 
The developed country firm (DC firm) has no manufacturing capacity of its own, 
and is strictly specialized in the marketing and retailing of goods.  If an LDC firm sells its 
                                                 
75 Recall that there is perfect information among the cluster firms about the output quality of each firm. 
 
76 Note that Assumption A (that joint action is potentially profitable for all firms) is not a subset of cases 
where joint action is potentially profitable for type A firms.  It can be the case that c
N
M
R B ≥−− )1( θ  even 
though it is not possible for type A firms alone to carry out a joint action initiative, for example when α  is 
small so that 
α
θθ
N
M
R
N
M
R AB −−>−− )1()1( .  
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one unit of output to the DC firm at the announced price, p, the DC firm sells it (if it is 
high quality) in its home country final goods market at a price R, effectively acting as a 
middleman between the cluster and the consumers.  The announced price p ,0[∈ ∞) is 
assumed to be a continuous variable. 
The quality of output produced by the cluster matters for the DC firm if it is buying 
goods from the cluster since only high quality goods can be sold to consumers.  The DC 
firm maximizes its expected profit subject to the constraint that the LDC firms are willing 
to sell their products at the announced price.  We assume that the DC firm, as an 
established player, does not have to pay a marketing cost, M.  This captures the idea that 
it has already built a distribution/marketing network.77  The expected proportion of high 
quality goods that the DC firm purchases from the cluster depends on which LDC cluster 
firms sell to the DC firm at the announced price.78  The DC firm’s problem is: 
[ ][ ]))(1()1))((1)(1()1))((1(max ppppRNE BBAADC
p
λθλαθλα −−−−−+−−=Π   
After the DC firm announces p, all cluster firms simultaneously decide to sell to 
the DC firm or carry out the joint action initiative.  The DC firm’s choice of p can be 
expressed as a function of λ (p) since the DC firm does not know the quality type of 
individual firms and therefore only takes into consideration the expected number of high 
quality goods that it buys from the cluster.  For a given p, the DC firm receives higher 
                                                 
77 The same results of the model would be obtained if instead we supposed that the DC firm has to pay a 
marketing cost, M’, as long as M’<M.  This is because the results of the model depend on the fact the DC 
firm has a cost advantage in marketing and distribution.  It is reasonable to assume that the DC firm’s 
marketing cost would be lower than what the cluster firms pay because it likely has some advantages in its 
home market, such as better information on local market conditions, preferential tax treatment, government 
subsidies, or economies of scale in marketing if it markets goods procured from producers other than the 
cluster.   
 
78 Note that while the DC firm cannot observe the type of individual cluster firms, in equilibrium it will be 
able to determine which type of cluster firm will sell to it. 
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expected profits from type A firms due to their higher expected output quality.  At the 
same time, the type of cluster firm that sells to the DC firm may also depend on the 
announced price.    
 
First Best Outcome 
We define efficiency in terms of the joint profits of the DC firm and the cluster 
firms.  The efficient or first best outcome is maximizes the total surplus, as elaborated in 
Proposition 1. 
Proposition 1:  It is always efficient for the DC firm to market the high quality goods of 
both high (type A) and low (type B) quality firms.  
Given the assumptions on the cost structure, it is efficient for all cluster firms to 
produce.  Production capacity, consumer demand, and consumer prices are fixed.  If the 
LDC firms (or a sub-set) market their own goods, they must pay an entry cost, M, to build 
a distribution network.  The DC firm already has a network through which it can sell the 
cluster’s goods, and does not need to pay the entry cost, making upstream foreclosure 
more efficient (see also Appendix A for a proof).79  Global welfare is higher when the 
DC firm markets all of the cluster’s output.  However, as will be discussed later, joint 
action also affects the division of surplus between the DC firm and the cluster.  We will 
also see how a reduction in efficiency is not necessary in order for the cluster firms to 
share in the total surplus, since the threat of joint action may be sufficient for the cluster 
firms to receive the same expected profits as when joint action actually occurs.  
                                                 
79 Upstream foreclosure is the restriction of buyers’ (in this case, the consumers in the developed country) 
access to other suppliers (the clustered manufacturers).  Tirole (1988) noted that fixed costs of production 
might lead to downstream foreclosure due to efficiency considerations (pg. 193). 
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2.4 Solving the Model 
We now solve this two-stage model where in period one, the DC firm announces 
the price at which it will buy goods from the cluster and in period two, the cluster firms 
decide to sell to the DC firm or engage in joint action.  In the second stage, the cluster 
firms simultaneously decide whether to engage in joint action or sell to the DC firm at the 
price p that is announced by the DC firm in the first stage.  Each possible p that the DC 
firm may announce in the first stage leads to a unique second stage subgame.  The model 
is a dynamic game of imperfect information.  However, since there is no signaling stage 
and no opportunity for the DC firms to update its beliefs about the types of cluster firms, 
we can proceed to solve the game by backwards induction.  
 
Solving the Second Stage 
We restrict the model to the consideration of pure strategies.80 
Lemma 1: For any announced price, p such that p≥ c, there exists at least one pure 
strategy second stage equilibrium where all cluster firms sell to the DC firm. 
To see why Lemma 1 holds, recall that the model assumes that no single 
cluster firm can make positive profits from marketing goods alone.  Therefore, if 
all cluster firms sell to the DC firm, there is no incentive for a single firm in the 
                                                 
80 We should note that the second stage of the game is supermodular even though we will not exploit this 
characteristic of the game.  Supermodular games were first described by Topkis (1979) and economic 
applications were developed by Vives (1990) and Milgrom and Roberts (1990).  In this class of games, 
players’ strategies are strategic complements.  In our model, the payoff to selecting “do joint action” is 
increasing in the number of LDC firms choosing to participate in the joint action initiative (in other words, 
the actions exhibit strategic complementarities) because the fixed cost of marketing their own goods is 
divided equally among all firms participating in the joint action initiative.   
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cluster to deviate from that strategy since it would receive negative profits from 
doing so (see Appendix A, proof of Lemma 1). 
Lemma 2: For any announced price, p such that p≥ c, the second stage game has at 
most three equilibria.  These are: i) all cluster firms sell to the DC firm; ii) all cluster 
firms participate in the joint action initiative; and iii) type A firms carry out the joint 
action initiative and type B firms sell to the DC firm. 
To see why Lemma 2 holds, we begin by noting: i) in any continuation equilibrium, 
all firms of certain quality type will have the same strategy, and ii) joint action cannot 
take place without the participation of type A firms (see Appendix A, Lemmas 2a and 2b 
for proofs).81  Given these restrictions, the three possible equilibria of the second stage of 
the game are those presented in Lemma 2.  The existence of the continuation equilibria 
depend on the parameter values R, M, N, c, Aθ , and Bθ  in addition to the price, p, 
announced by the DC firm in the first stage.82  The first continuation equilibrium, “all sell 
to the DC firm”, was discussed in Lemma 1. 
The outcome in which all firms carry out joint action is always an equilibrium of 
the second stage game provided that the announced price, p, is below a certain threshold.  
Formally, “all do joint action” is a continuation equilibrium for all parameter values and 
for all p such that p<
N
MR B −− )1( θ .    Any firm that deviates from the “do joint action” 
                                                 
81 That all type A firms follow the same strategy and all type B firms follow the same strategy follows from 
the assumptions that only pure strategies are played, that benefits to joint action are increasing in the 
number of participating firms, and that all cluster firms of a certain type have the same profit function.  
Joint action cannot take place without the participation of type A firms because for any strategy where it is 
profitable for type B firms to carry out joint action, then it is also profitable for all type A firms to 
participate in the joint action since )1()1( BA RR θθ −>−  and the cost of joint action is shared equally. 
 
82 All three continuation equilibria do not exist for all parameter values.  The possible second stage 
equilibria for various parameter values are given in Appendix C. 
  44 
 
strategy would earn lower expected profits (see Appendix A, Lemma 2c).   
A third continuation equilibrium exists for some parameter values and for p in the 
range 
α
θ
N
MR A −− )1(  > 1
)1(
+
−−≥
α
θ
N
MRp B .
83  In this case, a separating equilibrium 
is obtained where type A firms engage in joint action and type B firms sell to the DC 
firm.84  The first part of the condition says that it is profitable for type A firms to carry 
out a joint action initiative (with all type A firms participating).  The second part of the 
condition ensures that “sell to the DC firm” is a best response for type B firms; in other 
words if all type B firms sell to the DC firm, there is no incentive for an individual type B 
firm to join type A firms in carrying out joint action.85  
Since there are multiple equilibria in the second stage of the game for 
many values of the announced price p that may be offered in the first stage, we 
will have to specify a selection of a continuation equilibrium for each p.  How this 
second stage equilibrium is chosen will be dealt with in more detail in Section 2.5 
of the chapter through the introduction of a cooperative equilibrium refinement.  
For now, however, we derive results for the first stage that are obtained for any 
selection. 
 
                                                 
83 Note that the second part of the condition requires that Aθ  and Bθ  are not too similar in magnitude. 
 
84 For some parameter values, i.e. for 
1
)1(
+
−−
α
θ
N
MR B > α
θ
N
MR A −− )1( , the third continuation equilibrium 
does not exist. 
 
85 When 
α
θ
N
MR A −− )1(  > 1)1( +−−≥ αθ N
MRp B , it may even be more profitable (in expectation) for type B 
firms to participate in the joint action initiative along with the type A firms if all type B firms were to 
participate.  Even so, it is still a continuation equilibrium for type B firms to sell to the DC firm. 
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Solving the First Stage 
Now, we move to the first stage to find a solution to the whole game.  The 
DC firm always has a single best response (in the first period solved by 
backwards induction) which is determined by the cluster firms’ strategies and the 
parameter values of the particular game.  Given that all firms of the same type 
have the same strategy, λ (p) (the proportion of all cluster firms that participate in 
joint action) summarizes the payoff relevant information for the DC firm. 
In equilibrium, the DC firm knows which continuation equilibrium will be 
realized at each price it might announce in the first stage.86  The DC firm 
maximizes its profits by offering the lowest price necessary to buy goods from the 
LDC firms, given the strategy profiles of the cluster firms.  In this way, the DC 
firm’s choice of p in the first stage depends on the anticipated second stage 
equilibrium corresponding to each p.  
The multiplicity of second stage equilibria, combined with the assumption 
that the announced price is a continuous variable, implies that there is a 
continuum of equilibria in this game.  Despite this multiplicity, and without 
placing any restrictions on the selection of equilibria, we can derive Proposition 2 
regarding the ability of type B firms to engage in joint action.   
Proposition 2: The DC firm always prevents the participation of type B firms in joint 
action.  That is, there does not exist a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium where type B 
firms participate in a joint action initiative.   
                                                 
86 A semi-pooling equilibrium cannot exist where only some of the firms of a certain type sell to the DC 
firm.  Suppose that some type A firms sell to the DC firm while the rest carry out the joint action.  Then the 
DC firm could raise the announced price by a small amount “ε ” and buy from all type A firms.  The same 
argument applies to type B firms. 
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Intuitively, the DC firm will always prevent the participation of type B firms in 
joint action due to the cost advantage that the DC firm maintains since it does not have to 
pay a fixed cost to build a marketing/distribution network.87  The DC firm offers a high 
enough price to purchase the output of type B firms because the DC firm can always 
make positive profits from re-selling type B firms’ goods in the developed country’s 
consumer market.88  The price that the DC firm needs to pay to procure the goods of type 
B firms is less than (or at most equal to) the price needed to buy the goods of type A 
firms, due to type B firms’ lower probability of producing high quality goods.89   
 
 
2.5 Application of Equilibrium Refinements 
  Given that there are multiple equilibria, we examine possible refinements that 
may be used to select an equilibrium of the second stage game, which will allow us to 
solve for a unique equilibrium of the two-stage game.  The idea of applying a cooperative 
refinement is appealing because the objective of this model is to determine the conditions 
under which intra-cluster cooperation can be successful.  This leads us to consider 
Aumann’s strong equilibrium (1959) and Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston’s (1987) 
                                                 
87 The result is robust even if type B firms had to only pay a nominal marketing fee, for example anyε  >0, 
because the DC firm would still have a cost advantage since it does not have to pay any marketing cost.  
 
88 The DC firm receives expected revenues of )1( BR θ−  from each type B firm that it buys from, and the 
most that the DC firm would have to pay to buy goods only from type B firms is p = N
M
R B −− )1( θ . The DC 
firm’s strategy to offer a higher purchase price to the cluster firms in order to deter entry into the retail 
sector is similar in spirit to the limit pricing model where a firm charges a sufficiently low price to 
consumers deter entry of other firms. 
 
89 The expected profit from joint action is always lower for type B firms than for type A firms because of 
their lower probability of producing high quality goods, since cluster firms participating in joint action 
receive R only if they produce high quality.  
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coalition-proof equilibrium.90   
 Aumann’s strong equilibrium (1959) and Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston’s (1987) 
coalition-proof equilibrium propose that an equilibrium be chosen such that no subset of 
players can jointly deviate in a way that increases the payoffs of all members.  Since this 
includes the grand coalition of all players, the selected equilibrium is the unique, payoff 
dominant equilibrium. While they are slightly different concepts, both lead to the same 
result in the joint action model.91  We proceed with the coalition-proof equilibrium, since 
it is a slightly weaker concept than Aumann’s strong equilibrium.   
 
 
Equilibrium Selection in the Second Stage 
Our first result is that the coalition proof equilibrium results in a unique 
continuation equilibrium.  
Lemma 3: For each price, p, the coalition-proof equilibrium refinement results in a 
unique second stage equilibrium.  The selected equilibrium is payoff dominant for the 
cluster firms. 
The coalition-proof equilibrium refinement ensures that the payoff dominant 
                                                 
90 Other possible equilibrium refinements include focal points (Schelling (1960)), the maximin strategy 
(Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953)), correlated equilibria (Aumann (1974) and Myerson (1986)), and 
the global games approach (Carlsson and van Damme (1993) and Morris and Shin (2002)).  Of these, the 
global games approach may be of interest for this game because it has been applied to games characterized 
by multiple equilibria caused by self-fulfilling beliefs, such as speculative currency attacks and bank runs.  
An extension of the joint action model may incorporate the global games approach since the actions “do 
joint action” are strategic complements for the cluster firms, possibly causing them to have self-fulfilling 
beliefs about whether or not joint action will occur. 
 
91 Aumann’s strong equilibrium is a slightly stronger refinement.  In Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston’s 
coalition-proof equilibrium, once a sub-set of players has deviated, they are allowed to deviate again.  (This 
second potential deviation is not permitted in Aumann’s strong equilibrium.)  The “strong equilibrium” and 
the “coalition-proof equilibrium” give equivalent results in this model because if it is more profitable for 
the cluster firms to carry out joint action than to sell to the DC firm, then there is no incentive to deviate 
and sell to the DC firm. 
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equilibrium is chosen in the second stage.92  The selection of the continuation equilibrium 
depends on the announced price, since the coalition-proof equilibrium refinement uses a 
comparison of the announced price to the expected joint action return and selects the 
action leading to the highest expected payoff.  In this way, we know which continuation 
equilibrium will be selected (and which cluster firms will sell to the DC firm) for a given 
announced price.   
The proportion of firms selling to the DC firm increases monotonically with the 
announced price, since type A firms have a higher expected return to joint action than 
type B firms.  If the DC firm announces a low price (i.e. a price that is less than the 
payoff any cluster firm would receive from joint action with all firms participating), then 
the cluster firms cooperatively market their output.  If the DC firm announce a price 
greater than what type B firms would earn from joint action (with all firms participating) 
but less than type A firms’ payoff from joint action (with type A firms only), the third 
continuation equilibrium is selected.93  If the DC firm announces a price that is higher 
than the payoff from joint action, then the DC firm markets all of the cluster’s output.94,95   
                                                 
92 Recall that the three possible continuation equilibria are: i) all cluster firms sell to the DC firm; ii) all 
cluster firms participate in a joint action initiative; and iii) type A firms carry out the joint action initiative 
and type B firms sell to the DC firm.   
 
93 Recall from the earlier discussion of the second stage that the third continuation equilibrium does not 
exist for all parameter values.  We will discuss the implications of non-existence of the third equilibrium 
shortly.  
 
94 The payoff from joint action that the DC firm would exceed in order to purchase all of the cluster’s 
output depends on the parameter values.  If 
α
θ
N
MR A −− )1( < N
MR B −− )1( θ  so that there is no possibility of a 
separating equilibrium where type B firms sell to the DC firm and type A carry out joint action, then the 
highest price the  DC firm must pay to procure all of the cluster’s output is p=
N
MR B −− )1( θ . If, on the other 
hand 
N
MR B −− )1( θ  < α
θ
N
MR A −− )1( , the DC firm must pay p= α
θ
N
MR A −− )1(  to buy from all cluster firms.  
 
  49 
 
 
Solving the First Stage 
Given the selection of the second stage equilibrium defined by the coalition-proof 
equilibrium, the DC firm must offer the LDC firms a price equal to what they would earn 
from joint action if it wishes to procure the cluster’s output.   
The DC firm’s expected profits are decreasing in the price that it offers to the 
cluster and increasing in the type of LDC firm that is willing to sell to it at a given price. 
In the first stage, the DC firm chooses a price to maximize profits given this tradeoff, by 
tailoring the announced price accordingly in the first stage.   
The following two propositions give a full characterization of the game for 
different values of the game parameters  R, M, N, Aθ , and Bθ  (see also Appendix B).  We 
assume for Propositions 3 and 4 that Assumption A holds.  In order to make the analysis 
more tractable, we will divide the game parameters into two regions.  In Region I, 
α
θ
N
MR A −− )1( ≤  N
MR B −− )1( θ , so that there cannot be a separating equilibrium 
where the DC firm buys from type B firms only.  This can happen, for example, when the 
proportion of high quality firms in the cluster,α , is very small so that joint action with 
the participation of only type A firms is not profitable.  All other parameter values fall 
into Region II, so that 
N
MR B −− )1( θ  < α
θ
N
MR A −− )1( .   
Proposition 3: For all game parameters in Region I, there exists a unique subgame 
                                                                                                                                                 
95 Another way to state these results is as follows.  Whenever the continuation equilibrium, “all do joint 
action” exists, it is payoff dominant (and therefore chosen).  “All sell to DC firm” is only selected if it is the 
only continuation equilibrium.  If the parameter values and announced price are such that only the first and 
third continuation equilibria exist, the third is chosen so that type A firms carry out joint action and type B 
firms sell to the DC firm. 
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perfect Nash equilibrium where the DC firm offers p=
N
MR B −− )1( θ  and markets all 
of the cluster’s output.  
Since there is no p that leads to the third continuation equilibrium, the DC firm 
can effectively choose to buy from all or none of the cluster firms.  Its profit maximizing 
strategy is to announce the minimum price necessary to purchase the cluster’s output.96   
In Region II, on the other hand, the DC firm can effectively choose to buy from 
all cluster firms, from type B only, or from none of the cluster firms, depending on the 
announced price.97  In order to procure the higher average quality goods from type A 
firms, the DC firm must pay the highest price (p=
α
θ
N
MR A −− )1( ) to all cluster firms to 
compensate for the higher opportunity cost of the type A firms.  The DC firm’s choice of 
p in Region II requires further specification of the parameter values, as formalized in 
Proposition 4.   
 Proposition 4: For game parameters in Region II and  
3
1
)(
<
− ABNR
M
θθ
, the 
coalition-proof equilibrium refinement results in a unique subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium where for ),( 21 ααα ∈  the high quality firms market their own goods and 
                                                 
96 If the DC firm offers p<
N
MR B −− )1( θ , all firms carry out joint action, and if p≥ N
MR B −− )1( θ , all cluster 
firms sell to the DC firm. 
 
97 If the DC firm offers p<
N
MR B −− )1( θ , all firms carry out joint action.  If N
MR B −− )1( θ  ≤ p< αθ N
MR A −− )1( , 
type B firms sell to the DC firm and type A firms carry out joint action.  If p≥
α
θ
N
MR A −− )1( , all cluster 
firms sell to the DC firm. 
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the DC firm procures the goods of the low quality firms at price p=
N
MR B −− )1( θ .98  
For all other game parameters in Region II, that is, for i) 
3
1
)(
≥
− ABNR
M
θθ
or  ii) 
3
1
)(
<
− ABNR
M
θθ
 and ),( 21 ααα ∉ , the DC firm buys all of the cluster’s output at 
p=
α
θ
N
MR A −− )1( .   
The DC firm faces a price-quality trade-off because it can either announce a low 
price and buy only from type B firms or it can offer a high price and procure all of the 
cluster’s goods.  The intuition underlying Proposition 4 is that for some parameter values, 
the losses accruing to the DC firm as a result of paying the high price (required to procure 
type A’s output) to type B firms is not made up by the higher expected quality from type 
A firms.  Therefore, the DC firm does not always market the goods of type A firms, even 
when it can earn positive profits from doing so.99   
In the next sub-section, we see how small changes in the parameter values 
                                                 
98 
[ ] ( )[ ]
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±=
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2
)(
2
1
2,1
θθ
θθθθ
α .  Note that since 1α < 2
1 , the high quality firms do not 
need to be in the majority for them to carry out a joint action initiative.   
 
99  Within Region II, a sub-region exists where the DC firm would receive negative profits if it paid type A 
firms what they would earn from joint action.  Call this Region III.  It exists for game parameters such that 
0))(1( >−−−
α
θθα
N
MR AB .  In Region III, the DC firm only markets the goods of type B firms.  We can re-
write the condition for Region III to exist as: 
)( ABNR
M
θθ −
<
4
1  and ),( 43 ααα ∈  , where 
( )
)]([2
)]([4)]([
2
1
2
4,3
AB
ABAB
R
R
N
MR
θθ
θθθθ
α
−
−−−
±= .  Since the interval ),( 21 ααα∈  from Proposition 4 defining when 
the DC firm chooses to buy only the goods of type B firms is larger than the interval ),( 43 ααα ∈ , we can 
infer that the DC firm does not market type A’s goods for all parameters where it can earn positive profits. 
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alter the equilibrium strategies in the game, using the solution given in 
Proposition 4.  This will tell us under what conditions joint action can occur.   
 
Comparative Statics for Proposition 4 
We now analyze how the values of α  (described in Proposition 4) depend on the 
exogenous parameter values R, N, or ( Aθ−1 ), M, and ( Bθ−1 ).100  Increasing R, N, or 
( Aθ−1 ) or decreasing M or ( Bθ−1 ) relaxes the equilibrium constraint so that joint action 
takes place with the participation of type A firms for more values of α .101  Since the 
realization of joint action reduces total surplus, then changes in the parameters leading to 
joint action can be associated with a reduction in efficiency.   
Increasing the probability of producing high quality by type A firms ( Aθ−1 ) or 
increasing the retail margin, R, increases both the benefits and costs to the DC firm of 
buying from all cluster firms.  However, the net effect is that changes in either make type 
A firms less desirable to the DC firm as suppliers.  Even though buying from type A 
firms raises the average quality of the goods that the DC firm purchases, the DC firm 
pays a higher price not just to the type A firms, but to all cluster firms due its inability to 
distinguish type A and B firms ex ante.  In other words, the information effect (negative) 
                                                 
100 Technically, α  (the proportion of high quality firms) cannot take every value between 0 and 1, since the 
size of the cluster, N, is finite.  However, if the cluster is large, then we can effectively treat α  as a 
continuous variable. 
 
101 In other words, for parameter values such that the DC firm is indifferent between buying from all cluster 
firms (announcing p=
α
θ
N
MR A −− )1( ) and buying only type B’s output (announcing  p= N
MR B −− )1( θ ), the 
DC firm offers the lower price and buys from type B firms only if there is an increase in R, N, or ( Aθ−1 ), 
or a decrease in M or ( Bθ−1 ). The DC firm is indifferent when 3
1
)(
<
− ABNR
M
θθ
 and 1αα =  or 2αα = . 
We assume that the DC firm offers the higher price and buys from all firms at indifference points. 
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dominates the productivity effect (positive) through the impact on equilibrium prices. 
Changes in M and N affect the per firm cost of joint action.  Since each type A 
firm has to pay at least
αN
M to carry out a joint action initiative, then changes in M or N 
that reduce the required contribution per firm for joint action (such as increasing the 
number of firms, N, and/or reducing the total cost of joint action, M), increases the 
potential benefits of joint action to type A firms and therefore raises the price that the DC 
firm would have to pay all firms if it decided to buy from both firm types.  
Ceteris paribus, a decrease in ( Bθ−1 ), the probability that type B firms produce 
high quality, reduces the price that the DC firm has to pay to type B firms if it buys only 
from them.  At the same time it makes the high price demanded by the type A firms less 
palatable since the DC firm must also pay the higher price to type B firms in return for 
lower expected quality. 
 
Relaxing Assumption A 
Next, we briefly explore the possibility of joint action occurring when 
Assumption A fails, so that it is potentially profitable for type A firms to carry out joint 
action alone, but is not profitable for type B firms to participate in a joint action initiative 
even with the participation of all firms.  That is, we consider parameters such that 
c
N
MR B <−− )1( θ , but cN
MR A ≥−− α
θ )1( .  Similar to the discussion for Proposition 4, 
the DC firm has to pay a higher price to all cluster firms to compensate for the higher 
opportunity cost of type A firms in order to buy from all cluster firms rather than type B 
firms only.  Proposition 5 specifies the parameter values for which the DC firm chooses 
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to buy from all cluster firms or from the low quality firms only. 
Proposition 5: When joint action is potentially profitable only for the high quality 
firms, then for values of game parameters s.t. [ ]cRN
M
A −− )1( θ
<
4
1 the coalition-proof 
equilibrium refinement results in a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium where 
for α ∈ ),( 65 αα  the high quality firms market their own goods and the DC firm 
procures the goods of the low quality firms at price p=c.102  For all other game 
parameters, that is, for i)  [ ]cRN
M
A −− )1( θ
≥
4
1 ; or ii) [ ]cRN
M
A −− )1( θ
<
4
1 and 
α ∉ ),( 65 αα , the DC firm buys all of the cluster’s output at price p= α
θ
N
MR A −− )1( . 
The intuition is very similar to that described under Proposition 4, since the DC 
firm again faces a price-quality trade-off because it can either announce a low price and 
buy only from type B firms or it can offer a high price and procure all of the cluster’s 
goods.  The major difference from the results in Proposition 4 is that since type B firms 
would not participate in a joint action initiative under any conditions when Assumption A 
fails, the DC firm only has to pay the unit cost of production, c, in order to secure the 
output of type B firms.   
 
Comparative Statics for Proposition 5 
We now analyze how the values of α  (described in Proposition 5) depend on the 
exogenous parameter values R, N, or ( Aθ−1 ), M, and ( Bθ−1 ).  Increasing R, N, or 
                                                 
102 
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α . Note that since 5α < 2
1 , the high quality firms do not need 
to be in the majority for them to carry out a joint action initiative. 
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( Aθ−1 ) or decreasing M or ( Bθ−1 ) relaxes the equilibrium constraint so that joint action 
takes place with the participation of type A firms for more values of α .103  These 
conditions are similar to those discussed in the comparative statics section of Proposition 
4 (where Assumption A held), except that ( Bθ−1 ) is replaced here with the unit cost, c.  
The intuition for changes in R, N, ( Aθ−1 ), and M is identical to the discussion 
accompanying Proposition 4.  A small reduction in the unit production cost, c, to the 
extent that it does not make joint action potentially profitable for type B firms, would 
cause the DC firm to allow type A joint action by reducing the price that the DC firm 
pays type B firms if it only buys from them.104  Since the realization of joint action 
reduces total surplus, then changes in the parameters leading to joint action can be 
associated with a reduction in efficiency.   
 
 
2.6 Welfare Analysis 
In this section, we discuss the welfare implications of joint action.  Efficiency 
requires that the DC firm markets the goods of all cluster firms, as demonstrated in 
Proposition 1.  In this section, we return to Assumption A so that joint action is 
                                                 
103 For parameter values such that the DC firm is indifferent between buying from all cluster firms and only 
buying from type B firms, the DC firm will offer the lower price and only buy from type B firms if there is 
an increase in R, N, or ( Aθ−1 ), or a decrease in M or c.  The DC firm is indifferent between buying from 
all cluster firms and only buying from type B firms when [ ]cRN
M
A −− )1( θ
<
4
1  and α = 5α or α = 6α . We 
assume that the DC firm offers the higher price and buys from all firms at indifference points. 
 
104 Under Assumption A, the price that the DC firm pays type B firms (if it only buys from them) depends 
on their joint action payoff (which depends on ( Bθ−1 )).  However, when Assumption A fails so that joint 
action would yield negative profits for type B firms, the DC firm only pays them c for their output if it only 
buys from type B.   
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potentially profitable for all cluster firms.   
Here, we determine changes in welfare by comparing what the cluster firms earn 
when the coalition-proof equilibrium is applied to the joint action model versus what the 
cluster firms earn when participation in joint action is not an option, i.e. examining the 
altered game where choosing joint action is not part of the cluster firms’ action space.  In 
order to do this, we establish the equilibrium of the game where there is no possibility of 
joint action in Proposition 6.   
Proposition 6: In the game where joint action is not a member of the cluster firms’ 
action space, there exists a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium where the DC 
firm offers p=c and markets all of the cluster’s output.  
 If joint action is not part of the cluster firms’ action space, then they can choose to 
produce and sell to the DC firm or not produce.  We assume that a cluster firm will sell to 
the DC firm when it is indifferent between selling to the DC firm and not producing.  
Since the cluster firms have no alternative avenue through which it can sell its goods, the 
DC firm only needs to offer a price equal to the unit cost of production, c, in order to 
purchase all of the cluster’s output.  In this equilibrium, the DC firm receives the entire 
expected surplus, or =ΠDCE  [ ] NcNR BA −−−+− )1)(1()1( θαθα  and the cluster firms 
receive zero profits.  The division of profits obtained in the game without joint action is 
equivalent to the profits received by each firm in the original joint action model if the 
parameter values were such that joint action was not profitable for any coalition of cluster 
firms, in other words 0)1( <−−− c
N
MR Aθ .  In Corollary 1, we compare this outcome to 
that obtained under Assumption A and the application of the coalition-proof equilibrium 
refinement.   
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Corollary 1:  Under Assumption A, the coalition-proof equilibrium refinement  
results in weakly higher expected profits for all cluster firms than if joint action was 
not possible. 
The cluster firms are always better off simply whenever the option of joint action 
exists as a potentially profitable alternative to selling their goods to the DC firm and the 
coalition-proof equilibrium refinement is applied to select equilibrium strategies in the 
second stage, even though type B firms never engage in joint action and type A firms 
only carry out joint action for limited values of the game parameters.  The intuition is 
simple; under the coalition-proof equilibrium refinement, the cluster firms carry out joint 
action if the announced price is less than the joint action payoff.  The threat of joint 
action leads the DC firm to offer a price equal to the joint action payoff, leading to a 
redistribution of surplus compared to the game where joint action is not in the cluster 
firms’ action space. 
In Region II, each type A firm earns expected profits of 
α
θ
N
MR A −− )1(  – c, the 
payoff from joint action with the participation of type A firms, regardless of whether joint 
action takes place or not.  However, type A firms only receive 
N
MR B −− )1( θ  - c in 
Region I.  Type B earn 
N
MR B −− )1( θ  - c, the payoff from joint action with the 
participation of all firms in Region I.  In Region II type B firms can earn as much as 
α
θ
N
MR A −− )1(  – c if the DC firm offers the price necessary to stop type A firms from 
carrying out joint action.  Otherwise, they receive the same payoff as Region I (also see 
Appendix D). 
  58 
 
 It is not necessary that global surplus be reduced for the cluster firms to receive a 
higher share of the profits.  In Region I and for some parameter values in Region II (such 
that the DC firm purchases all of the cluster’s output - see Proposition 4), the first best 
outcome is achieved and the cluster firms receive a larger share of the surplus than the 
game where joint action is not part of the action space.105  For parameter values in Region 
II such that type A firms carry out joint action, the cluster firms also receive a higher 
surplus than if joint action were not possible, but with an efficiency cost such that total 
surplus is reduced.   
 If Assumption A fails, but joint action is still potentially profitable for type A 
firms, then only type A firms benefit from the possibility of joint action when comparing 
the outcome of the joint action model to the profits obtained in the model where joint 
action is not in the cluster firms’ action space.  In this case, type B firms would earn zero 
profits.  Similar to the results under Assumption A, efficiency may or may not be affected 
by the possibility of joint action.  For parameter values such that the DC firm purchases 
all of the cluster’s output (see Proposition 5), the first best outcome is achieved, but for 
parameter values such that joint action takes place, total surplus is reduced.  See 
Appendix D for details of the welfare implications when Assumption A fails. 
 
2.7 Conclusions 
The model has provided several results relating to joint action and the viability of 
breaking into the functions of marketing by a cluster of small firms when the final goods 
                                                 
105 This result assumes that the coalition-proof equilibrium refinement is applied and Assumption A holds. 
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market is dominated by an established multinational firm.  We have proved that joint 
marketing by the cluster may exclude low quality producers, and that it cannot take place 
without the participation of high quality firms.  In this sense, successful joint action 
initiatives may be associated with high quality output.  This may shed some light on the 
failure of joint action in the Sinos Valley (Brazil), where the largest firms with close ties 
to U.S. multinationals opposed the initiative.106  In order to bypass the middle-man, firms 
in industrial clusters may need to focus on improving the quality of their output.  
However, even without venturing into marketing, clustered firms may still be able to 
increase their profits through improvements in product quality.   
We have also seen that even in a model where joint marketing is inefficient, 
cluster firms can benefit when joint action exists as a potentially profitable alternative to 
selling to the DC firm (compared to the outcome when joint action is not part of the 
firms’ action space).  It is not necessary for joint marketing to take place for the cluster to 
receive a share a total surplus, since the DC firm may preempt joint action through the 
price it offers.  On the other hand, there are parameter values for which the DC firm is not 
willing to offer the cluster firms the equivalent of their joint action profits, and joint 
action (the inefficient outcome) occurs.  Under these circumstances, a trade-off may exist 
between efficiency and the cluster’s welfare.   
 
Extensions and Future Research 
We use the predictions of the comparative static exercises to expand on ideas for 
further research.  Recall that under Assumption A, increasing R, N, or ( Aθ−1 ) or 
                                                 
106 The largest firms in the Sinos Valley are more vertically integrated, which is correlated with having 
greater control over quality.  See Schmitz (1999) for details. 
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decreasing M or ( Bθ−1 ) relaxes the equilibrium constraint so that joint action takes place 
among the high quality firms for more values of α .  The propensity of clusters to 
undertake joint action might change over time due to changes in these parameter values. 
The high quality firms may therefore increase their chances of a successful joint 
action through the adoption of technologies that reduce the probability of low quality 
output.107  Also, new technologies (such as the internet) leading to an exogenous decrease 
in the cost of marketing, M, may make it more likely that clusters market their output 
without a middleman.   
Since, according to the existing model, increasing the size of the cluster (N) has 
beneficial effects by way of decreasing the per firm cost of a joint action initiative, 
existing firms should not erect barriers to entry.  This assumes, however, that the fixed 
cost (M) of joint action does not increase with the size of the cluster.  If instead the cost 
of joint action rises with the size of the cluster (for example, due to free-riding), this issue 
may require further investigation.   
Future research may attempt to incorporate some of the ideas above, in addition to 
considering how results would change if as mentioned previously, the Global Games 
approach is applied as an equilibrium selection device in place of the coalition-proof 
equilibrium refinement.     
                                                 
107 Increasing the probability of producing high quality output by type A firms, under the coalition-proof 
equilibrium refinement, would increase the price that the DC firm must pay to all cluster firms if it procures 
all of the cluster’s output.  Even though buying from type A firms raises the average quality of the goods 
that the DC firm purchases, the DC firm pays a higher price not just to the type A firms, but to all cluster 
firms due its inability to distinguish type A and B firms ex ante.  If the probability of producing high 
quality by type B firms does not increase at the same rate as for type A firms, then paying this higher price 
for the output of the type B firms becomes unattractive to the DC firm.  The losses accruing to the DC firm 
as a result of paying the high price (required to procure type A’s output) to type B firms would not made up 
by the higher expected quality from type A firms and the DC firm would choose to buy from type B firms 
only, allowing joint action taking place among type A firms. 
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Chapter 3: Intra-Cluster Cooperation and Relational Contracting in 
Pakistan’s Surgical Instrument Cluster: An Empirical Study 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Industrial clusters have been viewed as important in developing countries because 
they make sizeable contributions to their economies in terms of employment, output, and 
exports.108  An industrial cluster consists of a group of firms that are specialized by 
sector, located in close geographic proximity and consist of mostly small and medium 
sized enterprises.109  The benefits to firms from clustering are commonly referred to as 
active and passive collective efficiency.  Passive collective efficiency refers to benefits 
accruing to a firm by virtue of being in a cluster, such as market access, access to a large 
pool of skilled labor, technological spillovers, flexible specialization, and reduced 
transaction costs.  Active collective efficiency, on the other hand, stems from purposeful 
cooperation between the firms of the cluster to undertake a large-scale project to upgrade 
production.  The above mentioned upgrading may take the form of process upgrading, 
which consists of reducing costs either by re-organizing production or by implementing 
                                                 
108 Clusters produce a significant amount of output, with a great deal of this output bound for the export 
market. For example, India’s Palar Valley clusters produce forty-five percent of the country’s leather, 
where there are at least 600 tanneries in five clusters.  In Tiruppur, India, there were at least 2000 clustered 
cotton knitwear firms in 1995, which produced about 70 percent of India’s exports of this commodity 
(Banerjee and Munshi (2000)).  In Ludhiana, India, there were 10,000 firms and 200,000 workers 
producing Rs 241 billion (almost $10 billion in U.S. 1991 dollars) of woolen knitwear in 1991 (Tewari 
(1999)).  In Agra, India, 5000 clustered firms were producing 300,000 pairs of shoes per day in 1991-92 
(Knorringa (1999)). 
 
109 For example, clusters in Sinos Valley (Brazil), Agra (India), and Guadalajara and Leon (Mexico) all 
produce footwear.  Other clusters that have been studied specialize in the production of textiles, leather 
goods, and surgical instruments. 
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new technology, functional upgrading, leading to a greater involvement of 
(manufacturing) firms in the design and marketing process, or product upgrading that 
entails producing more sophisticated (higher value-added) goods.110  Cooperation is 
necessary because the individual firms are too small to carry out such a project.   
This chapter empirically examines the nature of cooperative relationships formed 
between clustered firms.  Two key aspects of collective efficiency, one passive and one 
active, are evaluated by empirically analyzing the surgical instrument cluster in Sialkot, 
Pakistan.  In the first part, we study one aspect of passive collective efficiency: the 
transaction costs the clustered firms encounter in their dealings with customers and 
suppliers.  Specifically, we test the hypothesis that relational contracting affects the 
amount of trust between firms, where trust is measured by the receipt of trade credit by 
customers from their suppliers.  The firms receiving trade credit are either members of 
the cluster or firms that interact frequently with it.  In the second part, we determine 
which firm and cluster characteristics contribute to firms’ interest in intra-cluster 
cooperation to engage in functional upgrading or “joint action” to market their own 
goods, a form of active collective efficiency.   
The main objectives of this study are to analyze the role of contract enforcement 
institutions in developing countries and the position of developing country producers in 
global supply chains, two major topics of interest in development economics today.  In 
the first part of the study, we focus on relational contracting in Pakistan’s surgical 
instrument cluster in order to deepen our understanding of contract enforcement in 
closely-knit communities in developing countries.   
In the second part of the study, we examine the opportunities for clustered 
                                                 
110 Schmitz and Nadvi (1999), pg. 1504. 
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surgical instrument producers in Pakistan to market their own goods.  Most firms in 
developing country industrial clusters are small and medium size enterprises that 
individually have limited access to markets in developed countries and often rely on 
multinational firms to distribute and market their goods.  This is the case in Sialkot’s 
surgical goods industry, as in other industrial clusters.  These clusters may provide an 
opportunity for small and medium sized firms to assert their interests and collectively 
promote their goods in the world market.  The second part of the study includes 
regressions to determine which factors influence the decision of exporting firms in the 
Sialkot surgical instrument cluster to engage in a hypothetical “joint action” initiative that 
would allow them to market their own goods.  This analysis will help to shed light on the 
ability of other, similar clusters to undertake initiatives of this type.   
Before proceeding further, it is important to discuss the theoretical foundations of 
relational contracting and joint action.  These discussions will provide an overview of 
these two topics and define the hypothesized predictions that we will test empirically in 
later sections.   
The importance of institutions, especially contract enforcement, has been well 
established in both theoretical and empirical economic literature.  The absence of strong 
institutions has been recognized as a major constraint to economic growth in developing 
countries.  As Douglass North argues in his seminal work on institutions:  
…the inability of societies to develop effective, low-cost enforcement of contracts 
is the most important source of both historical stagnation and contemporary 
underdevelopment in the Third World.111 
 
 Research has shown that in the absence of an effective legal system or formal 
system of contract enforcement, individuals and firms must rely on informal means to 
                                                 
111 North (1990), pg. 54. 
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enforce agreements.  In many cases, bilateral relationships or third-party social pressure 
may either substitute for, or complement, a legal system in the enforcement of contracts.  
This type of informal enforcement of contracts is referred to as relational contracting.  
Relational contracts are “informal agreements sustained by the value of future 
relationships”.112  The methods of informal enforcement have been laid out in the New 
Institutional Economics literature and consist of the agents’ ability to sanction individuals 
who have reneged on their agreements without relying on the legal system.113   
North (1990) presented three major methods that can be used to informally 
enforce agreements.  One method is for an agent to deal only with those who are known 
to them and can be trusted, so that trading partners are most likely to be friends and 
family members.  Another approach is to develop self-enforcing agreements by dealing 
with the same agent repeatedly over an extended period of time, using the threat of 
breaking off the profitable trading relationship as a means to prevent the other party from 
cheating.114  Finally, informal enforcement can also be carried out through community 
enforcement.  In this situation, when an agent reneges on an agreement, all members of 
the community sanction this individual by refusing to trade with that agent.  To be 
effective, community enforcement has two major requirements, i) that knowledge about 
                                                 
112 See Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (2002). 
 
113 See Macauley (1963), North (1990), Greif (1994), Kranton (1996).  Kranton (1996) studied a theoretical 
model of reciprocal exchange, where the value of long term relationships can support barter between two 
trading partners, and found that reciprocal exchange relationships can dominate in an economy even when 
they are a less efficient mode of exchange.  Greif (1994) explored the path dependence of contract 
enforcement institutions by examining the difference between the eleventh-century trading practices of 
Genoese and Maghribi traders and distinguished between the individualist and collectivist enforcement 
systems that were the precursors to modern-day institutions.  The collectivist system, characteristic of 
contract enforcement institutions in developing countries today, relied strongly on community enforcement 
mechanisms and social sanctions. 
 
114 Self-enforcing agreements may be characterized by high search costs and/or high transport costs to buy 
from alternate suppliers.  A firm must be able to identify their trading partners (i.e. know who they are 
trading with at the time of the trade) and be able to determine if a trading partner has cheated. 
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cheaters is diffused through the community, and ii) that other members of the community 
are willing to refuse to trade with a known cheater.  Community enforcement is therefore 
often limited to a specific geographic area and/or to agents of a common cultural or social 
background.  
In practice, informal enforcement is carried out through a combination of the 
three methods described above: trust, repeated interaction, and community enforcement.  
The combination used in practice depends on the environment in which the parties are 
contracting.  The particular characteristics of clusters may make some contract 
enforcement mechanisms more effective than others.  For instance, since all firms 
produce similar goods, the threat of an individual intermediate input supplier breaking off 
a trading relationship with a manufacturer (customer) is unlikely to prevent cheating 
unless there is community enforcement due the multiplicity of similar suppliers.  
Therefore we hypothesize that community enforcement is likely to be stronger force than 
sanction by an individual firm in a cluster.   
An analysis of the second major topic of intra-cluster cooperation was presented 
in Chapter Two, which developed a theoretical model of “joint action” for clustered firms 
to market their own goods.  It examined the conditions under which clustered firms from 
a developing country that are heterogeneous in expected quality of output can 
functionally upgrade through cooperation to eliminate a foreign distributor from a 
developed country acting as an intermediary between the clustered manufacturers and the 
final market for the goods.115  The model proved that joint action can occur among high 
quality type firms, but not with the participation of low quality firms.  The model also 
showed that joint action is more likely to take place when i) the size of the cluster, the 
                                                 
115 There were two types of firms in the cluster: type A or “high quality” and type B or “low quality”. 
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probability of producing high quality output by the high type firms, and the final market 
price of the good are high, and ii) when the probability of producing high quality output 
by the low type firms and the marketing cost are low.  The high quality firms do not need 
to be in the majority for joint action to take place, although a critical mass of high quality 
firms must exist as a necessary condition.  An important determinant of whether joint 
action occurs is the opportunity cost of such initiatives, as determined by the prices that 
the middleman is willing to pay for the cluster’s goods. 
As we have discussed in this section, the two main themes related to collective 
efficiency in this study are transaction costs originating from contract enforcement and 
the prospect of joint action for clustered firms to market their own goods.  Our two main 
research questions and summary results appear below. 
1) What factors influence the amount of trust (associated with informal contract 
enforcement or relational contracting) between the clustered firms and their 
customers?  Similarly, what factors influence the amount of trust that exists between 
clustered manufacturers and their intermediate input suppliers?  
Our results show that firms are more likely to offer trade credit to their customers, 
(i.e. inter-firm trust is greater) when they believe in the effectiveness of formal contract 
enforcement through the court system.  There is also some evidence of customer lock-in 
as a tool for contract enforcement since suppliers are more likely to give credit and allow 
customers to pay a larger portion of their bill with delay when relationships are of longer 
duration.  This is because locked-in customers are less able to find alternate suppliers.  
Participation in business networks (that can be used to gather information about 
reliability and/or for social sanction) is also an effective tool in that suppliers that obtain 
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information about customers through business networks are more likely to offer trade 
credit and allow customers to pay a larger portion of their bill with delay.  Additionally, 
customers are less likely to receive credit when they are visited by suppliers before the 
first sale.  If a customer receives a visit from the supplier before the first sale, this may 
indicate that it is a previously unknown trading partner, and therefore not fully trusted.  
On the other hand, customers that visit their suppliers weekly are more likely to receive 
trade credit.  These visits may assist the suppliers in gathering information about the 
reliability of the firms as well as to monitor informal contracts. 
2) Under what conditions might clustered surgical instrument firms band together and 
form a cooperative to “break out” of their relationship with multinational buyers to 
market their own goods?  
Our results demonstrate that firms are more likely to be interested in such 
initiatives once they have already had some direct experience in marketing, such as 
selling products under their own brand name and having already sold some goods directly 
to hospitals.  Firms that have had relationships of longer duration with customers tend to 
be less likely to be interested in joint action initiatives.  This indicates that a higher 
opportunity cost of engaging in joint action (as proxied by relationships of longer 
duration) reduces the likelihood of joint action initiatives in clusters. 
 
Organization of Chapter Three 
This chapter is presented in seven sections.  In Section 3.1, the introduction, we 
have defined and summarized the study.  Section 3.2 discusses some of the empirical 
literature related to clusters.  In Section 3.3, the surgical instrument cluster of Sialkot 
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(Pakistan) is introduced, along with the survey methodology and the estimation strategy 
for the relational contracting regressions.  Sections 3.4 and 3.5 present the results of the 
relational contracting regressions for trade credit offered to customers and trade credit 
received from suppliers.  Section 3.6 describes the estimation strategy and presents the 
results for the regressions on “joint action” that attempt to determine which firm and 
cluster characteristics contribute to firms’ interest in a theoretical joint marketing 
initiative.  Our conclusions are presented in Section 3.7. 
 
3.2 Empirical Literature  
Two earlier papers by McMillan and Woodruff (1999) and Johnson, McMillan, 
and Woodruff (2002) used an innovative survey instrument to test the hypothesis of 
relational contracting in two environments where the judicial system is not fully 
developed, first in Vietnam and then in Eastern Europe.  As discussed above, informal 
relationships can substitute for third party enforcement through relational contracting.  
The measure of trust used as the dependent regression variable was the amount of trade 
credit that a supplier offered to its customers.  In Vietnam, they found that the amount of 
trade credit given to a customer is positively related to the difficulty of finding a new 
supplier, a longer duration of the trading relationship, and the identification of customers 
through business networks.  Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff conducted a similar 
survey in five Eastern European countries: Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Russia and 
Ukraine.  In addition to relational contracting variables, they included the role of the 
judiciary in this second study.  This is because the court systems in Eastern Europe are 
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considered to be stronger than those in developing countries such as Vietnam.  Their 
study found that greater confidence in the court system made firms more likely to offer 
trade credit and to try new lower cost suppliers.  The effect of courts was greatest at the 
beginning of a trading relationship. 
We use a methodology similar to McMillan and Woodruff (1999) and Johnson, 
McMillan, and Woodruff (2002) and apply it to data from an industrial cluster in Sialkot 
Pakistan.  Our research makes a unique contribution to the literature since this aspect of 
relational contracting has not yet been studied empirically in the context of a cluster.   
In a related study, Fisman and Raturi (2000) also used trade credit data to study 
inter-firm trust, though they use a different methodology.  Studying trade credit data from 
Africa, they showed how competition could encourage long-term cooperative 
relationships when trading partners must make non-contractible investments at the 
beginning of the relationship.116   
While most of the literature on the topic of industrial clusters in developing 
countries has consisted of case studies, there are a few papers that have empirically 
analyzed the effects of social network-based relationships on economic activity in 
clusters.  Ilias (2001) and Banerjee and Munshi (2000) used empirical analysis to verify 
the existence and sometimes distortionary effects of these types of relationships in 
clusters.117  Woodruff’s (1998) case study of a shoe-producing cluster in Mexico 
                                                 
116 Fisman and Raturi (2000) use fixed-effects regression analysis to show that greater competition is 
associated with higher provision of trade credit.  Suppliers use trade credit in order to attract customers. 
Once a customer and supplier have invested in building trust, then the customer is “locked-in” to the 
relationship.  
 
117 Ilias (2001) focuses on the role of family labor in the Sialkot surgical instrument cluster and the 
distortionary effects of the decision to use family versus non-family labor.  He concludes that there existed 
a labor market distortion such that family managers are preferred to non-family and therefore firm output is 
correlated with family size.  Banerjee and Munshi (2000) present a theoretical model and empirical testing 
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demonstrated the importance of community sanctions for contract enforcement in a 
cluster.118  This chapter extends the empirical literature on clusters to include results on 
relational contracting to enforce contracts. 
 
3.3 The Surgical Instrument Cluster in Sialkot (Pakistan): Description of the 
Survey and Estimation Strategy 
There is a cluster of firms consisting of approximately 220 producers and 1500 
subcontracting firms in Sialkot, a city in the Punjab province of Pakistan (see Table 3.1), 
which produces surgical instruments mainly for foreign markets including the United 
States and Western Europe, with 36 percent and 39 percent of instruments being exported 
to these destinations respectively.119  For the most part, the U.S. imports Sialkot’s 
disposable (single-use) instruments, and Europe imports re-useable instruments.120  In 
addition to surgical instruments, the cluster also produces a small amount of veterinary 
and manicure/pedicure instruments.  This cluster’s output is significant, as verified by the 
$124 million worth of goods exported in 2000-2001.121  The firms of the cluster 
manufacture approximately 10,000 different types of disposable and re-useable surgical 
                                                                                                                                                 
of social network-based lending, comparing the investment and earnings profiles of migrants and 
established producers (a caste called the Gounders) in the Tiruppur knitwear cluster in India.  They find 
that the established producers, with access to cheaper informal credit through a social lending network, 
have lower output growth but invest more at all levels of experience as compared to the migrants.  
 
118 Woodruff (1998) presents a case study examining the impact of trade liberalization on the Mexican 
footwear industry, based on a qualitative analysis of surveys conducted in the Guadalajara and Leon 
clusters.  He finds that trade liberalization weakened the ability of cluster manufacturers to use informal 
contract enforcement mechanisms (reputation) with respect to retailers. 
 
119 SMEDA (2001), pg 16. 
 
120 SMEDA (2001), pg. 17. 
 
121 SMEDA (2001), pg. 13. 
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instruments.122  
In the cluster, production of the surgical instruments takes place in stages, 
including input production, manufacturing, and complementary services.  The large 
vendor segment consists of small firms that specialize in one or more stages of the 
production process.  There is a negative correlation between firm size and the percentage 
of sub-contracted manufacturing processes, and the largest firms carry out 80-90 percent 
of production processes in-house.123  Except for the largest manufacturers, production of 
a final good is not generally carried out in a single, vertically integrated firm. 
The cluster also has local business associations, including the Metal Industries 
Development Centre, the Sialkot Dry Port Trust, the Sialkot Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (SCCI) and the Surgical Instrument Manufacturer’s Association (SIMA).   
 
Table 3.1: Surgical Instrument Firms in Pakistan 
(from ’95-’96 Census of Manufacturing) 
 
Size of 
Firm 
Number of 
Firms 
Number of 
Employees
Revenues 
($) 
Capital 
Large 20 250-400 >1.5 million 
(Rs 60-100 million) 
(Rs 50-100 million) 
Medium 50 100-250 150,000-1 million  
(Rs 10-60 million) 
(Rs 10-25 million) 
Small 150 30-50 15,000-150,000  
(Rs 1-10 million) 
(Rs 1-5 million) 
Vendors 1500 5-20 800-15,000  
(Rs 1-1.5 million) 
(Rs 50,000-1 million) 
Traders 800-1000 na Na na 
 
The cluster has a long and interesting history.  Local blacksmiths began producing 
surgical instruments around the start of the 20th century at the request of the American 
Mission Hospital in Sialkot.  In the 1930s, the cluster began exporting regionally to 
                                                 
122 SMEDA (2001), pg. 21. 
 
123 SMEDA (2001), pg. 39. 
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countries such as Egypt and Afghanistan, and it was a vital supplier to both Indian and 
Allied forces during World War II.  The industry continued to expand in the decades after 
the Second World War.  Strong pro-labor legislation passed in 1973 (applying to firms 
with 10 or more employees) dramatically increased labor costs and altered Sialkot’s 
development trajectory, leading the industry to shift to extensive sub-contracting, referred 
to as “vendorization.”124   
At times, the cluster has experienced some problems with quality, which reached 
a crisis point in 1994 when the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) halted imports 
from Pakistan until the firms adopted Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) standards.  In 
general, the firms do not use the most technologically advanced equipment and 
manufacturing processes, since many of the machines have been built locally using 
reverse-engineering techniques.  As with sub-contracting, the largest companies offer a 
contrast to smaller firms in that they tend to use more modern equipment.  Nonetheless, 
the direct cause of the difficulties with the FDA were problems with the alloy 
composition of locally manufactured steel used for the disposable instruments, a problem 
that was accentuated by the lack of proper testing facilities.125,126  To this day, the firms 
only have access to an outdated and unreliable facility to test steel composition, despite 
the fact that many Sialkot firms have already obtained GMP certificates. 
 
Description of the Survey Instrument 
For purposes of this study, we designed and commissioned a survey of the 
                                                 
124 SMEDA (2001), pg. 9 and pg. 52. 
 
125 SMEDA (2001), pg. 49. 
 
126 Imported steel is used for the re-usable instruments. 
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surgical instrument cluster in Sialkot, Pakistan, based in large part on the survey 
questionnaire developed by McMillan and Woodruff (1999) for Vietnam and Johnson, 
McMillan, and Woodruff (2002) for their study in Eastern Europe and Russia.  The 
faculty at the Lahore School of Economics in Lahore, Pakistan conducted the survey.  A 
breakdown of the entire survey sample (before data cleaning) is provided in Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2: Survey Sample (All firms surveyed) 
 Number 
of firms 
% of 
sample 
Average 
employment  
(# of workers) 
Average age 
of firms 
(years) 
Exporters 76 62% 91.8 19.9 
Vendors 47 38% 15.4 11.7 
All Firms 123  61.9 16.7 
 
 
When the interviewer went to the cluster to begin the survey, she found that only 
about 180 of the 220 exporting firms that were listed by SIMA (the local business 
association) were actually in operation at that time.127  Of these, 76 firms at least partially 
answered the survey, leading to a response rate of 43 percent.  The interviewer then met 
with 47 vendor firms in the villages surrounding Sialkot, where the cottage industry is 
located. 
Estimation Strategy for Analysis of Relational Contracting 
The first part of the study examines elements of relational contracting in the 
context of a cluster in a country where the institutional environment is characterized by 
weak third party enforcement.  We adapted the survey instrument developed by Johnson, 
McMillan, and Woodruff (2002) in order to investigate mechanisms of contract 
                                                 
127 The survey was carried out in Spring 2002. 
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enforcement in the Sialkot surgical instrument cluster in Pakistan.   
The measure of trust used as the dependent regression variable in the relational 
contracting regressions is trade credit offered to customers or received from suppliers.  
More specifically, we asked each surveyed firm about the amount of trade credit they 
offered to two customers (their oldest and newest customers) and received from two 
suppliers (their oldest and newest suppliers).  This approach helped to increase the 
number of observations and heterogeneity in the characteristics of the surveyed firms’ 
customers and suppliers.128   
However, a potential problem arises if the duration of trading relationships is 
correlated with trade credit incidence, in which case sample selection is based in part on 
the error term.  Specifically, the sampling of the oldest customers and oldest suppliers 
would create a sample selection bias.  There is in fact a noticeable difference between the 
average duration of the relationship with the oldest and newest customer and between the 
average duration of the relationship with the oldest and newest supplier (see Table 3.3).  
However, we believe that the sample selection method will not cause bias in the estimates 
for two reasons.  First, there is considerable variation in the duration of trading 
relationships within-group.  Since there is considerable variation in the ages of firms in 
the cluster (from less than one year to more than forty years old), there is also substantial 
variation in the duration of the relationships (see Table 3.3).  Among the oldest 
customers, the average duration of the relationship is 10.5 years, with a standard 
deviation of 7 years.  Among the oldest suppliers, the average relationship is almost 12 
                                                 
128 As can be seen in Table F13, both exporter and vendors firms give and receive trade credit, but not in 
the same proportions.  Exporters in the sample give trade credit in greater proportions than they receive, but 
the reverse is the case among the vendors.  (Out of 53 exporters, 37 give trade credit, and 27 receive trade 
credit. Out of 42 vendors, 30 give trade credit and 39 receive trade credit.) 
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years, with a standard deviation of more than 8 years.  Secondly, all of the equations were 
estimated both with and without duration of the relationship as an explanatory variable, 
and the impact of removing duration was minimal.  
 
Table 3.3: Variation in Ages and Duration of Relationships in Sample129 
 Old 
Customers
New 
Customers 
Old 
Suppliers 
New 
Suppliers 
Age of Firm 
Surveyed 
    
Mean 15.2 16.3 16.5 17.8 
Std. Dev. 10.4 11.1 11.3 11.8 
Median 13.0 13.5 13.0 14.0 
Duration of 
Relationship 
    
Mean 10.5 2.7 11.9 2.8 
Std. Dev. 7.0 2.6 8.4 3.2 
Median 10.0 2.0 10.0 2.0 
Sample Size 68 64 61 52 
 
In addition to questions about trade credit and the length of relationships with the 
oldest and newest customers and suppliers, firms were asked several other questions 
about the nature of their trading relationships and contract enforcement, including 
questions about their belief in the effectiveness of local courts, how often they visit 
customers and suppliers, how they were introduced to their customers and suppliers, how 
difficult it would be to find alternate customers or suppliers, and whether social sanctions 
existed for reneging on contracts. 
                                                 
129 Note that the mean, standard deviation and median of the age variable are referring to the age of the firm 
that was surveyed, not the age of the customer or supplier.  The summary statistics for age of the firm 
surveyed varies slightly between old and new customers because the two samples are slightly different; 
there are 8 firms for which there was only sufficient data for their oldest customers, and 4 firms for which 
there was only sufficient data for their newest customers.  Likewise, these statistics vary between old and 
new suppliers for the same reason; there are 11 firms for which there was only sufficient data for their 
oldest suppliers, and 2 firms for which there was only sufficient data for their newest suppliers. 
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In their study of Vietnamese firms, McMillan and Woodruff (1999) found support 
for the hypothesis that customers lacking alternate suppliers receive more trade credit, 
due to the lack of an outside option.  If the customer’s main competitor is located nearby, 
it is allowed to pay 13 percent less of its bill with delay.  If a similar manufacturer is 
located within 1 km, it reduces by 1 percent the amount of a customer’s bill it is allowed 
to pay after delivery.  Also, customers receive more trade credit when i) the supplier 
inspects the customer directly before the start of the trading relationship (which increases 
by 8 percent the portion of the bill paid with delay) and ii) relationships are of longer 
duration, due to the supplier having better information about the reliability of a customer.  
An increase in the duration of relationship by one year increases by 7 percentage points 
the amount of the bill paid with delay.  A supplier belonging to a network grants 20 
percentage points more trade credit on average due to the ability to sanction cheaters, 
although business networks were stronger indicators than social networks.  Suppliers that 
communicate at least monthly with other suppliers allow customers to pay 19 percent 
more of their bill with delay.  Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff (2002) obtained similar 
results in their study of Eastern European firms.  They also found that belief in the 
effectiveness of the court system and membership in a trade association increased the 
amount of trade credit that firms were willing to offer to customers.  Those firms that 
believed in the court system were 8 percent more likely to offer trade credit and allowed 
customers to pay approximately 5.5 percent more of their bill after delivery. 
However, since the work of McMillan and Woodruff (1999) and Johnson, 
McMillan, and Woodruff (2002) was not related to clusters, the particular characteristics 
of clusters may yield somewhat different results from those obtained in the studies of 
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Vietnam and Eastern Europe.  For instance, one of McMillan and Woodruff’s results in 
Vietnam was that firms were more likely to trust customers (and therefore offer trade 
credit) the more difficult it was for that customer to find an alternate supplier.  In a 
cluster, manufacturing firms (as customers) have numerous alternate suppliers of similar 
(although perhaps not identical) intermediate inputs.  Therefore, the absence of alternate 
suppliers is less likely be a deterrent to reneging on contracts unless intermediate inputs 
are highly specialized.  Because of this, we hypothesize that information sharing and 
network effects are more likely to be significant determinants of trust and contract 
enforcement in a cluster environment.  
We estimate a model of the probability that a firm offers positive trade credit to 
its customer (where trade credit is a proxy for inter-firm trust), applying the probit 
estimation method and using the following equation: 
iiiiii ZSBRP εφδγβα +++++=            (1a) 
where Pi is the probability of offering trade credit to its customer, Ri is a vector 
representing factors that characterize the relationship between the firm and its customer, 
Bi is a vector of firm characteristics, Si is a vector of customer characteristics, and Zi 
represents firm-level controls. 
We also estimate a model of the probability that a firm receives positive trade 
credit from its supplier, applying the probit estimation method, using the following 
equation: 
iiiiii ZSBRP εφδγβα +++++=             (1b) 
where Pi is the probability of receiving trade credit from a supplier, Ri is a vector 
representing factors that characterize the relationship between the firm and its supplier, Bi 
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is a vector of firm characteristics, Si is a vector of supplier characteristics, and Zi 
represents firm-level controls. 
Similarly, the regression equation for the amount of trade credit offered to 
customers (where trade credit is a proxy for inter-firm trust) took the following form:  
iiiiii ZSBRTC εφδγβα +++++=*                                                                                (2a) 
where TCi* is the desired level of trade credit that a firm wishes to give its customer 
(trade credit is defined as the percentage of the bill paid with delay).  Finally, we have the 
regression equation for the amount of trade credit received from suppliers: 
iiiiii ZSBRTC εφδγβα +++++=*                                                                                (2b) 
where TCi* is the level of trade credit that a firm desires from its supplier.   
Since we can only measure observed trade credit that is restricted to values 
between 0 percent and 100 percent130, a tobit model is estimated such that the censored 
dependent variable takes the following form: 
TCi is the observed level of trade credit, where: 
TCi= TCi* for 0< TCi*<1 
TCi=0 for TCi*≤0 
TCi=1 for TCi*≥1 
The relational contracting variables fall into four categories.  First, we consider 
the lock-in of the customer or the ability of the customer to find an alternate supplier, 
which is measured by asking how long it would take a customer to find an alternate 
source if the supplier failed to deliver the inputs.  The hypothesis is that “locked-in” 
                                                 
130 In the sample of trade credit offered to customers, 59 observations are censored at 0%, 24 observations 
are censored at 100%, and 49 observations are not censored.  In the sample of trade credit received from 
suppliers, 40 observations are censored at 0%, 9 observations are censored at 100%, and 64 observations 
are not censored. 
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customers will receive higher trade credit because it is more difficult for them to find 
alternate suppliers if they fail to pay.  Second, information gathering by firms about their 
customers may increase trade credit, which is measured by the duration of the trading 
relationship (and duration-squared to measure non-linear effects) and visits between 
suppliers and customers.  Duration may also be interpreted as customer lock-in; longer 
duration relationships may signify greater customer lock-in for a number of reasons 
including, but not limited to the following: i) inputs may become more specialized or 
more tailored to the customer’s specifications over time, ii) production of specialized 
inputs may require a fixed investment by the supplier which is recouped over time, or iii) 
the customer has better information about a supplier that it has been working with for an 
extended period (i.e. the customer has better information about the reliability and 
expected quality of a supplier) and becomes reluctant to change suppliers.  Third, we 
have several variables to capture the positive effects of networks in increasing trade 
credit by building trust between a firm and its customers.  These networks may assist in 
gathering information about a customer at the beginning of a trading relationship, such as 
if the firm was introduced to the customer or received information about the customer’s 
trustworthiness through a business or social network.  Networks may also increase trade 
credit by helping firms to sanction delinquent customers and with continuous information 
gathering, which is measured by the frequency with which the firm speaks to other 
suppliers.  Lastly, we consider the effect of the firms’ belief in formal and informal 
contract enforcement institutions on the decision to offer trade credit, as a way to 
measure the ability of firms to sanction delinquent customers.  Formal contract 
enforcement is measured by a dummy variable that the respondent believes that courts 
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can enforce contracts.  Informal enforcement may be measured by dummy variables 
about the respondent’s belief in the strength of social sanctions, such as the belief that 
other firms would find out about a cheating customer, or that a trade dispute would lead 
suppliers to demand higher advanced payments for inputs (in other words, less trade 
credit).  We also control for other firm level characteristics, including firm size, age, and 
whether the firm is an exporter.   
Regressions for the determinants of offering trade credit to a firm’s customers are 
considered separately from regressions for receiving trade credit from its suppliers. 
Summary statistics on the Sialkot sample in Tables 3.4 and 3.7 show that the belief in the 
effectiveness of the court system is low, at an average of about 21 percent for all firms in 
the customer credit regressions, and 16 percent in the supplier credit sample.  In contrast, 
the average was about 74 percent for the Eastern European firms interviewed by Johnson, 
McMillan, and Woodruff (2002).  However, the belief in courts in Pakistan is relatively 
higher than in Vietnam, where only 9 percent of firms answered this question 
affirmatively. 
 
3.4 Relational Contracting Results I: Trade Credit Offered to Customers 
First, we consider the impact of the relational contracting variables on the 
probability that a clustered firm offers trade credit to its customers and the amount of 
trade credit offered.  Summary statistics on the variables used in the customer credit 
regressions are presented in Table 3.4.  Once the dataset was cleaned and balanced, 132  
observations remained for the customer credit regressions representing 72 unique firms in 
the survey.  For 60 firms, there are two observations per firm (representing both their 
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oldest and newest customers) and for 12 firms, there is only adequate information on one 
of their customers, either the oldest or the newest. 
 
 
Table 3.4: Customer Credit Summary Statistics 
  Mean Median Variance Std. Dev. Min Max NOBs 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLES    
 
   
Offer Trade Credit to  
Customer (0,1) 0.55 1.00 0.25 0.50 0.00 1.00 132 
Amount of Trade Credit 
Offered (%) 35.91 25.00 1443.06 37.99 0.00 100.00 132 
LOCK-IN        
Would Take Customer 
Less than a Week to 
Find Alternate Supply 
(0,1) 0.44 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.00 1.00 132 
Would Take Customer 
More Than a Month to 
Find Alternate Supply  0.26 0.00 0.19 0.44 0.00 1.00 132 
Maintain Inventory of 
Product Sold to 
Customer (0,1) 0.37 0.00 0.24 0.48 0.00 1.00 132 
INFORMATION /  
LOCK-IN    
 
   
Duration of Trading  
Relationship (years) 6.74 4.25 43.96 6.63 0.08 30.00 132 
INFORMATION / 
NETWORK EFFECTS     
 
   
Information about 
Customer Through 
Social Network (0,1) 0.13 0.00 0.11 0.34 0.00 1.00 132 
Information about 
Customer Through 
Business Network (0,1) 0.44 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.00 1.00 132 
Talk at Least Weekly 
With Other Producers 
(0,1) 0.63 1.00 0.24 0.49 0.00 1.00 72 
Talk at Least Monthly 
With Other Producers 
(0,1) 0.76 1.00 0.18 0.43 0.00 1.00 72 
ENFORCEMENT        
A Customer Has Failed 
to Pay After Delivery 0.22 0.00 0.18 0.42 0.00 1.00 72 
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  Mean Median Variance Std. Dev. Min Max NOBs 
(0,1) 
Customers Would Find 
Out About Dispute With 
Another Customer (0,1) 0.44 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.00 1.00 72 
Businesses Would 
Refuse to Deal with 
Customer Who Cheated 
(0,1) 0.42 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.00 1.00 72 
Belief in the Court 
System (0,1) 0.21 0.00 0.17 0.41 0.00 1.00 72 
Export Dummy*Belief 
in Courts (0,1) 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00 72 
CONTROLS        
Ln(Employment) 3.23 3.02 1.11 1.06 1.79 6.37 72 
Ln(1+age) 2.60 2.64 0.49 0.70 0.00 3.99 72 
Receive Bank Credit 0.26 0.00 0.20 0.44 0.00 1.00 72 
Average % of Bill Paid 
w/Delay to Suppliers 41.53 50.00 1051.33 32.42 0.00 100.00 72 
Price Determined by 
Relationship with 
Customer (0,1) 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.12 0.00 1.00 72 
 
 
Customer Trade Credit Results 
Table 3.5 contains the results of probit estimation of variables that affect the 
likelihood that the interviewed firms offer trade credit to their customers and tobit 
estimates for the impact of variables on the amount of trade credit offered to 
customers.131   
The results for the “lock-in” variables are mixed.  One of the variables 
representing lock-in, that it would take a month or more for customers to find alternate 
supplies, is insignificant in the regressions.  On the other hand, the duration of the trading 
relationship, which represents both lock-in and information gathering about the customer, 
                                                 
131 The standard errors are made robust by correcting for the fact that data was collected about two 
customers from the same firm.  The data for two customers of the same firm is considered “clustered” so 
that standard errors are calculated under the assumption that errors are independent across firms, but not 
necessarily within firms, in other words that the observations of the customers of the same firm may be 
correlated.   
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is positive and significant at the 10 percent level in the probit regression and at the 5 
percent level in the tobit regression.  A one-year increase in the duration of the 
relationship increases the likelihood that a firm offers credit to its customers by about 3.5 
percent, and increases by 9 percentage points the proportion of their bill paid with delay.  
Increasing the duration of the relationship by one standard deviation (from 6.74 to 13.37 
years) increases the probability of offering trade credit by about 23 percent. 
McMillan and Woodruff note that the duration variable may be biased upward, 
since both initial credit and duration of a trading relationship may be correlated with the 
level of initial trust that a firm has in a new customer.  The duration variables may also 
theoretically bias the estimates of the other coefficients.  However, repeating the 
regressions without the duration variables has mostly minor impacts on the coefficient 
estimates.  Of the variables that were significant in the original regressions, only two 
coefficients (for control variables, ln(1+age) and the dummy variable for exporters) had 
noticeable changes in the estimates.  These results can also be found in Table 3.5. 
Obtaining information about customers through a business network appears to 
have a positive and significant impact, increasing the probability of offering credit by 26 
percent and allowing customers to pay 44 percent more of their bill with delay.  Also, 
talking frequently with other suppliers of a customer (another way of measuring a 
business network) has a significant effect, increasing the likelihood of offering credit by 
19 percent. 
There is support for the hypothesis that belief in the court system increases the 
likelihood that trade credit is offered.  Firms that believe in the effectiveness of courts are 
about 30 percent more likely to offer trade credit and permit their customers to pay about 
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55 percent more of their bill with delay.  The variable representing community sanctions 
(a dummy variable representing the belief of the surveyed firm that other businesses 
would refuse to deal with a customer who cheated) does not have a significant effect on 
the decision to offer trade credit.   
Exporters are found to be more likely to offer trade credit to their customers and 
offer more trade credit, but the estimated coefficients are insignificant except for one of 
the tobit estimates (at the 10 percent level).   
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Table 3.5: Regressions on Trade Credit to Customers, Marginal Effects, Probit and Tobit, 
Main specification, Clustered errors 
 Probit Tobit  Probit 
(without 
duration) 
Tobit 
(without 
duration) 
LOCK-IN     
Would Take Customer More Than a 
Month to Find Alternate Supply 
-0.069 
(-0.58) 
0.49 
(0.02) 
-0.074 
(-0.68) 
-5.37 
(-0.21) 
INFORMATION/LOCK-IN     
Duration of Relationship (years) 
0.036 
(1.91)+ 
9.22 
(2.08)* 
  
Duration-squared 
-0.00088 
(-1.09) 
-0.24 
(-1.24) 
  
INFORMATION/ 
NETWORK EFFECTS 
    
Info. About Customer Through 
Business Network 
0.26 
(2.59)* 
44.44 
(2.10)* 
0.28 
(2.81)** 
46.45 
(2.11)* 
Talk To Other Suppliers of Customer 
At Least Monthly 
0.19 
(2.09)* 
27.97 
(1.37) 
0.18 
(2.03)* 
23.36 
(1.12) 
ENFORCEMENT     
Businesses Would Refuse to Deal With 
Customer Who Cheated Manufacturer 
-0.031 
(-0.36) 
-25.41 
(-1.45) 
-0.027 
(-0.34) 
-25.01 
(-1.51) 
Belief in Court System 
0.30 
(3.23)** 
55.75 
(2.44)* 
0.31 
(3.63)** 
55.04 
(2.45)* 
CONTROLS 
  
 
  
Ln(1+Age) 
-0.16 
(-2.86)** 
-25.45 
(-1.94)+ 
-0.085 
(-1.67)+ 
-6.12 
(-0.56) 
Ln(Employment) 
0.081 
(2.31)* 
22.67 
(2.41)* 
0.079 
(2.42)* 
24.45 
(2.73)** 
Export Dummy 
0.059 
(0.58) 
41.54 
(1.82)+ 
0.033 
(0.33) 
33.31 
(1.50) 
Observations 132 132 132 132 
R-Squared 0.18 0.043 0.14 0.03 
RI  Relative Amount of Information  
in Prediction132 
0.26 Not 
applicable 
0.23 Not 
applicable 
Chi-Squared 31.69 
(dof=10) 
24.09 
(dof=10) 
24.93 
(dof=8) 
16.79 
(dof=8) 
Prob>Chi-Squared 0.0005 0.0074 0.0016 0.032 
(Robust z statistics in parentheses, **significant at 1%, *significant at 5%, +significant at 10%) 
                                                 
132 RI , or the “relative amount of information in prediction” for models with qualitative dependent 
variables was developed by Betancourt and Clague (1981).  Put simply, it assesses the amount of additional 
information imparted by the inclusion of explanatory variables to the model (i.e. the introduction of a 
theory) relative to the amount of information already contained in the sample proportions.  It helps to deal 
with some of the undesirable properties of traditional R2 measures as they are applied to qualitative 
dependent variable models, for example that there cannot be a decomposition of total variation and 
questions about the correct upper-bound for binary-choice statistics. 
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An alternate specification of regression equations 1a and 2a is presented in Table 
3.6.  In this specification, different survey questions are used to derive alternate variables 
for “lock-in,” “information and network effects” and “community enforcement.”  The 
results are quite similar to the main specification in Table 3.5 in terms of which 
categories of variables are significant and the size of the coefficient estimates.  
We also estimate a tobit model using a similar specification to McMillan and 
Woodruff’s (1999) specifications for firms in Vietnam.  These results can be found in 
Table F1 (in Appendix F).  The coefficients with the most similar results are for the 
duration variable, where estimates of the effect of increasing the length of the relationship 
on the amount of trade credit offered for both Sialkot and Vietnam are around 7 – 8 
percent.  Also similar in magnitude is the replication of McMillan and Woodruff’s first 
regression for the effect of information obtained through a business network, with 
estimates of 26 and 20 percent in Sialkot and Vietnam respectively.  For the effect of 
lock-in, age, employment and “price being set by the relationship with customer,” the 
estimated coefficients have the same signs as McMillan and Woodruff, but are different 
in magnitude. 
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Table 3.6: Regressions on Trade Credit to Customers, Marginal Effects, Probit and Tobit, 
Alternate Specification, Clustered errors 
 Probit Tobit  
 
Probit 
(without 
duration) 
Tobit  
(without 
duration) 
LOCK-IN     
Would Take Customer Less than 
a Week to Find Alternate Supply 
0.12 
(1.36) 
14.18 
(0.91) 
0.11 
(1.22) 
14.26 
(0.87) 
Would Take Customer More 
Than a Month to Find Alternate 
Supply 
-0.042 
(-0.34) 
1.32 
(0.05) 
-0.051 
(-0.45) 
-3.29 
(-0.12) 
INFORMATION/LOCK-IN     
Duration of Relationship (years) 
0.034 
(1.94)+ 
8.82 
 (2.07)* 
  
Duration-squared 
-0.001 
(-1.13) 
-0.22 
(-1.20) 
  
INFORMATION/ 
NETWORK EFFECTS 
    
Info. About Customer Through 
Business Network 
0.24 
(2.39)* 
41.22 
(1.96)* 
0.25 
(2.58)** 
43.83 
(2.02)* 
Talk To Other Suppliers of 
Customer At Least Weekly 
0.20 
(2.54)** 
28.30 
(1.54) 
0.20 
(2.58)** 
27.72 
(1.47) 
ENFORCEMENT     
Customers Would Find Out 
About Dispute With Another 
Customer 
-0.073 
(-0.90) 
-17.42 
(-1.06) 
-0.073 
(-0.92) 
-15.96 
(-0.98) 
Belief in Court System 
0.29 
(3.16)** 
49.21 
(2.13)* 
0.30 
(3.49)** 
48.43 
(2.09)* 
CONTROLS 
    
Ln(1+Age) 
-0.16 
(-2.85)** 
-21.57 
(-1.65)+ 
-0.079 
(-1.62) 
-2.07 
(-0.18) 
Ln(Employment) 
0.068 
(1.65)+ 
19.89 
(1.95)+ 
0.068 
(1.78)+ 
21.71 
(2.23)* 
Export Dummy 
0.13 
(1.35) 
46.87 
(2.04)* 
0.099 
(1.06) 
38.95 
(1.69)+ 
Observations 132 132 132 132 
R-Squared 0.21 0.044 0.17 0.03 
RI  Relative Amount of 
Information in Prediction 
0.30 Not 
applicable 
0.23 Not 
applicable 
Chi-Squared 36.58 
(dof=11) 
26.12 
(dof=11) 
33.45 
(dof=9) 
17.86 
(dof=9) 
Prob>Chi-Squared 0.0001 0.006 0.0001 0.037 
(Robust z statistics in parentheses, **significant at 1%, *significant at 5%, +significant at 
10%) 
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Robustness 
Additional regressions (Table F3, in Appendix F) test for the robustness of the 
relational contracting results against alternate explanations for trade credit offered in the 
literature.  A clear hypothesis does not arise with respect to the size or age of firms and 
trade credit. If trade credit serves as a way to assure quality, then larger and older firms 
should offer less trade credit since they should have a lower variance in quality.133  On 
the other hand, if larger and older firms have better access to formal credit sources, then 
they should offer more trade credit on average.134  Trade credit may also be a price 
discrimination mechanism.135  McMillan and Woodruff (1999) found for Vietnam that on 
average, larger and older firms offered less trade credit to their customers.  Our results 
are mixed; smaller and older firms offer less trade credit to their customers on average. 
A firm that has access to credit from formal sources, either from a bank or a credit 
association, may be more likely to offer trade credit, because it is less credit constrained.  
However, the regressions in Table F3 show that access to formal credit does not affect 
either whether trade credit is offered or the amount.  The average percentage of trade 
credit received from suppliers, another source of credit that may loosen credit constraints, 
has a small but positive effect on the probability that firms offer credit to their customers 
(less than one percent) and on the amount of credit offered (also less than one percent). 
In order to test the price discrimination hypothesis, McMillan and Woodruff 
                                                 
133 See Long, Malitz, and Ravid (1993), Deloof and Jegers (1996). 
 
134 See Peterson and Rajan (1997). 
 
135 See Petersen and Rajan (1997).  The discussion of alternate trade credit hypotheses was taken from 
McMillan and Woodruff (1999). 
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(1999) used a dummy variable representing when firms set their price based on the 
relationship with the customer.  Since only one percent of the firms in our sample 
answered this question affirmatively, this variable could not be included in our 
specifications.   
Two other variables included in the robustness regressions are a social network 
variable and an interaction variable between exporters and belief in the court system.  
The coefficient on the social network variable, in contrast to the business network 
variable, is not significant.  The joint “court*exporter” variable, which is also not 
significant, was included to see if courts are beneficial to all cluster firms or only to the 
exporting firms.  In the tobit regression, inclusion of this interaction variable has a minor 
impact on coefficient estimate of the original variable for belief in the courts, but it is still 
significant at the 5 percent level.   
Table F4 presents estimates of the main specification using an alternate (and more 
complex) estimation technique to correct for the survey sampling method, taking into 
account the stratification of the sample and the under-representation of vendors in the 
sample.136  Since exporters and vendors were sampled separately, those two groups were 
considered different strata in the estimation.  Probability weights were used to correct for 
the fact that exporters and vendors were sampled in different proportions than exist in the 
cluster.  The probability weights assigned for the estimation in Table F4 were based on 
the number of each type of firm (exporters and vendors) in the cluster.  Among the 
significant variables, the probit estimates with corrections for the survey sampling 
technique are larger in magnitude and more significant than the estimates that only 
                                                 
136 Similar to the results contained in the main text (Tables 3.5 and 3.6), the standard errors in Table F4 are 
also corrected for the fact that data was collected about two customers from the same firm. The data for two 
customers of the same firm was considered “clustered”.  
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corrected for clustered errors (except for ln(1+age)).  Among the significant variables in 
the tobit regressions, the estimates are more significant when corrections are made for the 
sampling technique, but are smaller in magnitude (except the dummy variable that the 
firm communicates with other firms at least monthly).  The magnitudes and significance 
of the estimates calculated with this method are in general quite high, leading us to 
question whether they are in fact realistic. 
Tables F5 and F6 re-estimate the main specifications in Table 3.5 using different 
samples.  Table F5 uses a slightly smaller sample where the only observations that are 
included are those that have two customers per firm.137  The results are very similar to 
those in Table 3.5, except that some coefficient estimates are slightly larger (in absolute 
value) and somewhat more significant.  Table F6 uses only the exporter firms in the 
sample.  Except for duration of the relationship and employment, most of the variables 
lose significance when only the exporter observations are used as compared to the full 
sample that includes the vendor firms.  In addition, the effect of increasing the duration of 
the trading relationship by one year is larger in magnitude in the exporter-only sample 
(24 percent vs. 9 percent more of the bill being paid with delay), but it is only significant 
at the 10 percent level. 
 
 
3.5 Relational Contracting Results II: Trade Credit Received from Suppliers 
Similar regressions were carried out for trade credit that firms receive from their 
suppliers.  The set of variables varied only slightly, since the supplier credit section of the 
                                                 
137 In other words, observations where there was only one customer per firm are dropped.  
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survey also included questions on visits by customers and suppliers before the first sale 
and during the trading relationship.  Summary statistics are presented in Table 3.7.  Once 
the dataset was cleaned and balanced, 113 observations remained for the supplier credit 
regressions representing 63 unique firms in the survey.  For 50 firms, there are two 
observations per firm (representing both their oldest and newest suppliers) and for 13 
firms, there is only adequate information on one of their suppliers, either the oldest or the 
newest. 
 
Table 3.7: Supplier Credit Summary Statistics 
  Mean Median Variance Std. Dev. Min Max NOBs 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES        
Receive Trade Credit (0,1) 0.65 1.00 0.23 0.48 0.00 1.00 113 
Amount of Trade Credit 
Received (%) 36.59 50.00 1018.87 31.92 0.00 100.00 113 
LOCK-IN        
Would take a day or less to 
find alternate supply (0,1) 0.12 0.00 0.10 0.32 0.00 1.00 113 
Would take more than a week 
to find alternate supply (0,1) 0.28 0.00 0.20 0.45 0.00 1.00 113 
% Inputs Purchased From 
Less Than 1 km 16.90 0.00 758.41 27.54 0.00 100.00 63 
% Inputs Imported 4.21 0.00 165.49 12.86 0.00 70.00 63 
Have Other Suppliers (0,1) 0.73 1.00 0.20 0.44 0.00 1.00 113 
INFORMATION/ LOCK-IN        
Duration of Trading 
Relationship (years) 7.71 5.00 63.52 7.97 0.00 40.00 113 
Visit supplier at least once 
before first sale (0,1) 0.90 1.00 0.09 0.30 0.00 1.00 113 
Customer visits supplier at 
least weekly (0,1) 0.39 0.00 0.24 0.49 0.00 1.00 113 
INFORMATION/ 
NETWORK EFFECTS        
Introduction to Supplier 
Through Social Network (0,1) 0.33 0.00 0.22 0.47 0.00 1.00 113 
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  Mean Median Variance Std. Dev. Min Max NOBs 
Talk at Least Monthly with  
Other Producers (0,1) 0.68 1.00 0.22 0.47 0.00 1.00 63 
Talk at Least Weekly with  
Other Producers (0,1) 0.56 1.00 0.25 0.50 0.00 1.00 63 
ENFORCEMENT        
Dispute Would Lead to 
Higher Advanced Payment  0.17 0.00 0.15 0.38 0.00 1.00 63 
Other Producers Would Find 
Out About Dispute With 
Supplier (0,1) 0.59 1.00 0.25 0.50 0.00 1.00 63 
Belief in the Court System 
(0,1) 0.16 0.00 0.14 0.37 0.00 1.00 63 
Exporter*Belief in Courts 
(0,1) 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.25 0.00 1.00 63 
CONTROLS        
Ln(Employment) 3.34 3.09 1.13 1.06 1.61 6.00 63 
Ln(1+age) 2.67 2.64 0.41 0.64 1.10 3.99 63 
Bank Credit Access (0,1) 0.33 0.00 0.23 0.48 0.00 1.00 63 
Vendors (proportion of 
sample)  0.40 0.00 0.24 0.49 0.00 1.00 63 
Exporters (proportion of 
sample) 0.60 1.00 0.24 0.49 0.00 1.00 63 
 
Supplier Trade Credit Results 
Table 3.8 contains the results of probit estimations of variables that affect the 
likelihood that the interviewed firms receive trade credit from their suppliers and tobit 
estimates for the impact of variables on the amount of trade credit received.138   
The results show that a firm is more likely to receive trade credit and receives 
more trade credit when suppliers do not visit the firm before the first sale.  This result 
appears counterintuitive, but when a firm does not receive a visit from the supplier it 
could possibly mean that they already know (and therefore trust) each other.  A firm that 
is visited by the supplier at least once before the first transaction is 27 percent less likely 
                                                 
138 The standard errors are corrected for the fact that data was collected about two suppliers of the same 
firm. The data for two suppliers of the same firm is considered “clustered” so that standard errors are 
calculated under the assumption that errors are independent across firms, but not necessarily within firms, 
in other words that the observations of the suppliers of the same firm may be correlated. 
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to receive credit, and pays on average 47 percent more of their bill at the time of sale.  
Firms that visit their suppliers weekly are 17 percent more likely to receive trade credit.  
These visits may assist the suppliers in gathering information about the reliability of the 
customer as well as in monitoring informal contracts. 
Customer lock-in, i.e. the ability to easily locate alternate suppliers (as measured 
by the customer buying inputs less than one km away) does not have an effect on the 
likelihood of being offered trade credit by its supplier or the amount of trade credit 
received.  Similarly, the duration of the trading relationship does not significantly affect 
the probability of receiving trade credit.  Concern that the duration variables would result 
in bias are unwarranted, since the changes to the coefficient estimates and standard errors 
caused by dropping the duration variables are almost negligible.   
While receiving an introduction through a social network has an expected positive 
effect on the likelihood of receiving trade credit, the variable is only significant (at the 10 
percent level) in the tobit and probit specifications that exclude the duration variables.  
Exporters are about 24 percent less likely to receive trade credit and allowed to pay about 
30 percent less of their bill with delay, although this result is only significant at the 10 
percent level.  Neither a belief in the courts, nor belief in informal enforcement (as 
measured here), appears to influence the likelihood of receiving trade credit from one’s 
suppliers.   
McMillan and Woodruff (1999) found that older and larger firms on average 
received less trade credit in Vietnam. Our results for Sialkot show that older firms are 
less likely to receive trade credit and receive less credit, although this effect is not 
significant.  The coefficient on firm size had different signs in the probit and tobit 
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regressions.  
If access to other forms of credit serves as a reputation mechanism that induces 
suppliers to offer trade credit, then this variable should have a positive effect on the 
likelihood that trade credit is offered.  The regressions show that access to formal credit 
(either from a bank or a credit association) has a negative impact on the likelihood of 
receiving trade credit but does not affect the amount of trade credit received.  This may 
indicate that firms with access to formal credit are less likely to need trade credit.   
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Table 3.8: Supplier Trade Credit Results, Main specification, Clustered errors 
(Robust z statistics in parentheses, **significant at 1%, *significant at 5%, +significant at 
10%) 
                                                 
139 RI , or the “relative amount of information in prediction” for models with qualitative dependent 
variables was developed by Betancourt and Clague (1981).  Put simply, it assesses the amount of additional 
 Probit Tobit  
 
Probit 
(without 
duration) 
Tobit  
(without 
duration) 
LOCK-IN     
% Inputs Purchased From Less Than 
1 km 
-0.0011 
(-0.50) 
-0.10 
(-0.38) 
-0.0012 
(-0.52) 
-0.10 
(-0.38) 
% Inputs Imported 
0.0015 
(0.39) 
-0.11 
(-0.24) 
0.0011 
(0.29) 
-0.12 
(-0.28) 
INFORMATION/LOCK-IN     
Duration of Relationship (years) 
-0.0014 
(-0.13) 
0.28 
(0.23) 
  
Duration-squared 
0.00021 
(0.67) 
-0.0038 
(-0.10) 
  
INFO./NETWORK EFFECTS     
Visit Supplier Before First Sale 
-0.27 
(-2.79)** 
-46.9 
(-2.29)* 
-0.27 
(-2.72)** 
-46.76 
(-2.28)* 
Visit Supplier at Least Weekly 
0.17 
(1.94)+ 
11.74 
(0.95) 
0.18 
(1.95)+ 
11.8 
(0.93) 
Intro. To Supplier Through Social 
Network 
0.16 
(1.54) 
20.95 
(1.58) 
0.17 
(1.71)+ 
21.4 
(1.65)+ 
ENFORCEMENT     
Dispute With Supplier Would Lead 
To Higher Advanced Payment 
0.14 
(1.13) 
9.86 
(0.48) 
0.13 
(1.04) 
9.79 
(0.47) 
Belief in Court System 
-0.0087 
(-0.06) 
-1.23 
(-0.07) 
-0.0038 
(-0.03) 
-1.10 
(-0.06) 
CONTROLS 
    
Ln(1+Age) 
0.11 
(1.18) 
19.62 
(1.34) 
0.13 
(1.41) 
20.44 
(1.40) 
Ln(Employment) 
0.012 
(0.18) 
-0.89 
(-0.10) 
0.012 
(0.18) 
-0.81 
(-0.09) 
Export Dummy 
-0.24 
(-1.91)+ 
-30.84 
(-1.93)+ 
-0.24 
(-1.88)+ 
-30.96 
(-1.92)+ 
Receive Bank Credit -0.27 
(-1.93)+ 
-12.25 
(-0.69) 
-0.26 
(-1.88)+ 
-12.42 
(-0.70) 
Observations 113 113 113 113 
R-Squared 0.25 0.039 0.24 0.038 
RI  Relative Amount of Information 
in Prediction139 
0.21 Not 
applicable 
0.20 Not 
applicable 
Chi-squared 28.27 
(dof=13) 
20.31 
(dof=13) 
26.37 
(dof=11) 
 
(dof=11) 
Prob>Chi-squared 0.008 0.088 0.006 0.066 
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An alternate specification of regression equations 1b and 2b is presented in Table 
3.9.  In this specification, different survey questions are used to derive alternate variables 
for “lock-in,” “information and network effects” and “community enforcement.”  The 
results are fairly similar to the main specification in Table 3.8 in terms of which 
categories of variables are significant.  The lock-in and community enforcement variables 
are insignificant in both sets of regressions.  The estimates on receiving a visit from the 
supplier before the first sale are somewhat larger and more significant in the alternate 
specification.  The dummy variable representing that a firm visits his supplier frequently 
has less significance in the main specification (Table 3.8) than the substitute 
network/information variable in the alternate specification (Table 3.9) representing that 
the firm talks frequently with other producers. 
More interesting are estimates (Table F7, in Appendix F) when techniques to 
adjust for the survey sampling technique are applied, taking into account the stratification 
of the sample and the under-representation of vendors in the sample.  The coefficient on 
lock-in (as measured by the percentage of inputs purchased locally) is larger in absolute 
value and more significant in survey-adjusted regressions.  Also, the coefficients on two 
of the network variables (introduction through the social network and visiting the supplier 
weekly) are larger and more significant in the probit specification when the estimation is 
adjusted for the sampling technique.  In the tobit specifications, the impact of a firm 
being visited before the first sale is somewhat smaller and loses significance with the 
adjustment for sampling.  Access to bank credit also loses significance in the probit 
                                                                                                                                                 
information imparted by the inclusion of explanatory variables to the model (i.e. the introduction of a 
theory) relative to the amount of information already contained in the sample proportions.  It helps to deal 
with some of the undesirable properties of traditional R2 measures as they are applied to qualitative 
dependent variable models, for example that there cannot be a decomposition of total variation and 
questions about the correct upper-bound for binary-choice statistics. 
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specifications when adjusted for the sampling method. 
Table 3.9: Supplier Trade Credit Results, Alternate specification, Clustered errors 
 Probit Tobit  
 
Probit 
(without 
duration) 
Tobit  
(without 
duration) 
LOCK-IN     
Have Other Supplier of Input  
0.057 
(0.60) 
1.68 
(0.13) 
0.057 
(0.58) 
1.69 
(0.13) 
INFORMATION/LOCK-IN     
Duration of Relationship (years) 
0.001 
(0.10) 
0.52 
(0.45) 
  
Duration-squared 
0.00013 
(0.42) 
-0.0088 
(-0.25) 
  
INFO./NETWORK EFFECTS     
Visit Supplier Before First Sale 
-0.28 
(-3.29)** 
-59.04 
(-2.93)* 
-0.28 
(-3.23)** 
-56.76 
(-2.91)** 
Talk At Least Weekly to Other 
Producers 
0.30 
(2.17)* 
38.84 
(2.27)* 
0.29 
(2.17)* 
34.47 
(2.27)* 
Intro. To Supplier Through 
Social Network 
0.069 
(0.63) 
11.36 
(0.95) 
0.082 
(0.78) 
12.26 
(1.06) 
ENFORCEMENT     
If Manufacturer Cheated 
Supplier, Other Suppliers Find 
Out 
0.043 
(0.50) 
3.31 
(0.32) 
0.042 
(0.48) 
3.35 
(0.33) 
Belief in Court System 
-0.0013 
(-0.01) 
2.57 
(0.15) 
-0.004 
(-0.03) 
2.60 
(0.15) 
CONTROLS 
    
Ln(1+Age) 
0.059 
(0.62) 
15.34 
(1.13) 
0.08 
(0.86) 
16.69 
(1.27) 
Ln(Employment) 
-0.013 
(-0.23) 
-4.08 
(-0.55) 
-0.013 
(-0.23) 
-4.04 
(-0.54) 
Export Dummy 
-0.19 
(-1.54) 
-23.77 
(-1.67)+ 
-0.2 
(-1.56) 
-24.20 
(-1.71)+ 
Receive Bank Credit -0.14 
(-1.03) 
-2.8 
(-0.17) 
-0.14 
(-1.02) 
-3.2 
(-0.19) 
Observations 113 113 113 113 
R-Squared 0.26 0.047 0.26 0.046 
RI  Relative Amount of 
Information in Prediction 
0.19 Not 
applicable 
0.26 Not 
applicable 
Chi-squared 26.45 
 (dof=12) 
 19.91 
(dof=12) 
24.51 
 (dof=10) 
18.89 
(dof=10) 
Prob>Chi-squared 0.009 0.069 0.0064 0.042 
(Robust z statistics in parentheses, **significant at 1%, *significant at 5%, +significant at 
10%) 
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We also estimate a tobit model using a similar specification to McMillan and 
Woodruff’s (1999) specifications for firms in Vietnam.  These results can be found in 
Table F2 (in Appendix F).  The coefficients with the most similar results are for the 
duration (1.09 vs. 2 percent) and “having an alternate supplier” (7.88 vs. 7 percent) 
variables replicating column 3 of McMillan and Woodruff’s estimation.  For the effect of 
“introduction through social network,” duration-squared, and employment, the 
coefficients are the same sign, but are different in magnitude. 
Tables F8 and F9 re-estimate the main specifications in Table 3.8 using different 
samples.  Table F8 uses a slightly smaller sample where the only observations that are 
included are those that have two customers per firm.140  The results are very similar to 
those in Table 3.8.  The signs are different for some of the lock-in and duration variables, 
but the estimates are insignificant in all regressions.  The only major differences are that 
the significant coefficient estimates are somewhat larger (in absolute value) and slightly 
more significant when all firms have two observations.  Table F9 uses only the exporter 
firms in the sample.  Again, the lock-in variables have different signs, but are 
insignificant in all regressions.  The coefficient on the variable representing that the firm 
was visited by the supplier at least once before the first transaction continues to be 
significant when only exporters are included, and the coefficient estimate is much larger 
in the exporter-only regression (-41 percent probability of receiving credit and -63 
percent of the bill paid with delay vs. -27 percent and -47 percent respectively). 
                                                 
140 In other words, observations where there was only one customer per firm are dropped.  
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3.6 Analysis of Joint Action 
In this section, we attempt to determine whether firm level characteristics affect 
the decision of exporting firms to engage in a “joint action” marketing initiative.  In other 
words, we determine which factors contribute to the exporting firms deciding to join 
together to collectively market their own goods rather than sell their output through a 
middleman. 
Basic probit and logit regression techniques are used to determine how firm-level 
characteristics affect the decision of an exporting firm to engage in joint action to market 
their own goods. The dependent variable comes from the following survey question 
asking about the exporting firms’ interest in a hypothetical joint marketing initiative: 
If other firms in the cluster were forming a cooperative to sell surgical 
instruments directly to hospitals rather than selling to surgical instrument 
companies in the U.S. and Europe, would you join it?  (0) No (1) Yes 
 
We hypothesize that the firm characteristics that could potentially influence the 
proclivity of exporters to engage in a joint action initiative to market their own goods 
include risk aversion, access to credit (as a source of funds to set up the project), previous 
experience of the firm with direct marketing, and the value of the firm’s current trading 
relationships with customers.  We estimate the following equation using probit and logit 
methods: 
iiiiii ZDREP εφδγβα +++++=                                                                                
(3) 
where: 
E: Experience with direct marketing 
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R: Relationship with other firms  
D: Opportunity cost of joint action  
Z: Firm level controls 
Previous experience in direct marketing is measured by two dummy variables that 
the firms have sold products under their own name and have sold some goods directly to 
hospitals.  A prediction about the likely impact of previous experience with marketing is 
not immediately apparent.  On the one hand, firms that have had some marketing 
experience might be more likely to be interested in expanding their efforts through a 
larger and broader marketing initiative.  However, if they have already had some success 
marketing on their own, they may not be interested in sharing their knowledge and 
experience with the rest of the cluster.  We will proceed without making a prediction for 
the signs of these coefficients. 
Relationships between firms are measured by a dummy variable that firms speak 
at least weekly with other producers.  Frequent interaction with other firms may 
positively affect a firm’s joint action decision because this interaction may serve to 
spread information and help the initiative to gain momentum and support among the 
cluster firms.  We predict that this variable will positively influence the decision of firms 
to participate in joint action.   
A firm’s decision to participate in a direct marketing scheme should be inversely 
related to the value of the firm’s trading relationship with its current trading partners.  
This variable is proxied by the duration of the firm’s relationship with its oldest 
customer.   
Firms that are more risk averse should be less likely to be interested in a joint 
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action initiative.  The proxies used to measure risk aversion are firm size (number of 
employees) and firm age.  The hypothesis is that larger and older firms are less risk 
averse and therefore will express greater interest in joint action.   
We also predict that access to credit should positively affect the decision to 
participate, since these firms are more able to fund their participation in the initiative.   
 
Table 3.10: Joint Action Summary Statistics 
  Mean Median Std. Dev. Variance Min Max NOBs 
Employment (# of 
Employees) 95.54 45.5 121.45 14750.39 5 585 56 
Ln(Employment) 3.89 3.82 1.19 1.41 1.61 6.37 56 
Age 18.59 16.5 12.34 152.32 2 53 56 
Ln(1+age) 2.75 2.86 0.71 0.50 1.10 3.99 56 
Sell Some Products  
Under Own Name 
(0,1) 0.46 0 0.50 0.25 0 1 56 
Sell Some Products  
Directly to Hospitals 
(0,1) 0.30 0 0.46 0.22 0 1 56 
Would Participate in 
Joint Action (0,1) 0.27 0 0.45 0.20 0 1 56 
Duration of Trading 
Relationship with 
Oldest Customer 
(years) 11.55 10 8.64 74.71 1 40 56 
Talk at Least Weekly 
with Other Producers 
(0,1) 0.45 0 0.50 0.25 0 1 56 
Credit Access (0,1) 0.59 1 0.50 0.25 0 1 56 
 
 
Joint Action Results 
Probit and logit regressions are estimated for the probability that firms would 
decide to participate in the hypothetical joint action initiative, using various firm-level 
characteristics as explanatory variables as described in the previous sub-section. The 
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results of these regressions are presented in Table 3.11.   
The results show that firms with some previous experience in direct marketing, 
including selling some products under their own name and selling some goods directly to 
hospitals, have a greater interest in carrying out a joint action with other firms for 
purposes of marketing.  Firms that sell products under their own brand name are 22-23 
percent more likely to be interested in joint action, and firms that have already sold some 
goods directly to hospitals are 29 percent more likely to be interested in a joint marketing 
initiative.   
Firms that have had longer duration relationships with customers tend to be less 
likely to be interested in joint action.  Increasing the duration of a firm’s relationship with 
their oldest customer by one year reduces the likelihood that a firm is interested in a joint 
marketing initiative by about 6 percent.  Increasing the duration by one standard 
deviation (from 11.55 to 20.19 years) reduces the probability that a firm is interested in 
joint action by 48 to 51 percent.  These results are consistent with the hypothesis that 
firms with a higher opportunity cost of joint action would be less likely to participate in 
such initiatives.  Since the coefficient on the duration-squared variable is positive, one 
may be concerned that the impact of duration on the likelihood of carrying out joint 
action may become positive for some sample points.  However, the effect of duration on 
joint action only becomes positive at 40 ½ years and 39 years for probit and logit 
estimations respectively, and only one firm has a relationship of duration longer than 
these values.   
Having access to credit, either from a bank or through a credit association has a 
positive but insignificant effect on the likelihood of being interested in direct marketing.  
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Since the cost of such an initiative was not discussed in the questionnaire, it is possible 
that the firms did not consider the potential cost when answering the questions about joint 
action. 
Risk aversion (as measured by firm size and age) does not appear to affect the 
decision to participate in a joint marketing initiative.  Intra-cluster communication  as 
measured by frequent interactions with other producers also had no significant impact. 
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Table 3.11: Joint Action Results, Marginal Effects 
 (1) (2) 
 Joint Action  
Probit 
(Marginal Effects) 
Joint Action  
 Logit 
(Marginal Effects) 
Employment 
  
-0.00074 
(-0.46) 
-0.00077 
(-0.47) 
Employment squared -0.000004 
(-0.75) 
-0.000003 
(-0.69) 
Age 
  
0.019 
(1.10) 
0.016 
(0.82) 
Age squared -0.00018 
(-0.52) 
-0.00012 
(-0.30) 
Sell some products under own name 0.22 
(1.95)+ 
0.23 
(1.89)+ 
Sell some products to hospitals 
directly 
0.29 
(2.44)* 
0.29 
(2.38)* 
Duration of relationship with oldest 
customer (years) 
-0.066 
(-3.87)** 
-0.063 
(-3.77)** 
Duration squared 
  
0.0016 
(4.42)** 
0.0016 
(4.47)** 
Credit Access 
  
0.095 
(1.15) 
0.089 
(1.07) 
Talk at Least Weekly with Other 
Producers 
0.15 
(1.62) 
0.15 
(1.62) 
Observations 56 56 
Wald Chi-2(10) 20.10 15.75 
Prob>Chi-2 0.03 0.11 
Log Likelihood -21.08 -21.09 
RI  Relative Amount of Information 
in Prediction141 
0.27 0.27 
Pseudo R-squared 0.35 0.35 
(Robust z statistics in parentheses, **significant at 1%, *significant at 5%, +significant at 
10%) 
 
 
3.7 Conclusions 
 
Several interesting results have been obtained regarding relational contracting as 
                                                 
141  RI , or the “relative amount of information in prediction” for models with qualitative dependent 
variables was developed by Betancourt and Clague (1981).  Put simply, it assesses the amount of additional 
information imparted by the inclusion of explanatory variables to the model (i.e. the introduction of a 
theory) relative to the amount of information already contained in the sample proportions.  It helps to deal 
with some of the undesirable properties of traditional R2 measures as they are applied to qualitative 
dependent variable models, for example that there cannot be a decomposition of total variation and 
questions about the correct upper-bound for binary-choice statistics. 
  105 
 
well as the prospects for direct marketing by clustered firms.  It was originally speculated 
that networks, rather than the lock-in of individual customers, would be the predominant 
form of contract enforcement in a cluster environment.  However, similar to McMillan 
and Woodruff (1999), both types of variables were significant in the regressions of trade 
credit offered to customers.  Since firms give more trade credit (and are more likely to 
give credit) when relationships are of longer duration, there is some evidence of lock-in 
as a tool for contract enforcement.  Business networks, that may be used to gather 
information about the reliability of customers or for social sanction, are also found to be 
significant determinants of inter-firm trust; firms that obtain information through business 
networks are more likely to offer trade credit (and offer more trade credit) to their 
customers.  Finally, we found that firms are more likely to offer trade credit and to offer 
more trade credit to their customers when firms believe that the court system can help to 
enforce contracts.  
In the regressions for trade credit received from suppliers, customer lock-in (as 
measured here) does not appear to have an effect on receiving trade credit.  The lack of a 
measurable impact of customer lock-in may be caused either by a poor measurement of 
customer lock-in or that it is not an important factor determining trust between clustered 
firms in Sialkot.  The results show that firms are less likely to receive credit when they 
are visited by suppliers before the first sale, possibly indicating that unknown trading 
partners are less trusted.  On the other hand, regular contact between firms and suppliers 
appear to reinforce inter-firm trust, since firms that visit their suppliers weekly are 17 
percent more likely to receive trade credit.   
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The joint action regression results show that exporters with some previous 
experience in direct marketing, including selling some products under their own name 
and selling some goods directly to hospitals, are more interested in carrying out a joint 
action with other firms to market goods.  On average, firms with a long trading 
relationship with its oldest customer tend to express less interest in joint marketing 
agreements, most likely due to the fact that longer duration trading relationships are of 
high (and certain) value. 
Industrial clusters provide employment for large numbers of people in developing 
countries, and have become significant exporters.  Case studies highlighting the successes 
of developing country clusters in these respects have led to enthusiasm on the part of 
development practitioners about the prospects of clustering as a strategy to promote 
private sector development and reduce poverty.  However, our relational contracting 
results are qualitatively (and in some cases quantitatively) similar to those obtained in 
studies of non-clustered firms.142  Furthermore, social network-based relationships in 
clusters have been shown to have distortionary effects, as documented by Ilias (2001) and 
Banerjee and Munshi (2000).  Therefore, policies to promote the development of 
industrial clusters should consider both the benefits and the drawbacks of clustering, and 
incorporate the lessons learned from these studies.
                                                 
142 This is only a tentative conclusion based on a comparison of the coefficient estimates of similar 
regressions conducted of clustered (Sialkot, this study) and non-clustered firms (Vietnam, McMillan and 
Woodruff (1999)).  We cannot directly compare the magnitudes of coefficients because there was not a 
joint regression of clustered and non-clustered firms.  Conclusive results comparing contract enforcement 
of clustered versus non-clustered firms would require further study. 
  107 
 
 
  108 
 
Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Proofs for Chapter Two 
 
Proof of Proposition 1:  It is always efficient for the DC firm to market the high quality 
goods of both high and low quality firms.  
If the LDC firms (or a sub-set) decide to market their own goods, the cluster must 
pay an entry cost, M, in order to build a distribution network.  (The manner in which the 
entry cost is divided among the firms is irrelevant).  Therefore, the total expected surplus 
of the goods produced and marketed by the cluster firms is 
[ ] MNcNR BA −−−−+− )1)(1()1( θαθα . 
The DC firm already has a distribution network through which it can sell the 
cluster’s goods, and the entry cost does not need to be paid.  The total expected surplus of 
the goods produced by the cluster that can be earned by selling the goods through the DC 
firm is simply [ ] NcNR BA −−−+− )1)(1()1( θαθα . 
Therefore, total expected surplus is reduced when the clustered firms decide to market 
their own goods.   
 
 
Lemma 1: For any announced price, p such that p≥ c, there exists at least one pure 
strategy second stage equilibrium, where all cluster firms to sell to the DC firm. 
 
Proof:  
For type A firms: Suppose that for a given p = p*≥ c, N-1 of the cluster firms decide to 
sell to the DC firm.  For the remaining firm, firm i, (suppose it is type A), it is a best 
response to also sell to the DC firm.  By selling to the DC firm, it earns LDCAiΠ = p
* – c≥0. 
By deciding to market its output alone, it would earn E LDCAiΠ = cMR A −−− )1( θ <0.   
For type B firms: Similar arguments prove the proposition for type B firms. 
 
 
Lemma 2a: In any continuation equilibrium, all type A firms will follow the same 
strategy, and all type B firms will follow the same strategy.  
 
Proof: Proof is by contradiction.  Consider two type B firms i and j that might be 
following different strategies.  Suppose that type B firm i follows a strategy such that if 
the announced price p=p* then firm i sells to the DC firm.  For type B firm j, if p=p* then 
the firm engages in joint action.  
If firm j’s strategy is a best response, it must be that 
γ
θ
N
MR B −− )1( ≥  p
* where γ  is the 
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proportion of all cluster firms participating in joint action when p=p*.143  If this is true, 
then firm i's strategy is not a best response to the other LDC firms’ strategies because i's 
payoff from following the strategy when p=p* is LDCBiΠ = p
* – c which is strictly lower 
than i's payoff from deviating from the strategy by engaging in joint action and earning 
LDC
BiΠ = 1
)1(
+
−−
γ
θ
N
MR B .   
If, instead 
γ
θ
N
MR B −− )1( < p
*, then firm j’s strategy is not a best response, and it will 
join firm i in selling to the DC firm. 
Therefore firm i must follow the same strategy as firm j in equilibrium.  The argument 
can be extended to consider any three type B firms that have different strategies and so on 
up to )1( α−N  type B firms.  Therefore, all type B firms will follow the same strategy.  
Similar arguments prove the proposition for type A firms. 
 
Lemma 2b: There does not exist a set of continuation equilibrium strategies such that 
type B firms participate in the joint action and type A firms sell to the DC firm.  
 
Proof: Proof is by contradiction.  Suppose that a type A firm i follows a strategy where if 
the announced price p=p* then firm i sells to the DC firm.  For a type B firm j, if p=p* 
then the firm engages in joint action.  For firm j’s strategy to be a best response, it must 
be that 
γ
θ
N
MR B −− )1( ≥  p
* where γ  is the proportion of all cluster firms participating in 
joint action when p=p*.144  If this is true, then firm i's strategy is not a best response to the 
other LDC firms’ strategies because i's payoff from following the strategy when p=p* is 
LDC
AiΠ = p
* – c which is strictly lower than i's payoff from deviating from the strategy by 
engaging in joint action and earning E LDCAiΠ = 1
)1(
+
−−
γ
θ
N
MR A .  Therefore, there does 
not exist a set of strategies in equilibrium such that type B firms can engage in joint 
action while type A firms sell to the DC firm. 
 
 
Lemma 2c: Given Assumption A, for any given p<
N
MR B −− )1( θ  (in other words, p is 
less than the expected profit from joint action for type B firms when all firms 
participate), there exists a pure strategy continuation equilibrium where all cluster 
firms engage in joint action. 
If p*<
N
MR B −− )1( θ  and all cluster firms participate in joint action, type B firms earn 
                                                 
143  If no firms other than j are participating in joint action, let γN =1. 
 
144 If no firms other than j are participating in joint action, let γN =1. 
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E LDCBiΠ = N
MR B −− )1( θ - c and type A firms earn E LDCAiΠ = N
MR A −− )1( θ  - c.  A cluster 
firm (type A or B) that deviates and sells to the DC firm will earn LDCiΠ =p
*- c which is 
lower than the payoff to joint action.  
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Appendix B: Nash Equilibria of the Game for Various Parameter Values 
When the Coalition-Proof Equilibrium Refinement is Applied to the Second 
Stage 
 
a. Case 1: Joint action is potentially profitable for type A firms only  
Case 1: 
N
MR B −− )1( θ < c and α
θ
N
MRc A −−< )1(  
 
The DC firm can always buy from only the type B firms at a price p=c since joint action 
would never yield positive profits for them under these parameter values.   
 
If the coalition-proof equilibrium refinement is applied, then type A firms adopt the 
strategy that they will carry out joint action for any announced price 
α
θ
N
MRp A −−< )1( .  Whether or not offering a higher price to the type A firms is 
profitable for the DC firm depends on all the parameter values.  Since the DC firm cannot 
distinguish between type A and type B firms, the DC firm would have to offer the higher 
price (
α
θ
N
MRp A −−= )1( ) to all the cluster firms, not just type A firms.   
Given  DC BonlyBuyEΠ = [ ]cRN B −−− )1()1( θα  and  
DC
BABuyE &Π = [ ] 



−−−−−+−
α
θθαθα
N
MRNNR ABA )1()1)(1()1( =
α
θθα MNR BA +−− ))(1( , DC BABuyE &Π > DC BonlyBuyEΠ  requires that 
0)1()1)(1( >−++−−− cNMNR A αα
θα . 
Given the roots of DC BABuyE &Π -
DC
BonlyBuyEΠ =0, then for ])1([ cRN
M
A −−θ
>
4
1 , no real 
roots exist, so that DC BABuyE &Π >
DC
BonlyBuyEΠ  for all α .  And for ])1([ cRN
M
A −−θ
<
4
1 , 
DC
BABuyE &Π >
DC
BonlyBuyEΠ  for ),( 65 ααα ∈ .
145 
 
Summary of results for case 1: 
Type B firms sell their goods to the DC firm since joint action would not yield positive 
profits. If the coalition-proof equilibrium refinement is applied, and 
                                                 
145 
2
])1([
41
2
1
6,5
cRN
M
A −−
−
±=
θ
α  
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[ ]cRN
M
A −− )1( θ
≤1/4, then a pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists 
such that for all ),( 65 ααα ∈ the DC buys goods from type B firms at p=c and type A 
firms carry out a joint action marketing initiative.   
If the coalition-proof equilibrium refinement is applied, and either i) 
[ ]cRN
M
A −− )1( θ
≤1/4 where ),( 65 ααα ∉  or ii) [ ]cRN
M
A −− )1( θ
>1/4, then a pure 
strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists such that the DC firm buys from all 
cluster firms at a price  
α
θ
N
MRp A −−= )1( .   
 
 
b. Cases 2 – 15: Joint action is potentially profitable for both types of cluster firms, 
but it is not possible for the DC firm to only buy from type B firms  
Cases 2 - 15: 
c
N
MR B >−− )1( θ , 0))(1( ≤−−− α
θθα
N
MR AB , and α
θ
N
MR A −− )1( < N
MR B −− )1( θ  
 
In cases 2-15, the DC firm can only buy from all or none of the cluster firms since 
α
θ
N
MR A −− )1( < N
MR B −− )1( θ . 
Since the DC firm receives positive profits by buying and reselling the cluster’s output, 
the DC firm will always buy from all of the cluster firms in this case. 
 
If the coalition-proof equilibrium refinement is applied, then the DC firm would earn 
[ ] 



−−−−−+−=Π
N
MRNNRE BBA
DC )1()1)(1()1( θθαθα  by offering 
N
MRp B −−= )1( θ  and would earn zero profits if it offers N
MRp B −−< )1( θ . 
 
 
Summary of results for cases 2 – 15: 
If the coalition-proof equilibrium refinement is applied, then a pure strategy subgame 
perfect Nash equilibrium exists such that the DC firm buys from all cluster firms and 
pays 
N
MRp B −−= )1( θ  to all cluster firms.   
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c. Cases 16 – 21: Joint action is potentially profitable for both types of cluster firms, 
and it is possible for the DC firm to either buy from all cluster firms or buy only 
from type B firms 
For cases 16 - 21: 
c
N
MR B >−− )1( θ , 0))(1( ≤−−− α
θθα
N
MR AB , and  
N
MR B −− )1( θ < α
θ
N
MR A −− )1(  
 
In cases 16-21, the DC firm can effectively buy from all cluster firms, type B only, or 
from none of the cluster firms, depending on the price that it announces.  The DC firm 
will always buy from at least the type B firms because it makes positive profits by buying 
and marketing the output of type B firms.  It will be shown that there will be some 
instances where the DC firm could make positive profits procuring the whole cluster’s 
output, but chooses to buy from type B firms only.  
 
If the coalition-proof equilibrium refinement is applied, the DC firm can buy the whole 
cluster’s output by offering p=
α
θ
N
MR A −− )1(  to all firms, or it buy only from type B 
firms by offering p=
N
MR B −− )1( θ  as long as DC BABuyE &Π > DC BonlyBuyEΠ .  Recall that if 
the DC firm is buying all of the cluster’s output, it must pay the same price to all firms 
since it cannot distinguish the quality type of individual cluster firms.   
Given  DC BonlyBuyEΠ = 









−−−−−
N
MRRN BB )1()1()1( θθα = )1( α−M  and  
DC
BABuyE &Π = α
θθα MN AB +−− ))(1( , DC BABuyE &Π > DC BonlyBuyEΠ  requires that 
0)1())(1( >


 −
−+−−−
N
M
N
MRN AB
α
α
θθα .  However, the DC firm can profitably buy 
from type A (and therefore the entire cluster) whenever 0))(1( ≥+−−−
α
θθα
N
MR AB .  
Therefore, the condition allowing for DC to make positive profits by buying all of the 
cluster’s output is not sufficient for the DC firm to want to do so. 
 
When the difference between the benefit that the DC firm receives by buying from both 
firms ( [ ])1)(1()1( BAR θαθα −−+− ) and the price that the DC firm has to pay in order to 
procure the output of type A firms (
α
θ
N
MRp A −−= )1( ) is sufficiently small, such that 
[ ]
N
M
N
MRR ABA
)1()1()1)(1()1( α
α
θθαθα −<



−−−−−+− , then the DC firm will 
choose to only buy the type B firms’ output, even though it can make positive profits by 
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procuring and marketing all of the cluster’s output.   
 
Given the roots of DC BABuyE &Π -
DC
BonlyBuyEΠ =0, then for )( ABNR
M
θθ −
>
3
1 , no real roots 
exist, and DC BABuyE &Π >
DC
BonlyBuyEΠ  for all α
146.  And for 
)( ABNR
M
θθ −
<
3
1 , the DC firm 
will choose to only buy the type B firms’ output for ),( 21 ααα ∈ . 
 
 
Summary of results for cases 16 - 21: 
 
If the coalition-proof equilibrium refinement is applied, then for parameter values such 
that 
)( ABNR
M
θθ −
>
3
1  , or for 
3
1
)(
<
− ABNR
M
θθ
 where for ),( 21 ααα ∉  a pure strategy 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists such that the cluster firms sell their goods to the 
DC firm at a price 
α
θ
N
MRp A −−= )1( .  For all other parameter values such that 
3
1
)(
<
− ABNR
M
θθ
 where for ),( 21 ααα ∈  a pure strategy subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium exists such that the type B firms sell their goods to the DC firm at a price 
N
MRp B −−= )1( θ  and type A firms will market their own goods.   
 
 
 
d. Cases 22 – 27: Joint action is potentially profitable for all firms, but the DC firm 
would earn negative profits if it were to offer type A firms what they would earn 
from joint action  
For cases 22 - 27: 
c
N
MR B >−− )1( θ , 0))(1( >−−− α
θθα
N
MR AB  
In cases 22 – 27, the DC firm would earn negative profits if it were to offer 
α
θ
N
MRp A −−= )1( , i.e. what type A firms what they would earn from joint action. 
 
However, in order to have positive profits, the DC firm must at least buy from the type B 
firms.  If the coalition-proof equilibrium refinement is applied, the DC firm buys from 
                                                 
146 
[ ] ( )[ ]
[ ]
N
MR
N
MR
N
M
N
M
AR
AB
AB
+−
+−−+−
±=
)(2
)(4
2
)2(
2
1
2,1
θθ
θθθθ
α  
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type B firms at a price p=
N
MR B −− )1( θ .   
 
If the coalition-proof equilibrium refinement is applied, then the DC firm will only make 
positive profits if it purchases goods from the type B firms.  Buying from the type B 
firms, the DC firm would earn 
[ ] 



−−−−−−+−−=Π
N
MRNRNE BBA
DC )1()1()1)(1()1()1( θαθαθαα  by offering 
N
MRp B −−= )1( θ  and would earn zero profits if it offers N
MRp B −−< )1( θ .   
 
Summary of results for cases 22 - 27: 
If the coalition-proof equilibrium refinement is applied, then a pure strategy subgame 
perfect Nash equilibrium exists such that the type A firms carry out a joint action 
initiative and the DC firm markets the goods of the type B firms at price 
N
MRp B −−= )1( θ . 
  116 
 
Appendix C: Continuation Equilibria of the Second Stage for Various 
Parameter Values, Taking p as Given 
 
a. Case 1: Joint action is potentially profitable for type A firms only  
For Case 1: 
N
MR B −− )1( θ < c and α
θ
N
MRc A −−< )1(  
For 
α
θ
N
MRpc A −−<≤ )1( , there are two pure strategy continuation (or second stage) 
equilibria, taking p as given.  In the first, type B firms sell to the DC firm and type A 
firms engage in joint action.  In the second, all cluster firms sell to the DC firm. For 
α
θ
N
MRp A −−≥ )1( , there is one continuation equilibrium where all cluster firms to sell 
to the DC firm. 
 
 
b. and c. Cases 2 – 15 and 16 - 21: Joint action is potentially profitable for both 
types of cluster firms 
b. For Cases 2 – 15, the following hold: c
N
MR B >−− )1( θ , 
0))(1( ≤−−−
α
θθα
N
MR AB , and α
θ
N
MR A −− )1( < N
MR B −− )1( θ . 
 
2. For 
1
)1(
+
−−
α
θ
N
MR B <c< α
θ
N
MR A −− )1( < )1(
)1(
α
θ
−
−−
N
MR B   we have the 
following equilibria in the second stage of the game, taking p as given. 
For 
N
MRpc B −−<≤ )1( θ , there are three continuation equilibria.  In the first, all cluster 
firms sell to the DC firm.  In the second, all cluster firms carry out joint action. In the 
third continuation equilibrium, type A firms carry out a joint action initiative while type 
B firms sell to the DC firm.  For 
N
MRp B −−≥ )1( θ , there is one continuation 
equilibrium where all cluster firms to sell to the DC firm.   
 
3. For <c
1
)1(
+
−−
α
θ
N
MR B < α
θ
N
MR A −− )1( < )1(
)1(
α
θ
−
−−
N
MR B   we have the 
following  equilibria in the second stage of the game, taking p as given.  
For 
1
)1(
+
−−<≤
α
θ
N
MRpc B  there are two continuation equilibria.  In the first, all 
cluster firms sell to the DC firm.  In the second, all cluster firms carry out a joint action 
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initiative.  For <≤
+
−− p
N
MR B 1
)1(
α
θ
N
MR B −− )1( θ , there are three pure strategy 
continuation equilibria.  In the first, all cluster firms sell to the DC firm.  In the second, 
all cluster firms carry out a joint action initiative.  In the third continuation equilibrium, 
type A firms carry out a joint action initiative while type B firms sell to the DC firm.  For 
N
MRp B −−≥ )1( θ , there is one continuation equilibrium where all cluster firms to sell 
to the DC firm.  
 
4. For <c
α
θ
N
MR A −− )1( < 1
)1(
+
−−
α
θ
N
MR B < )1(
)1(
α
θ
−
−−
N
MR B , we have the 
following equilibria in the second stage of the game, taking p as given. 
For 
N
MRpc B −−<≤ )1( θ , there are two continuation equilibria.  In the first, all cluster 
firms engage in joint action and in the second, all sell to the DC firm.  For 
N
MRp B −−≥ )1( θ , there is one continuation equilibrium where all cluster firms sell 
their goods to the DC firm.   
 
5.  For 
α
θ
N
MR A −− )1( c< < )1(
)1(
α
θ
−
−−
N
MR B  we have the following equilibria in the 
second stage of the game, taking p as given. 
For 
N
MRpc B −−<≤ )1( θ , there are two continuation equilibria.  In the first, all cluster 
firms engage in joint action and in the second, all sell to the DC firm.  For 
N
MRp B −−≥ )1( θ , there is one continuation equilibrium where all cluster firms sell 
their goods to the DC firm.   
 
 
6. For 
α
θ
N
MR A −− )1( < )1(
)1(
α
θ
−
−−
N
MR B < c < 1)1(
)1(
+−
−−
α
θ
N
MR A  we have the 
following equilibria in the second stage, taking p as given. 
For 
N
MRpc B −−<≤ )1( θ , there are two continuation equilibria.  In the first, all cluster 
firms engage in joint action and in the second, all sell to the DC firm.  For 
N
MRp B −−≥ )1( θ , there is one continuation equilibrium where all cluster firms sell 
their goods to the DC firm.    
 
7. For 
α
θ
N
MR A −− )1( < )1(
)1(
α
θ
−
−−
N
MR B   < 1)1(
)1(
+−
−−
α
θ
N
MR A < c, we have the 
following equilibria in the second stage of the game, taking p as given. 
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For 
N
MRpc B −−<≤ )1( θ , there are two continuation equilibria.  In the first, all cluster 
firms engage in joint action, and in the second, all sell to the DC firm. For 
N
MRp B −−≥ )1( θ , there is one continuation equilibrium where all cluster firms sell 
their goods to the DC firm.   
 
8.  For 
N
MR B −− )1( θ > α
θ
N
MR A −− )1( > )1(
)1(
α
θ
−
−−
N
MR B  1
)1(
+
−−>
α
θ
N
MR B >c 
we have the following equilibria in the second stage of the game, taking p as given. 
For 
1
)1(
+
−−<≤
α
θ
N
MRpc B , there are two continuation equilibria.  In the first, all 
cluster firms engage in joint action, and in the second, all sell to the DC firm.  For 
α
θ
α
θ
N
MRp
N
MR AB −−<≤+
−− )1(
1
)1(  , there are three possible pure strategy 
continuation equilibria.  In the first, all cluster firms engage in joint action, and in the 
second, all sell to the DC firm.  In the third continuation equilibrium, type A firms carry 
out a joint action initiative while the type B firms sell to the DC firm.  
For <≤−− p
N
MR A α
θ )1(
N
MR B −− )1( θ , there are two continuation equilibria.  In the 
first, all cluster firms engage in joint action, and in the second, all sell to the DC firm.  
For 
N
MRp B −−= )1( θ there is one continuation equilibrium where all cluster firms sell 
their goods to the DC firm.   
 
 
9. For 
N
MR B −− )1( θ > α
θ
N
MR A −− )1( > )1(
)1(
α
θ
−
−−
N
MR B >c 1
)1(
+
−−>
α
θ
N
MR B  
then we have the following equilibria in the second stage of the game, taking p as given. 
For 
α
θ
N
MRpc A −−<≤ )1(    there are three pure strategy continuation equilibria.  In the 
first, all cluster firms to engage in joint action, and in the second, all cluster firms sell to 
the DC firm.  In the third pure strategy continuation equilibrium, type A firms carry out a 
joint action initiative and type B firms sell to the DC firm.  For 
<≤−− p
N
MR B α
θ )1(
N
MR B −− )1( θ  there are two pure strategy continuation equilibria.  
In the first, all cluster firms to engage in joint action and in the second, all cluster firms 
sell to the DC firm.  For 
N
MRp B −−≥ )1( θ , there is one continuation equilibrium where 
all cluster firms sell to the DC firm.   
 
10. For 
N
MR B −− )1( θ > α
θ
N
MR A −− )1( >c> )1(
)1(
α
θ
−
−−
N
MR B  1
)1(
+
−−>
α
θ
N
MR B  
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then we have the following equilibria in the second stage of the game, taking p as given.  
For 
α
θ
N
MRpc A −−<≤ )1(    there are three pure strategy continuation equilibria.  In the 
first, all cluster firms to engage in joint action, and in the second, all cluster firms sell to 
the DC firm.  In the third pure strategy continuation equilibrium, type A firms carry out a 
joint action initiative and type B firms sell to the DC firm.  For 
<≤−− p
N
MR B α
θ )1(
N
MR B −− )1( θ  there are two pure strategy continuation equilibria.  
In the first, all cluster firms to engage in joint action and in the second, all cluster firms 
sell to the DC firm.  For 
N
MRp B −−≥ )1( θ , there is one continuation equilibrium where 
all cluster firms sell to the DC firm.   
 
11. For 
N
MR B −− )1( θ >c> α
θ
N
MR A −− )1( > )1(
)1(
α
θ
−
−−
N
MR B  1
)1(
+
−−>
α
θ
N
MR B  
we have the following equilibria in the second stage of the game, taking p as given. 
 For 
N
MRpc B −−<≤ )1( θ   there are two continuation equilibria.  In the first, all cluster 
firms engage in joint action and in the second, all sell to the DC firm.    
For 
N
MRp B −−≥ )1( θ , there is one continuation equilibrium where all cluster firms sell 
their goods to the DC firm.   
 
12. For 
N
MR B −− )1( θ > α
θ
N
MR A −− )1( 1
)1(
+
−−>
α
θ
N
MR B > )1(
)1(
α
θ
−
−−
N
MR B  >c 
then we have the following equilibria in the second stage of the game, taking p as given. 
 For c <≤ p
1
)1(
+
−−
α
θ
N
MR B  there are two pure strategy continuation equilibria.  In 
the first, all cluster firms engage in joint action and in the second, all sell to the DC firm.  
For <≤
+
−− p
N
MR B 1
)1(
α
θ
α
θ
N
MR A −− )1(  there are three pure strategy continuation 
equilibria.  In the first, all cluster firms engage in joint action, and in the second, all sell 
to the DC firm. In the third pure strategy continuation equilibrium, type A firms carry out 
a joint action initiative and type B firms sell to the DC firm.   
For <≤−− p
N
MR B α
θ )1(
N
MR B −− )1( θ  there are two pure strategy continuation 
equilibria.  In the first, all cluster firms to engage in joint action and in the second, all 
cluster firms sell to the DC firm.  For 
N
MRp B −−≥ )1( θ , there is one continuation 
equilibrium where all cluster firms sell to the DC firm.   
 
13. For 
N
MR B −− )1( θ > α
θ
N
MR A −− )1( 1
)1(
+
−−>
α
θ
N
MR B >c > )1(
)1(
α
θ
−
−−
N
MR B  
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then we have the following equilibria in the second stage of the game, taking p as given. 
 For c <≤ p
1
)1(
+
−−
α
θ
N
MR B  there are two pure strategy continuation equilibria.  In 
the first, all cluster firms engage in joint action and in the second, all sell to the DC firm.  
For <≤
+
−− p
N
MR B 1
)1(
α
θ
α
θ
N
MR A −− )1(  there are three pure strategy continuation 
equilibria.  In the first, all cluster firms engage in joint action, and in the second, all sell 
to the DC firm.  In the third pure strategy continuation equilibrium, type A firms carry 
out a joint action initiative and type B firms sell to the DC firm.  For 
<≤−− p
N
MR B α
θ )1(
N
MR B −− )1( θ  there are two pure strategy continuation equilibria.  
In the first, all cluster firms to engage in joint action and in the second, all cluster firms 
sell to the DC firm.  For 
N
MRp B −−≥ )1( θ , there is one continuation equilibrium where 
all cluster firms sell to the DC firm.   
 
14. For 
N
MR B −− )1( θ > α
θ
N
MR A −− )1( >c 1
)1(
+
−−>
α
θ
N
MR B > )1(
)1(
α
θ
−
−−
N
MR B  
then we have the following equilibria in the second stage, taking p as given. 
 For c
α
θ
N
MRp A −−<≤ )1( , there are three pure strategy continuation equilibria.  In the 
first, all cluster firms engage in joint action, and in the second, all sell to the DC firm.  In 
the third pure strategy continuation equilibrium, type A firms carry out a joint action 
initiative and type B firms sell to the DC firm.  For <≤−− p
N
MR B α
θ )1(
N
MR B −− )1( θ  
there are two pure strategy continuation equilibria.  In the first, all cluster firms to engage 
in joint action, and in the second, all cluster firms sell to the DC firm.   
For 
N
MRp B −−≥ )1( θ , there is one continuation equilibrium where all cluster firms sell 
to the DC firm. 
 
15. For 
N
MR B −− )1( θ >c > α
θ
N
MR A −− )1( 1
)1(
+
−−>
α
θ
N
MR B > )1(
)1(
α
θ
−
−−
N
MR B  
then we have the following equilibria in the second stage of the game, taking p as given. 
 For <≤ pc
N
MR B −− )1( θ there are two pure strategy continuation equilibria.  In the 
first, all cluster firms engage in joint action, and in the second all cluster firms sell to the 
DC firm.  For 
N
MRp B −−= )1( θ , there is one continuation equilibrium where all cluster 
firms sell to the DC firm.   
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c. For cases 16 – 21, the following hold: c
N
MR B >−− )1( θ , 
0))(1( ≤−−−
α
θθα
N
MR AB , and N
MR B −− )1( θ < α
θ
N
MR A −− )1(  
 
16. For 
α
θ
N
MR A −− )1( > N
MR B −− )1( θ > 1
)1(
+
−−
α
θ
N
MR B > )1(
)1(
α
θ
−
−−
N
MR B >c 
then we have the following equilibria in the second stage of the game, taking p as given. 
For <≤ pc
1
)1(
+
−−
α
θ
N
MR B  there are two pure strategy continuation equilibria.  In 
the first, all cluster firms engage in joint action and in the second all cluster firms sell to 
the DC firm.  For 
1
)1(
+
−−
α
θ
N
MR B <≤ p N
MR B −− )1( θ  there are three pure strategy 
continuation equilibria.  In the first, all cluster firms engage in joint action and in the 
second all cluster firms sell to the DC firm.  In the third continuation equilibrium, type A 
firms carry out a joint action initiative and type B firms sell to the DC firm.    
For <≤−− p
N
MR B )1( θ α
θ
N
MR A −− )1( , there are two pure strategy continuation 
equilibria.  In the first, type B firms sell to the DC firm and type A firms carry out a joint 
action initiative.  In the second continuation equilibrium, all cluster firms to sell to the 
DC firm.  For 
α
θ
N
MRp A −−≥ )1(  there is one continuation equilibrium where all cluster 
firms sell to the DC firm.   
 
 
17.  For 
α
θ
N
MR A −− )1( > N
MR B −− )1( θ > 1
)1(
+
−−
α
θ
N
MR B >c> )1(
)1(
α
θ
−
−−
N
MR B  
then we have the following equilibria in the second stage of the game, taking p as given. 
For c
1
)1(
+
−−<≤
α
θ
N
MRp B  there are two pure strategy continuation equilibria.  In the 
first, all cluster firms engage in joint action and in the second all cluster firms sell to the 
DC firm.  For <≤
+
−− p
N
MR B 1
)1(
α
θ
N
MR B −− )1( θ   there are three pure strategy 
continuation equilibria.  In the first, all cluster firms engage in joint action and in the 
second all cluster firms sell to the DC firm.  In the third pure strategy continuation 
equilibrium, type A firms carry out a joint action initiative and type B firms sell to the 
DC firm.  For 
N
MR B −− )1( θ α
θ
N
MRp A −−<≤ )1(  there are two pure strategy 
continuation equilibria.  In the first, type A firms carry out joint action while type B firms 
sell to the DC firm, and in the second equilibrium all cluster firms sell to the DC firm. 
For 
α
θ
N
MRp A −−≥ )1(  there is one continuation equilibrium where all cluster firms sell 
to the DC firm.  
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18. For 
α
θ
N
MR A −− )1( > N
MR B −− )1( θ >c> 1
)1(
+
−−
α
θ
N
MR B > )1(
)1(
α
θ
−
−−
N
MR B  
then we have the following equilibria in the second stage of the game, taking p as given. 
For c <≤ p
N
MR B −− )1( θ  there are three pure strategy continuation equilibria.  In the 
first, all cluster firms engage in joint action, and in the second all cluster firms sell to the 
DC firm. In the third pure strategy continuation equilibrium, type A firms carry out a 
joint action initiative and type B firms sell to the DC firm.   
For <≤−− p
N
MR B )1( θ α
θ
N
MR A −− )1( , there are two pure strategy continuation.  In 
the first, type B firms sell to the DC firm and type A firms carry out a joint action 
initiative.  In the second continuation equilibrium, all cluster firms to sell to the DC firm.  
For 
α
θ
N
MRp A −−≥ )1(  there is one continuation equilibrium where all cluster firms sell 
to the DC firm.   
 
19. For 
α
θ
N
MR A −− )1( > N
MR B −− )1( θ > )1(
)1(
α
θ
−
−−
N
MR B > 1
)1(
+
−−
α
θ
N
MR B >c 
then we have the following equilibria in the second stage, taking p as given. 
For 
1
)1(
+
−−<≤
α
θ
N
MRpc B , there are two pure strategy continuation equilibria.  In 
the first, all cluster firms sell to the DC firm and in the second, all cluster firms carry out 
joint action.  For <≤
+
−− p
N
MR B 1
)1(
α
θ
N
MR B −− )1( θ  there are three pure strategy 
continuation equilibria.  In the first, all cluster firms sell to the DC firm, and in the 
second, all cluster firms carry out joint action.  In the third, type A firms carry out joint 
action and type B firms sell to the DC firm.  For <≤−− p
N
MR B )1( θ α
θ
N
MR A −− )1( , 
there are two pure strategy continuation equilibria.  In the first, type B firms sell to the 
DC firm and type A engage in joint action and in the second, all cluster firms sell to the 
DC firm.  For 
α
θ
N
MRp A −−≥ )1(  there is one continuation equilibrium where all cluster 
firms sell to the DC firm.   
 
20. For 
α
θ
N
MR A −− )1( > N
MR B −− )1( θ > )1(
)1(
α
θ
−
−−
N
MR B >c > 1
)1(
+
−−
α
θ
N
MR B  
then we have the following equilibria in the second stage, taking p as given. 
For <≤ pc  
N
MR B −− )1( θ  there are three pure strategy continuation equilibria.  In the 
first, all cluster firms sell to the DC firm, and in the second, all cluster firms carry out 
joint action.  In the third, type A firms carry out joint action and type B firms sell to the 
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DC firm.  For <≤−− p
N
MR B )1( θ α
θ
N
MR A −− )1( , there are two pure strategy 
continuation equilibria.  In the first, type B firms sell to the DC firm and type A engage in 
joint action and in the second, all cluster firms sell to the DC firm.   
For 
α
θ
N
MRp A −−≥ )1(  there is one continuation equilibrium where all cluster firms sell 
to the DC firm.   
 
21. For 
α
θ
N
MR A −− )1( > N
MR B −− )1( θ >c > )1(
)1(
α
θ
−
−−
N
MR B  > 1
)1(
+
−−
α
θ
N
MR B  
then we have the following equilibria in the second stage, taking p as given. 
For <≤ pc  
N
MR B −− )1( θ  there are three pure strategy continuation equilibria.  In the 
first, all cluster firms sell to the DC firm and in the second, all cluster firms carry out 
joint action.  In the third, type A firms carry out joint action and type B firms sell to the 
DC firm.  For <≤−− p
N
MR B )1( θ α
θ
N
MR A −− )1( , there are two pure strategy 
continuation equilibria.  In the first, type B firms sell to the DC firm and type A engage in 
joint action, and in the second, all cluster firms sell to the DC firm.   
For 
α
θ
N
MRp A −−≥ )1(  there is one continuation equilibrium where all cluster firms sell 
to the DC firm.   
 
 
d. Cases 22 – 27: Joint action is potentially profitable for all firms, but the DC firm 
would earn negative profits if it were to offer type A firms what they would earn 
from joint action 
 
For Cases 22 – 27, the following hold: c
N
MR B >−− )1( θ  and 
0))(1( >−−−
α
θθα
N
MR AB .  The second inequality tells us that DC firm would earn 
negative profits if it were to offer type A firms 
α
θ
N
MRp A −−= )1(   
 
22. For 
)1(
)1(
α
θ
−
−−
N
MR B > 1
)1(
+
−−
α
θ
N
MR B >c then we have the following 
equilibria in the second stage of the game, taking p as given. 
For 
1
)1(
+
−−<≤
α
θ
N
MRpc B  there are two pure strategy continuation equilibria.  In the 
first, all cluster firms carry out joint action and in the second, all cluster firms sell to the 
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DC firm.  For <≤
+
−− p
N
MR B 1
)1(
α
θ
N
MR B −− )1( θ , there are three pure strategy 
continuation equilibria.  In the first, all cluster firms sell to the DC firm and in the second, 
all cluster firms carry out joint action.  In the third continuation equilibrium, type A firms 
carry out joint action and type B firms sell to the DC firm.  For p=
N
MR B −− )1( θ ,  there 
are two pure strategy continuation equilibria.  In the first, type A firms carry out joint 
action and type B firms sell to the DC firm and in the second, all cluster firms sell to the 
DC firm.  
 
23. For 
)1(
)1(
α
θ
−
−−
N
MR B  >c> 1
)1(
+
−−
α
θ
N
MR B  then we have the following 
equilibria in the second stage of the game, taking p as given. 
For 
N
MRpc B −−<≤ )1( θ  there are three pure strategy continuation equilibria.  In the 
first, all cluster firms sell to the DC firm and in the second, all cluster firms carry out 
joint action.  In the third, type A firms carry out joint action and type B firms sell to the 
DC firm.  For p=
N
MR B −− )1( θ ,  there are two pure strategy continuation equilibria.  In 
the first, type A firms carry out joint action and type B firms sell to the DC firm and in 
the second, all cluster firms sell to the DC firm.   
 
24. For  c>
)1(
)1(
α
θ
−
−−
N
MR B > 1
)1(
+
−−
α
θ
N
MR B  then we have the following 
equilibria in the second stage of the game, taking p as given. 
For c
N
MRp A −−<≤ )1( θ  there are three pure strategy continuation equilibria.  In the 
first, type B firms sell to the DC firm and type A firms engage in joint action.  In the 
second continuation equilibrium, all cluster firms engage in joint action.  In the third, all 
cluster firms sell to the DC firm.  For 
N
MRp A −−= )1( θ , there are two pure strategy 
continuation equilibria.  In the first, all cluster firms sell to the DC firm and in the second, 
type B firms sell their goods to the DC firm and type A firms engage in joint action.   
 
25. For 
1
)1(
+
−−
α
θ
N
MR B > )1(
)1(
α
θ
−
−−
N
MR B >c, then we have the following 
equilibria in the second stage of the game, taking p as given. 
For c
1
)1(
+
−−<≤
α
θ
N
MRp B  there are two pure strategy continuation equilibria.  In the 
first, all cluster firms engage in joint action and in the second, all cluster firms sell to the 
DC firm.  For <≤
+
−− p
N
MR B 1
)1(
α
θ
N
MR A −− )1( θ , there are three pure strategy 
continuation equilibria.  In the first, all cluster firms engage in joint action.  In the second, 
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type B firms sell to the DC firm and type A firms engage in joint action.  In the third, all 
cluster firms sell to the DC firm.  For 
N
MRp A −−= )1( θ , there are two pure strategy 
continuation equilibria.  In the first, type B firms sell their goods to the DC firm and type 
A firms engage in joint action and in the second, all cluster firms sell to the DC firm.     
 
26. For 
1
)1(
+
−−
α
θ
N
MR B >c > )1(
)1(
α
θ
−
−−
N
MR B , then we have the following 
equilibria in the second stage of the game, taking p as given.  
For c
1
)1(
+
−−<≤
α
θ
N
MRp B  there are two pure strategy continuation equilibria.  In the 
first, all cluster firms engage in joint action and in the second all cluster firms sell to the 
DC firm. For <≤
+
−− p
N
MR B 1
)1(
α
θ
N
MR A −− )1( θ , there are three pure strategy 
continuation equilibria.  In the first, all cluster firms engage in joint action.  In the second, 
type B firms sell to the DC firm and type A firms engage in joint action.  In the third, all 
cluster firms sell to the DC firm.  For 
N
MRp A −−= )1( θ , there are two pure strategy 
continuation equilibria.  In the first, type B firms sell their goods to the DC firm and type 
A firms engage in joint action, and in the second, all cluster firms sell to the DC firm.     
 
 
27. For c>
1
)1(
+
−−
α
θ
N
MR B > )1(
)1(
α
θ
−
−−
N
MR B  then we have the following 
equilibria in the second stage of the game, taking p as given. 
For <≤ pc
N
MR A −− )1( θ , there are three pure strategy continuation equilibria.  In the 
first, all cluster firms engage in joint action.  In the second, type B firms sell to the DC 
firm and type A firms engage in joint action.  In the third, all cluster firms sell to the DC 
firm.  For 
N
MRp A −−= )1( θ , there are two pure strategy continuation equilibria.  In the 
first, type B firms sell their goods to the DC firm and type A firms engage in joint action, 
and in the second, all cluster firms sell to the DC firm.  
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Appendix D: Welfare Implications of Joint Action 
 
a. Case 1: Joint action is potentially profitable for type A firms only  
Case 1: 
N
MR B −− )1( θ < c and α
θ
N
MRc A −−< )1(  
 
If the coalition-proof equilibrium refinement is applied and [ ]cRN
M
A −− )1( θ
≤1/4, then 
for all ),( 65 ααα ∈ , then type B firms receive p=c selling to the DC firm, and type A 
firms earn 
α
θ
N
MR A −− )1( - c in expected profits.  In this case, type B firms receive the 
same level of welfare as when there is no possibility of joint action, type A firms are 
better off, and the DC firm is worse off. 
LDC
AEΠ = α
θ
N
MR A −− )1( - c   
LDC
BΠ =0 
DCEΠ = [ ]cRN B −−− )1()1( θα  
 
If the coalition-proof equilibrium refinement is applied and either i) zα ≤1/4 where 
),( 65 ααα ∉  or ii) [ ]cRN
M
A −− )1( θ
>1/4, the DC firm buys from all cluster firms at a 
price 
α
θ
N
MRp A −−= )1( .   In this case, all cluster firms are better off, and the DC firm 
is worse off than if there were no possibility of joint action. 
LDC
iEΠ = α
θ
N
MR A −− )1( - c  for i=A,B 
DCEΠ = [ ] 



−−−−−+−
α
θθαθα
N
MRNNR ABA )1()1)(1()1(  
 
 
b. Cases 2 – 15: Joint action is potentially profitable for both types of cluster firms, 
but it is not possible for the DC firm to only buy from type B firms  
Cases 2 - 15: 
c
N
MR B >−− )1( θ , 0))(1( ≤−−− α
θθα
N
MR AB , and α
θ
N
MR A −− )1( < N
MR B −− )1( θ  
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Even if the coalition-proof equilibrium refinement is applied, the DC firm procures the 
goods of all cluster firms, paying p=
N
MR B −− )1( θ  for their goods.  In this case, the LDC 
firms are better off (and the DC firm is worse off) as a result of the opportunity for joint 
action.  The firms receive: 
LDC
iΠ = N
MR B −− )1( θ -c where i=A,B; and  
[ ] 



−−−−−+−=Π
N
MRNNRE BBA
DC )1()1)(1()1( θθαθα  
 
 
c. Cases 16 – 21: Joint action is potentially profitable for both types of cluster firms, 
and it is possible for the DC firm to buy from all cluster firms or only buy from type 
B firms 
 
For cases 16 - 21: 
c
N
MR B >−− )1( θ , 0))(1( ≤−−− α
θθα
N
MR AB , and  
N
MR B −− )1( θ < α
θ
N
MR A −− )1(  
 
If the coalition-proof equilibrium refinement is applied, for parameter values such that 
)( ABNR
M
θθ −
>
3
1 , then no joint action takes place, and the DC firm pays 
p=
α
θ
N
MR A −− )1(  to all LDC firms for their goods. In this case, the LDC firms are 
better off (and the DC firm is worse off) as a result of the opportunity for joint action.  
The firms receive: 
LDC
iΠ = α
θ
N
MR A −− )1(  - c where i=A,B; and  
[ ] 





−−−−−+−=Π
α
θθαθα
N
MRNNRE ABA
DC )1()1)(1()1(  
Even though no joint action occurs, the cluster firms are better off and the DC firm is 
worse off than if there were no joint action option. 
 
If the coalition-proof equilibrium refinement is applied, for parameter values such that 
)( ABNR
M
θθ −
<
3
1 , then joint action happens with type A participation for ),( 21 ααα ∈ . 
The cluster firms are better off than if there were no possibility of joint action, and the 
DC firm is worse off. 
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LDC
AEΠ = α
θ
N
MR A −− )1( - c 
LDC
BΠ = N
MR B −− )1( θ - c  






−−−−−−=Π
N
MRNRNE BB
DC )1()1()1()1( θαθα .  Even though no joint action 
occurs, the cluster firms are better off and the DC firm is worse off than if there were no 
joint action option. 
 
 
 
d. Cases 22 – 27: Joint action is potentially profitable for all firms, but the DC firm 
would earn negative profits if it were to offer type A firms what they would earn 
from joint action  
For cases 22 - 27: 
c
N
MR B >−− )1( θ , 0))(1( >−−− α
θθα
N
MR AB  
 
If the coalition-proof equilibrium refinement is applied, then joint action takes place with 
the participation of type A firms and the DC firm buys the output of the type B firms at 
p=
N
MR B −− )1( θ .  The cluster firms are better off than if there were no possibility of 
joint action, and the DC firm is worse off. 
LDC
AEΠ = α
θ
N
MR A −− )1( - c 
LDC
BΠ = N
MR B −− )1( θ - c  






−−−−−−=Π
N
MRNRNE BB
DC )1()1()1()1( θαθα . 
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Appendix E: Data Cleaning and Description of Sample for Chapter Three 
 
Data cleaning: 
When the interviewer went to the cluster to begin interviewing firms, she found that 
only about 180 of the 220 exporting firms that were listed by SIMA (the local business 
association) as surgical instrument manufacturers were actually in operation at the time of 
the survey.  Of the exporter firms in operation, 99 returned the surveys, out of which 76 
were actually filled out leading to a response rate of 43 percent among the exporters.  The 
interviewer then met with 47 vendor firms in the villages surrounding Sialkot, where the 
cottage industry is located.   
 Data was collected on 123 firms.  This meant that there was potentially 
information on 246 customers and 246 suppliers.  However, some of the surveys were 
incomplete and several observations had to be dropped in order to have a balanced data 
set.   
 
Customer Credit Sample: 
Once the dataset was cleaned and balanced, 132 observations remained for the 
customer credit regressions representing 72 unique firms in the survey.  For 60 firms (32 
exporters and 28 vendors) there were two observations per firm (representing their oldest 
and newest customers).  For 12 firms (7 exporters and 5 vendors) there was only adequate 
information on one of their customers.  These 12 firms only provided enough information 
on the variables of interest for one of their customers, and therefore the other customer 
had to be dropped.  For the 7 exporters where there was only sufficient data on one 
customer, 5 had data on their oldest customer only and 2 had enough data only on their 
newest customer.  For the 5 vendors where there was only sufficient data on one 
customer, 3 had data on their oldest customer only and 2 had enough data only on their 
newest customer. 
 
Supplier Credit Sample: 
Once the dataset was cleaned and balanced, 113 observations remained for the 
supplier credit regressions representing 63 unique firms in the survey.  For 50 firms (31 
exporters and 19 vendors) there were two observations per firm (representing their oldest 
and newest suppliers) and for 13 firms (7 exporters and 6 vendors) there was only 
adequate information on one of their suppliers.  These 13 firms only provided enough 
information on the variables of interest for one of their suppliers, and therefore the other 
supplier had to be dropped.  For the 7 exporters where there was only data on one 
supplier, 6 had sufficient data on their oldest supplier only and 1 had enough data only on 
their newest supplier.  For the 6 vendors where there was only data on one supplier, 5 had 
data on their oldest supplier and 1 had sufficient data only on their newest supplier.   
 
Comparison of Customer Credit and Supplier Credit Samples: 
 Since the number of observations was limited, the samples were cleaned 
separately for the customer credit regressions and the supplier credit regressions.  
Comparing the two samples, 90 of the same observations representing 53 of the same 
firms were included in the two data sets. 
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Appendix F: Additional Regression and Data Tables  
 
Table F1: Regressions on Trade Credit to Customers, Marginal Effects, Specifications 
similar to McMillan and Woodruff for Research in Vietnam, Tobit with clustered errors 
 Tobit  
(sim. to Col. 
1 of McM-W)
Tobit  
(Co1. 1 of 
McM-W)147
Tobit  
(sim. to Col. 
3 of McM-W) 
Tobit  
(Col. 3 of 
McM-W) 
LOCK-IN     
Would Take Customer Less than a 
Week to Find Alternate Supply 
-3.64 
(-0.19) 
 -7.07 
(-0.43) 
 
Would Take Cust. More Than a 
Month to Find Alt. Supply 
22.26 
(0.75) 
 -5.78 
(-0.20) 
 
# Similar Manufacturers w/in 1 km 
 -0.7 
(1.66)+ 
 -1.1 
(2.54)* 
Most important competitor w/in 1 km 
 -13 
(2.46)* 
 -16 
(2.92)** 
INFORMATION/LOCK-IN     
Duration of Relationship (years) 
7.32 
(1.64)+ 
8 
(2.96)** 
8.63 
(2.01)* 
7 
(2.51)* 
Duration-squared 
-0.19 
(-0.96) 
-0.5 
(2.15)* 
-0.23 
(.) 
-0.4 
(1.74)+ 
INFO./NETWORK EFFECTS     
Info. About Customer Through 
Business Network 
26.17 
(1.32) 
20 
(3.36)** 
27.79 
(1.49) 
10 
(1.99)* 
Talk To Other Suppliers of Customer 
At Least Monthly 
   19 
(2.63)** 
Info. About Customer Through Social 
Network 
-0.55 
(-0.02) 
4 
(0.60) 
16.84 
(0.67) 
-8 
(1.34) 
CONTROLS     
Price Set By Relationship With 
Customer 
  50.62 
(1.77)+ 
2 
(0.53) 
Customer is Retailer/Wholesaler 
   7 
(1.62) 
Ln(1+Age) 
  -20.28 
(-1.47) 
-9 
(1.76)+ 
Ln(Employment) 
  26.52 
(1.95)+ 
2 
(0.98) 
Manufacturer Receives Bank Credit 
  14.38 
(0.44) 
-2 
(0.36) 
Avg. % of Bill Paid With Delay To 
Suppliers 
  0.62 
(2.25)* 
40 
(6.27)** 
Observations 132 224 132 224 
Chi-Squared 8.89 73.5 32.50 134.5 
Prob>Chi-Squared 0.18 <0.001 0.0003 <0.001 
 (Robust z statistics in parentheses, **significant at 1%, *significant at 5%, +significant 
at 10%) 
                                                 
147 We have converted McMillan and Woodruff’s results from decimals to percentages to be more easily 
comparable to our results, which accounts for the lower degree of accuracy for those results. 
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Table F2: Regressions on Trade Credit to Suppliers, Marginal Effects, Specifications 
similar to McMillan and Woodruff for Research in Vietnam, Tobit with clustered errors 
 Tobit 
(similar to 
Col. 1 of 
McM-W) 
Tobit  
(Col. 1 of 
McM-W)148 
Tobit 
(similar to 
col. 2 of 
McM-W) 
Tobit  
(Col. 2 of 
McM-W) 
LOCK-IN     
Would Take Customer Less 
than a Day to Find Alternate 
Supply 
15.55 
(0.76) 
-11 
(1.67)+ 
8.17 
(0.45) 
-12 
(1.74)+ 
Would Take Customer More 
Than a Week to Find Alternate 
Supply 
-19.44 
(-1.34) 
0.4 
(0.07) 
-19.23 
(-1.34) 
0.1 
(0.02) 
INFORMATION/LOCK-IN     
Duration of Relationship 
(years) 
0.83 
(0.59) 
3 
(1.44) 
1.2 
(0.93) 
2 
(0.92) 
Duration-squared 
-0.00063 
(-0.15) 
-0.16 
(1.62) 
-0.017 
(-0.44) 
-0.13 
(1.37) 
Visited Supplier Before First 
Purchase 
  -31.76 
(-1.58) 
7 
(1.19) 
Currently Visit Supplier At 
Least Weekly 
  18.74 
(1.64) 
-0.3 
(0.06) 
Manufacturer Receives Bank 
Credit 
-26.41 
(-1.56) 
26 
(3.79)** 
-29.76 
(-1.80)+ 
23 
(3.56)** 
NETWORK EFFECTS 
    
Introduction To Supplier 
Through Social Network 
22.4 
(1.67)+ 
11 
(1.70)+ 
20.65 
(1.53) 
12 
(1.89)+ 
If Manufacturer Cheated 
Supplier, Other Suppliers Find 
Out  
  -1.97 
(-0.16) 
14 
(3.19)** 
Observations 113 243 113 243 
R-Squared 0.02 Not available 0.03 Not available 
Chi-Squared 11.39 45.0 18.27 59.6 
Prob>Chi-Squared 0.077 <0.001 0.032 <0.001 
(Robust z statistics in parentheses, **significant at 1%, *significant at 5%, +significant at 
10%) 
 
                                                 
148 We have converted McMillan and Woodruff’s results from decimals to percentages to be more easily 
comparable to our results, which accounts for the lower degree of accuracy for those results. 
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Table F2 (continued): Regressions on Trade Credit to Suppliers, Marginal Effects, 
Specifications similar to McMillan and Woodruff for Research in Vietnam, Tobit with 
clustered errors  
 Tobit (similar
to Col. 3 of 
McM-W) 
Tobit  
(Col. 3 of 
McM-W)149
Tobit (similar
to Col. 4 of 
McM-W) 
Tobit  
(Col. 4 of 
McM-W) 
LOCK-IN     
Would Take Customer Less than a 
Day to Find Alternate Supply 
  15.56 
(0.80) 
-11 
(1.62) 
Would Take Customer More Than a 
Week to Find Alternate Supply 
  -21.18 
(-1.53) 
-0.2 
(0.03) 
Currently Have Alternate Supplier 
7.88 
(0.57) 
7 
(1.12) 
  
INFORMATION/LOCK-IN     
Duration of Relationship (years) 
1.09 
(0.87) 
2 
(0.87) 
0.89 
(0.73) 
3 
(1.36) 
Duration-squared 
-0.015 
(-0.40) 
-0.12 
(1.28) 
-0.022 
(-0.60) 
-0.14 
(1.54) 
Visited Supplier Before First 
Purchase 
-31.88 
(-1.62) 
9 
(1.51) 
-42.47 
(-2.17)* 
7 
(1.34) 
Currently Visit Supplier At Least 
Weekly 
22.61 
(2.02)* 
-2 
(0.31) 
12.94 
(1.07) 
-2 
(0.39) 
Manufacturer Receives Bank Credit 
-28.05 
(-1.88)+ 
22 
(3.46)** 
-25.09 
(-1.41) 
24 
(3.60)** 
NETWORK EFFECTS 
    
Introduction To Supplier Through 
Social Network 
22.09 
(1.56) 
12 
(1.79)+ 
19.02 
(1.48) 
10 
(1.48) 
If Manufacturer Cheated Supplier, 
Other Suppliers Find Out  
-8.54 
(-0.69) 
13 
(3.03) 
3.19 
(0.25) 
13 
(3.09) 
CONTROLS     
% Sales Main Product 
   -39 
(3.23)** 
Ln(1+Age) 
  23.68 
(1.74) 
-6 
(1.13) 
Ln(Employment) 
  -11.13 
(-1.45) 
-6 
(2.12)* 
Observations 113 243 113 243 
R-Squared 0.03 Not available 0.04 Not available
Chi-Squared 16.15  20.48 76.1 
Prob>Chi-Squared 0.04 <0.001 0.039 <0.001 
(Robust z statistics in parentheses, **significant at 1%, *significant at 5%, +significant at 
10%) 
                                                 
149 We have converted McMillan and Woodruff’s results from decimals to percentages to be more easily 
comparable to our results, which accounts for the lower degree of accuracy for those results. 
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Table F3: Customer Credit Robustness Check, Marginal Effects, Main Specification, 
Clustered errors 
 Probit Tobit  
 
LOCK-IN   
Would Take Customer More 
Than a Month to Find Alternate 
Supply 
-0.091 
(-0.77) 
-6.33 
(-0.24) 
INFORMATION/LOCK-IN   
Duration of Relationship (years) 
0.035 
  (2.02)* 
9.63 
(2.23)* 
Duration-squared 
-0.0009 
(-1.25) 
-0.26 
(-1.43) 
INFORMATION/ 
NETWORK EFFECTS 
  
Info. About Customer Through 
Business Network 
0.25 
(2.68)** 
41.12 
(1.92)+ 
Info. About Customer Through 
Social Network 
0.014 
(0.14) 
13.11 
(0.57) 
Talk To Other Suppliers of 
Customer At Least Monthly 
0.12 
(1.07) 
23.61 
(1.02) 
ENFORCEMENT   
Businesses Would Refuse to 
Deal With Customer Who 
Cheated Manufacturer 
-0.066 
(-0.75) 
-28.51 
(-1.61) 
Belief in Court System 
0.27 
(2.51)* 
37.95 
(2.00)* 
Export Dummy*Belief in Courts 
0.14 
(0.79) 
55.57 
(1.26) 
CONTROLS   
Ln(1+Age) 
-0.17 
(-3.33)** 
-26.92 
(-2.06)* 
Ln(Employment) 
0.053 
(1.14) 
16.72 
(1.45) 
Receive Bank Credit 
-0.027 
(-0.22) 
13.34 
(0.40) 
% Trade Credit Received by 
Supplier 
0.0046 
(4.49)** 
0.79 
(3.04)** 
Export Dummy 
0.16 
(1.78)+ 
49.21 
(1.78)+ 
Observations 132 132 
Chi-Squared 46.09 
dof=14 
33.84 
dof=14 
Prob>Chi-Squared <0.0001 0.0022 
(Robust z statistics in parentheses, **significant at 1%, *significant at 5%, +significant at 
10%) 
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Table F4: Regressions on Trade Credit to Customers, Marginal Effects, Correction for 
survey sampling, Main Specification 
 Probit Tobit  
 
Probit 
(without 
duration) 
Tobit  
(without 
duration) 
LOCK-IN     
Would Take Customer More 
Than a Month to Find 
Alternate Supply 
-0.09 
(-0.48) 
-3.11 
(-0.15) 
-0.097 
(-0.56) 
-8.15 
(-0.41) 
INFORMATION/LOCK-IN     
Duration of Relationship 
(years) 
0.043 
(1.41) 
5.56 
(2.09)* 
  
Duration-squared 
-0.00068 
(-0.49) 
-0.13 
(-1.14) 
  
INFORMATION/ 
NETWORK EFFECTS 
    
Info. About Customer Through 
Business Network 
0.46 
(3.45)** 
38.95 
(2.94)** 
0.43 
(3.40)** 
34.58 
(2.61)* 
Talk To Other Suppliers of 
Customer At Least Monthly 
0.52 
(4.56)** 
46.38 
(2.91)** 
0.50 
(4.14)** 
45.96 
(2.64)** 
ENFORCEMENT     
Businesses Would Refuse to 
Deal With Customer Who 
Cheated Manufacturer 
-0.19 
(-1.25) 
-22.69 
(-2.22)* 
-0.13 
(-0.91) 
-17.65 
(-1.72)+ 
Belief in Court System 
0.39 
(3.52)** 
32.48 
(2.86)** 
0.37 
(3.50)** 
27.55 
(2.55)* 
CONTROLS 
    
Ln(1+Age) 
-0.42 
(-4.43)** 
-28.47 
(-3.68)** 
-0.25 
(-3.07)** 
-14.25 
(-2.22)* 
Ln(Employment) 
0.18 
(2.20)* 
21.32 
(2.55)* 
0.15 
(1.90)+ 
21.25 
(2.51)* 
Export Dummy 
0.21 
(1.30) 
40.24 
(2.39)* 
0.18 
(1.20) 
33.59 
(1.97)+ 
Observations 132 132 132 132 
F-statistic 4.64 
F(10,61) 
3.35 
F(10,61) 
4.21 
F(8,63) 
2.69 
F(8,63) 
Prob>F 0.0001 0.0016 0.0004 0.0131 
(Robust T-statistics in parentheses, **significant at 1%, *significant at 5%, +significant 
at 10%) 
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Table F5: Regressions on Trade Credit to Customers, Marginal Effects, Sample has two 
observations per firm, Clustered Errors, Main Specification  
 Probit Tobit  
 
Probit 
(without 
duration) 
Tobit  
(without 
duration) 
LOCK-IN     
Would Take Customer More 
Than a Month to Find 
Alternate Supply 
-0.059 
(-0.50) 
-0.89 
(-0.03) 
-0.078 
(-0.73) 
-8.88 
(-0.34) 
INFORMATION/LOCK-IN     
Duration of Relationship 
(years) 
0.043 
(2.24)* 
10.90 
(2.42)* 
  
Duration-squared 
-0.001 
(-1.24) 
-0.27 
(-1.36) 
  
INFORMATION/ 
NETWORK EFFECTS 
    
Info. About Customer 
Through Business Network 
0.31 
(3.14)** 
49.98 
(2.42)* 
0.31 
(3.12)** 
48.8 
(2.21)* 
Talk To Other Suppliers of 
Customer At Least Monthly 
0.20 
(2.26)* 
26.98 
(1.22) 
0.20 
(2.32)* 
24.83 
(1.16) 
ENFORCEMENT     
Businesses Would Refuse to 
Deal With Customer Who 
Cheated Manufacturer 
-0.057 
(-0.70) 
-36.97 
(-2.26)* 
-0.047 
(-0.60) 
-34.96 
(-2.16)* 
Belief in Court System 
0.40 
(5.58)** 
78.44 
(3.36)** 
0.39 
(5.31)** 
71.32 
(3.02)** 
CONTROLS 
    
Ln(1+Age) 
-0.19 
(-3.43)** 
-36.74 
(-2.91)** 
-0.082 
(-1.68)+ 
-9.60 
(-0.88) 
Ln(Employment) 
0.068 
(2.10)* 
23.53 
(2.78)** 
0.075 
(2.51)* 
26.52 
(3.11)** 
Export Dummy 
0.086 
(0.90) 
43.43 
(1.98)* 
0.032 
(0.33) 
28.41 
(1.36) 
Observations 120 120 120 120 
R-Squared 0.25 0.062 0.19 0.040 
Chi-Squared 38.45 
(dof=10) 
31.82 
(dof=10) 
31.81 
(dof=8) 
23.66 
(dof=8) 
Prob>Chi-Squared <0.0001 0.0004 0.0001 0.0026 
(Robust z statistics in parentheses, **significant at 1%, *significant at 5%, +significant at 
10%)
  136 
 
Table F6: Regressions on Trade Credit to Customers, Marginal Effects, Exporters Only 
Sample, Clustered Errors, Main Specification  
 Probit Tobit  
 
Probit 
(without 
duration) 
Tobit  
(without 
duration) 
LOCK-IN     
Would Take Customer More 
Than a Month to Find 
Alternate Supply 
-0.12 
(-0.92) 
-24.56 
(-0.41) 
-0.11 
(-0.91) 
-24.35 
(-0.43) 
INFORMATION/LOCK-IN     
Duration of Relationship 
(years) 
0.047 
(2.08)* 
24.02 
(1.88)+ 
  
Duration-squared 
-0.0013 
(-1.46) 
-0.70 
(-1.43) 
  
INFORMATION/ 
NETWORK EFFECTS 
    
Info. About Customer Through 
Business Network 
0.13 
(0.79) 
39.02 
(0.52) 
0.19 
(1.21) 
78.60 
(1.00) 
Talk To Other Suppliers of 
Customer At Least Monthly 
-0.016 
(-0.12) 
2.02 
(0.03) 
-0.054 
(-0.42) 
-20.97 
(-0.33) 
ENFORCEMENT     
Businesses Would Refuse to 
Deal With Customer Who 
Cheated Manufacturer 
-0.029 
(-0.26) 
-48.63 
(-0.83) 
-0.063 
(-0.60) 
-64.67 
(-1.13) 
Belief in Court System 
0.19 
(1.24) 
93.08 
(1.07) 
0.22 
(1.45) 
99.33 
(1.07) 
CONTROLS 
    
Ln(1+Age) 
-0.061 
(-0.82) 
-1.92 
(-0.05) 
0.0009 
(0.01) 
29.57 
(0.83) 
Ln(Employment) 
0.082 
(2.11)* 
43.55 
(1.82)+ 
0.086 
(2.46)* 
48.23 
(2.13)* 
Observations 71 71 71 71 
R-Squared 0.13 0.059 0.076 0.037 
Chi-Squared 16.48 7.86 10.09 7.00 
Prob>Chi-Squared 0.058 
(dof=9) 
0.55 
(dof=9) 
0.18 
(dof=7) 
0.43 
(dof=7) 
(Robust z statistics in parentheses, **significant at 1%, *significant at 5%, +significant at 
10%)
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Table F7: Regressions on Trade Credit from Suppliers, Marginal Effects, Correction for 
survey sampling Main Specification 
 Probit Tobit  
 
Probit 
(without 
duration) 
Tobit  
(without 
duration) 
LOCK-IN     
% Inputs Purchased From Less 
Than 1 km 
-0.0078 
(-2.46)* 
-0.62 
(-2.19)* 
-0.0073 
(-2.25)* 
-0.61 
(-2.13)* 
% Inputs Imported 
0.0020 
(0.35) 
-0.16 
(-0.35) 
0.0014 
(0.27) 
-0.15 
(-0.36) 
INFORMATION/LOCK-IN     
Duration of Relationship 
(years) 
0.026 
(1.334) 
1.94 
(1.45) 
  
Duration-squared 
-0.00050 
(-0.88) 
-0.070 
(-1.67)+ 
  
INFORMATION/ 
NETWORK EFFECTS 
    
Visit Supplier Before First 
Sale 
-0.23 
(-1.96)* 
-29.09 
(-1.27) 
-0.25 
(-2.14)* 
-28.52 
(-1.32) 
Visit Supplier at Least Weekly 
0.42 
(4.30)** 
7.63 
(0.63) 
0.4 
(4.07)** 
7.27 
(0.60) 
Intro. To Supplier Through 
Social Network 
0.34 
(3.88)** 
16.05 
(1.47) 
0.35 
(3.86)** 
20.71 
(1.84)+ 
ENFORCEMENT     
Dispute With Supplier Would 
Lead To Higher Advanced 
Payment 
0.21 
(1.69)+ 
23.71 
(1.04) 
0.18 
(1.36) 
19.99 
(0.86) 
Belief in Court System 
0.15 
(1.08) 
5.58 
(0.28) 
0.16 
(1.16) 
7.12 
(0.37) 
CONTROLS 
    
Ln(1+Age) 
-0.042 
(-0.32) 
8.07 
(0.66) 
0.058 
(0.43) 
9.46 
(0.79) 
Ln(Employment) 
-0.021 
(-0.19) 
-1.94 
(-0.17) 
-0.038 
(-0.33) 
-2.13 
(-0.19) 
Export Dummy 
-0.2 
(-1.21) 
-19.52 
(-1.23) 
-0.18 
(-1.11) 
-20.3 
(-1.26) 
Receive Bank Credit  -0.27 
(-1.30) 
2.12 
(0.12) 
-0.28 
(-1.37) 
0.17 
(0.01) 
Observations 113 113 113 113 
F-statistic 4.34 
F(13,49) 
1.23 
F(13,49) 
4.21 
F(11,51) 
1.51 
F(11,51) 
Prob>F 0.0001 0.29 0.0002 0.16 
 (Robust T-statistics in parentheses, **significant at 1%, *significant at 5%, +significant 
at 10%) 
  138 
 
Table F8: Regressions on Trade Credit from Suppliers, Marginal Effects, Sample has two 
observations per firm, Clustered Errors, Main Specification 
 
(Robust z statistics in parentheses, **significant at 1%, *significant at 5%, +significant at 
10%)
 Probit Tobit  
 
Probit 
(without 
duration) 
Tobit  
(without 
duration) 
LOCK-IN     
% Inputs Purchased From 
Less Than 1 km 
0.001 
(0.43) 
0.030 
(0.09) 
0.00072 
(0.30) 
0.021 
(0.07) 
% Inputs Imported 
0.0014 
(0.31) 
-0.24 
(-0.37) 
0.00043 
(0.09) 
-0.27 
(-0.40) 
INFORMATION/LOCK-IN     
Duration of Relationship 
(years) 
-0.011 
(-1.24) 
-0.49 
(-0.42) 
  
Duration-squared 
0.00041 
(1.58) 
0.013 
(0.36) 
  
INFORMATION/ 
NETWORK EFFECTS 
    
Visit Supplier Before First 
Sale 
-0.28 
(-2.75)** 
-49.88 
(-2.29)* 
-0.28 
(-2.69)** 
-49.83 
(-2.28)* 
Visit Supplier at Least 
Weekly 
0.26 
(2.74)** 
23.90 
(1.68)+ 
0.27 
(2.80)** 
24.17 
(1.65)+ 
Intro. To Supplier Through 
Social Network 
0.21 
(2.07)* 
27.80 
(1.90)+ 
0.21 
(2.14)* 
27.25 
(1.91)+ 
ENFORCEMENT     
Dispute With Supplier 
Would Lead To Higher 
Advanced Payment 
0.17 
(1.26) 
9.52 
(0.43) 
0.16 
(1.14) 
9.71 
(0.44) 
Belief in Court System 
-0.04 
(-0.27) 
0.94 
(0.05) 
-0.036 
(-0.24) 
0.78 
(0.04) 
CONTROLS 
    
Ln(1+Age) 
0.12 
(1.27) 
17.68 
(1.14) 
0.12 
(1.26) 
17.05 
(1.08) 
Ln(Employment) 
-0.0076 
(-0.12) 
-1.38 
(-0.14) 
-0.0084 
(-0.13) 
-28.09 
(-1.05) 
Export Dummy 
-0.17 
(-1.30) 
-28.47 
(-1.54) 
-0.16 
(-1.23) 
-28.09 
(-1.50) 
Receive Bank Credit -0.35 
(-2.56)** 
-18.31 
(-0.98) 
-0.33 
(-2.38)* 
-17.90 
(-0.96) 
Observations 100 100 100 100 
R-Squared 0.32 0.052 0.31 0.052 
Chi-squared 39.38 24.37 31.72 23.09 
Prob>Chi-squared 0.0002 
(dof=13) 
0.028 
(dof=13) 
0.0008 
(dof=11) 
0.017 
(dof=11) 
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Table F9: Regressions on Trade Credit from Suppliers, Marginal Effects, Exporters Only 
Sample, Clustered Errors, Main Specification 
(Robust z statistics in parentheses, **significant at 1%, *significant at 5%, +significant at 
10%) 
 Probit Tobit  
 
Probit 
(without 
duration) 
Tobit  
(without 
duration) 
LOCK-IN     
% Inputs Purchased From 
Less Than 1 km 
0.0021 
(0.80) 
0.33 
(0.96) 
0.0016 
(0.59) 
0.29 
(0.86) 
% Inputs Imported 
0.0019 
(0.41) 
-0.12 
(-0.26) 
0.0011 
(0.23) 
-0.21 
(-0.44) 
INFORMATION/LOCK-IN     
Duration of Relationship 
(years) 
-0.0061 
(-0.45) 
0.16 
(0.11) 
  
Duration-squared 
0.00058 
(1.09) 
0.018 
(0.44) 
  
INFORMATION/ 
NETWORK EFFECTS 
    
Visit Supplier Before First 
Sale 
-0.41 
(-3.52)** 
-62.86 
(-2.51)* 
-0.4 
(-3.25)** 
-62.15 
(-2.50)* 
Visit Supplier at Least 
Weekly 
0.17 
(1.16) 
20.90 
(0.91) 
0.18 
(1.16) 
22.46 
(0.97) 
Intro. To Supplier Through 
Social Network 
-0.03 
(-0.18) 
2.01 
(0.08) 
0.026 
(0.16) 
4.94 
(0.21) 
ENFORCEMENT     
Dispute With Supplier 
Would Lead To Higher 
Advanced Payment 
0.0079 
(0.04) 
-4.61 
(-0.16) 
-0.00079 
(-0.01) 
-4.32 
(-0.16) 
Belief in Court System 
0.24 
(1.07) 
17.59 
(0.61) 
0.22 
(0.99) 
16.49 
(0.58) 
CONTROLS 
    
Ln(1+Age) 
0.18 
(1.43) 
32.01 
(1.53) 
0.21 
(1.74)+ 
34.53 
(1.63) 
Ln(Employment) 
-0.02 
(-0.25) 
-6.0 
(-0.54) 
-0.013 
(-0.16) 
-5.27 
(-0.47) 
Receive Bank Credit -0.29 
(2.17)* 
-21.62 
(-1.01) 
-0.28 
(-2.06)* 
-21.78 
(-1.02) 
Observations 69 69 69 69 
R-Squared 0.20 0.036 0.17 0.035 
Chi-squared 16.26 12.24 11.18 1.022 
Prob>Chi-squared 0.18 
(dof=12) 
0.43 
(dof=12) 
0.34 
(dof=10) 
0.42 
(dof=10) 
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Table F10: Customer Credit Comparison of Regression Sample to Deleted Observations 
 
Mean 
(included)
Standard 
Deviation 
(included)
Mean 
(excluded)
Standard 
Deviation 
(excluded) 
T-Statistic 
(Hypothesis: 
Means are equal; 
degree of freedom 
in parentheses) 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLES      
Give trade credit 0.55 0.50 0.44 0.50 
1.62 
(212) 
Trade credit (%) 35.91 37.99 29.13 38.61 
1.25 
(210) 
LOCK-IN      
Would Take Customer Less 
Than a Week to Find 
Alternate Supply 0.44 0.50 0.38 0.49 
0.85 
(204) 
Would Take Customer More 
Than a Month to Find 
Alternate Supply 0.26 0.44 0.27 0.45 
-0.20 
(204) 
Maintain inventory of 
product sold to customer 0.37 0.48 0.40 0.49 
-0.42 
(233) 
INFORMATION/ LOCK-IN      
Duration of relationship 
(years) 6.74 6.63 8.38 8.83 
-1.58 
(222) 
Duration squared 89.05 162.60 147.42 289.36 
-1.91 
(222) 
INFORMATION / 
NETWORK EFFECTS      
Info. About Customer 
Through Business Network 0.44 0.50 0.42 0.50 
0.23 
(229) 
Info. About Customer 
Through Social Network 0.13 0.34 0.10 0.30 
0.65 
(229) 
Talk To Other Suppliers of 
Customer At Least Weekly 0.63 0.49 0.40 0.49 
2.53 
(127) 
Talk To Other Suppliers of 
Customer At Least Monthly 0.76 0.43 0.67 0.48 
1.21 
(127) 
ENFORCEMENT      
Customer has failed to pay 
after delivery 0.22 0.42 0.18 0.39 
0.55 
(125) 
Customers Would Find Out 
About Dispute With Another 
Customer 0.44 0.50 0.26 0.44 
2.20 
(128) 
Other producers will refuse 
to deal with customer who 
has cheated 0.42 0.50 0.31 0.47 
1.23 
(125) 
Belief in courts*exporter 
dummy 0.08 0.28 0.18 0.39 
-1.65 
(125) 
Belief in courts 0.21 0.41 0.29 0.46 
-1.06 
(125) 
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Mean 
(included)
Standard 
Deviation 
(included)
Mean 
(excluded)
Standard 
Deviation 
(excluded) 
T-Statistic 
(Hypothesis: 
Means are equal; 
degree of freedom 
in parentheses) 
CONTROLS      
Ln(Employment) 3.23 1.06 3.53 1.18 
-1.54 
(129) 
Ln(1+age) 2.60 0.70 2.76 0.81 
-1.20 
(130) 
Receive Bank Credit 0.26 0.44 0.46 0.50 
-2.16 
(116) 
Credit Access 0.31 0.46 0.47 0.50 
-1.75 
(115) 
Average % Trade Credit 
Received by Supplier 41.53 32.42 38.50 33.31 
0.50 
(120) 
Price Set By Relationship 
with Customer 0.01 0.12 0.07 0.25 
-1.54 
(114) 
Vendors 0.46 0.50 0.29 0.46 
2.0 
(132) 
Exporters 0.54 0.50 0.71 0.46 
-2.0 
(132) 
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Table F11: Supplier Credit Comparison of Regression Sample to Deleted Observations  
  
Mean 
(included)
Standard 
Deviation 
(included)
Mean 
(excluded)
Standard 
Deviation 
(excluded) 
T-Statistic 
(Hypothesis: 
Means are 
equal; degree 
of freedom in 
parentheses) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES      
Receive trade credit 0.65 0.48 0.63 0.49 
0.27 
(224) 
Trade credit (%) 36.59 31.92 42.99 37.87 
-1.32 
(208) 
LOCK-IN      
Would take a day or less to find
alternate supply  0.12 0.32 0.10 0.30 
0.31 
(219) 
Would take more than a week 
to find alternate supply 0.28 0.45 0.21 0.41 
1.20 
(219) 
% inputs purchased from less 
than 1 km 16.90 27.54 17.56 30.31 
-0.12 
(111) 
% inputs imported 4.21 12.86 7.31 19.67 
-1.01 
(113) 
Have Other Suppliers 0.73 0.44 0.72 0.45 
0.27 
(221) 
INFORMATION/ LOCK-IN      
Duration of trading relationship 
(years) 7.71 7.97 6.84 7.74 
0.78 
(204) 
Duration squared 122.36 247.57 106.11 220.52 
0.49 
(204) 
Introduction to Supplier 
Through Social Network 0.33 0.47 0.33 0.47 
-0.09 
(216) 
Visit supplier at least once 
(before first sale) 0.90 0.30 0.95 0.23 
-1.24 
(223) 
Customer visits supplier at 
least weekly 0.39 0.49 0.49 0.50 
-1.47 
(224) 
INFORMATION/ 
NETWORK EFFECTS      
Talk with other producers at 
least weekly 0.56 0.50 0.56 0.50 
-0.06 
(127) 
Talk with other producers at 
least monthly 0.68 0.47 0.80 0.40 
-1.56 
(127) 
ENFORCEMENT      
If I have a dispute w/ supplier, 
others will find out 0.59 0.50 0.50 0.50 
0.97 
(123) 
Dispute w/ supplier would lead 
to higher advance payment 0.17 0.38 0.23 0.42 
-0.75 
(122) 
Belief in court system 0.16 0.37 0.19 0.40 
-0.47 
(113) 
Belief in courts*export dummy 0.06 0.25 0.12 0.32 -0.97 
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Mean 
(included)
Standard 
Deviation 
(included)
Mean 
(excluded)
Standard 
Deviation 
(excluded) 
T-Statistic 
(Hypothesis: 
Means are 
equal; degree 
of freedom in 
parentheses) 
(113) 
CONTROLS      
Ln(Employment) 3.34 1.06 3.37 1.20 
-0.17 
(129) 
Ln(1+age) 2.67 0.64 2.66 0.84 
0.12 
(130) 
Receive bank credit 0.33 0.48 0.27 0.45 
0.70 
(116) 
Have access to credit 0.33 0.48 0.33 0.48 
0.00 
(115) 
Vendors 0.40 0.49 0 0.49 
0.19 
(123) 
Exporters 0.60 0.49 1 0.49 
-0.19 
(123) 
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Table F12: Joint Action Comparison of Regression Sample to Deleted Observations 
  
Mean 
(included)
Standard 
Deviation 
(included)
Mean 
(excluded
) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(excluded) 
T-Statistic 
(Hypothesis: Means 
are equal; degree of 
freedom in 
parentheses) 
Ln(Employment)      
Ln(1+age) 3.89 1.19 3.74 1.25 
0.46 
(71) 
Sell Some Products  
Under Own Name  0.46 0.50 0.61 0.50 
-1.06 
(72) 
Sell Some Products  
Directly to Hospitals 0.30 0.46 0.47 0.51 
-1.25 
(71) 
Would Participate in 
Joint Action  0.27 0.45 0.37 0.50 
-0.81 
(73) 
Duration of Trading 
Relationship with 
Oldest Customer (years) 11.55 8.64 13.69 7.57 
-0.84 
(68) 
Talk at Least Weekly 
with Other Producers 0.45 0.50 0.24 0.44 
1.54 
(71) 
Credit Access 0.59 0.50 0.42 0.51 
1.07 
(66) 
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Table F13: Sources and Uses of Trade Credit150 
  
EXPORTERS (53 firms) 
  
Give to old 
customer 
(only) 
Give to new 
customer 
(only) 
Give to 
neither 
customer 
Give to both 
customers 
 
 
Total 
Receive from old 
supplier (only) 2 0 0 0 
 
2 
Receive from new 
supplier (only) 1 0 2 0 
 
3 
Receive from 
neither supplier 4 10 8 4 
 
26 
Receive from both 
suppliers 8 1 6 7 
 
22 
Total  15 11 16 11 
Out of 53 
exporters, 37 give 
trade credit, and 27
receive trade 
credit. 
       
VENDORS (42 firms) 
  
Give to old 
customer 
(only) 
Give to new 
customer 
(only) 
Give to 
neither 
customer 
Give to both 
customers 
 
 
Total 
Receive from old 
suppliers (only) 3 0 1 0 
 
4 
Receive from new 
suppliers (only) 0 0 2 0 
 
2 
Receive from 
neither supplier 1 0 2 0 
 
3 
Receive from both 
suppliers 3 3 7 20 
 
33 
Total  7 3 12 20 
Out of 42 vendors, 
30 give trade 
credit and 39 
receive trade 
credit. 
 
                                                 
150 The sample used to create this table is larger than the samples used in the regressions on trade credit in 
Chapter Three, since only the trade credit variable was needed.  Each of these 95 firms has observations on 
trade credit given to two customers and received from two suppliers.      
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Table F14: Correlation Coefficients for Customer Credit Variables 
  
Vendor 
Dummy 
Exporter 
Dummy LnEmp 
Ln(1+ag
e) Duration Dur-Sq 
Business 
Network 
for Info 
Social 
Network 
for Info 
Vendor Dummy 1.00        
Exporter 
Dummy -1.00 1.00       
LnEmp -0.52 0.52 1.00      
Ln(1+age) -0.25 0.25 0.29 1.00     
Duration -0.04 0.04 0.12 0.48 1.00    
Dur-Sq -0.10 0.10 0.14 0.44 0.94 1.00   
Business 
Network for 
Info 0.50 -0.50 -0.30 -0.19 0.00 -0.01 1.00  
Social Network 
for Info -0.13 0.13 -0.06 -0.04 0.00 0.02 -0.02 1.00 
Trade Credit 
(0/1) 0.13 -0.13 0.06 -0.11 0.14 0.09 0.24 -0.02 
TradeCredit % -0.12 0.12 0.28 0.08 0.24 0.19 0.07 0.00 
Lockin-less 
than 1 week alt. 
Supp 0.57 -0.57 -0.38 -0.25 -0.08 -0.12 0.37 0.08 
Lockin-more 
than 1 month 
alt. Supp -0.48 0.48 0.53 0.27 0.12 0.17 -0.42 -0.02 
Cust Find Out 
About Dispute 0.16 -0.16 -0.15 0.08 0.02 -0.03 0.08 0.19 
Bus Refuse to 
Deal w/ 
Cheating Cust -0.15 0.15 0.19 -0.03 -0.07 -0.10 -0.11 0.08 
Court*Exporter -0.28 0.28 0.33 0.17 0.07 0.04 -0.10 0.05 
Belief in Courts 0.13 -0.13 0.11 0.10 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 
  147 
 
  
Vendor 
Dummy 
Exporter 
Dummy LnEmp 
Ln(1+ag
e) Duration Dur-Sq 
Business 
Network 
for Info 
Social 
Network 
for Info 
Avg Trade 
Credit from 
Supplier 0.27 -0.27 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.09 -0.13 
Talk Weekly 
w/Other Firms 0.24 -0.24 -0.03 0.01 0.07 0.07 0.12 0.10 
Talk Monthly 
w/Other Firms 0.11 -0.11 0.00 -0.02 0.03 0.06 -0.03 0.03 
Bank Credit -0.54 0.54 0.52 0.18 0.10 0.17 -0.30 -0.17 
CreditAccess -0.60 0.60 0.55 0.12 0.07 0.16 -0.37 0.05 
Price Set 
Relationship 
w/Cust -0.11 0.11 0.05 0.07 -0.05 -0.04 0.02 -0.05 
 
  
Trade 
Credit 
(0/1) 
TradeCre
dit % 
Lockin-
less than 
1 week 
alt. Supp
Lockin-
more 
than 1 
month 
alt. Supp
Cust Find 
Out 
About 
Dispute
Bus 
Refuse to 
Deal w/ 
Cheating 
Cust 
Court* 
Exporter 
Belief in 
Courts 
Trade Credit 
(0/1) 1.00        
TradeCredit % 0.84 1.00       
Lockin-less 
than 1 week alt. 
Supp 0.17 -0.05 1.00      
Lockin-more 
than 1 month 
alt. Supp -0.13 0.07 -0.51 1.00     
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Trade 
Credit 
(0/1) 
TradeCre
dit % 
Lockin-
less than 
1 week 
alt. Supp
Lockin-
more 
than 1 
month 
alt. Supp
Cust Find 
Out 
About 
Dispute
Bus 
Refuse to 
Deal w/ 
Cheating 
Cust 
Court* 
Exporter 
Belief in 
Courts 
Cust Find Out 
About Dispute -0.07 -0.10 0.00 -0.09 1.00    
Bus Refuse to 
Deal w/ 
Cheating Cust 0.03 -0.04 -0.13 0.13 0.57 1.00   
Court*Exporter 0.11 0.22 -0.15 0.26 -0.06 0.18 1.00  
Belief in Courts 0.23 0.18 -0.10 0.00 0.18 0.29 0.59 1.00 
Avg Trade 
Credit from 
Supplier 0.33 0.16 0.22 -0.06 -0.09 0.03 -0.24 0.05 
Talk Weekly 
w/Other Firms 0.25 0.10 0.23 -0.14 -0.02 0.06 -0.18 0.10 
Talk Monthly 
w/Other Firms 0.13 0.05 0.04 -0.16 -0.12 -0.08 -0.31 -0.06 
Bank Credit -0.08 0.12 -0.33 0.38 -0.32 0.07 0.14 -0.08 
CreditAccess -0.09 0.13 -0.33 0.45 -0.26 0.12 0.23 -0.04 
Price Set 
Relationship 
w/Cust -0.01 0.05 -0.11 -0.07 0.14 0.14 -0.04 -0.06 
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Avg Trade 
Credit from 
Supplier 
Talk Weekly 
w/Other 
Firms 
Talk 
Monthly 
w/Other 
Firms Bank Credit CreditAccess
Price Set 
Relationship 
w/Cust 
Avg Trade 
Credit from 
Supplier 1.00      
Talk Weekly 
w/Other Firms 0.53 1.00     
Talk Monthly 
w/Other Firms 0.30 0.70 1.00    
Bank Credit -0.13 -0.37 -0.21 1.00   
CreditAccess -0.15 -0.28 -0.15 0.89 1.00  
Price Set 
Relationship 
w/Cust -0.15 -0.17 -0.24 0.21 0.19 1.00 
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Table F15: Correlation Coefficients for Supplier Credit Variables 
  
Vendor 
Dummy 
Exporter 
Dummy LnEmp Ln(1+age) Duration Dur-sq 
Bus 
Network 
Intro 
Social 
Network 
Intro 
Vendor 
Dummy 1.00        
Exporter 
Dummy -1.00 1.00       
LnEmp -0.54 0.54 1.00      
Ln(1+age) -0.11 0.11 0.41 1.00     
Duration 0.03 -0.03 0.11 0.41 1.00    
Dur-sq -0.04 0.04 0.14 0.41 0.92 1.00   
Bus 
Network 
Intro -0.16 0.16 0.24 -0.04 -0.04 -0.08 1.00  
Social 
Network 
Intro 0.14 -0.14 -0.18 0.02 0.17 0.13 -0.16 1.00 
Visit 
Supplier at 
Least Once 
b/f 1st sale 0.26 -0.26 -0.11 0.26 0.16 0.13 -0.01 0.10 
Trade 
Credit (0/1) 0.33 -0.33 -0.18 0.10 0.14 0.12 -0.11 0.20 
TradeCredit 
% 0.30 -0.30 -0.14 0.15 0.13 0.10 -0.17 0.23 
Have Other 
Supp -0.22 0.22 0.20 0.17 0.09 0.10 -0.21 0.12 
Lock-in: a 
day or less -0.29 0.29 0.46 0.18 0.05 0.11 0.13 -0.25 
Lock-in: 
more than 1 
week -0.02 0.02 -0.12 -0.07 -0.02 -0.04 -0.13 -0.23 
Visit Supp 
Weekly 0.07 -0.07 0.04 0.20 0.12 0.16 0.13 0.14 
% inputs 
<1km -0.14 0.14 0.06 0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.09 0.17 
% Inputs 
Import -0.27 0.27 0.48 0.08 -0.10 -0.08 0.26 -0.18 
Other Supp 
Find Out 
About 
Cheater -0.09 0.09 0.07 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.05 
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Vendor 
Dummy 
Exporter 
Dummy LnEmp Ln(1+age) Duration Dur-sq 
Bus 
Network 
Intro 
Social 
Network 
Intro 
Belief in 
Courts 0.14 -0.14 0.03 0.06 0.01 -0.01 -0.18 -0.18 
Court* 
Exporter -0.21 0.21 0.19 0.10 -0.08 -0.07 -0.12 -0.02 
Dispute 
Leads 
Higher Adv 
Pay -0.10 0.10 -0.15 0.15 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.10 
Talk Weekly 
w/Other 
Firms 0.35 -0.35 -0.12 0.30 0.18 0.17 -0.19 0.35 
  
  
Visit 
Supplier at 
Least Once 
b/f 1st sale 
Trade 
Credit (0/1)
TradeCredit 
% 
Have Other 
Supp 
Lock-in: a 
day or less 
Lock-in: 
more than 
1 week 
Visit Supp 
Weekly 
Visit 
Supplier at 
Least Once 
b/f 1st sale 1.00       
Trade 
Credit (0/1) -0.06 1.00      
TradeCredit 
% -0.06 0.85 1.00     
Have Other 
Supp -0.20 0.10 0.09 1.00    
Lock-in: a 
day or less -0.16 0.03 0.00 0.03 1.00   
Lock-in: 
more than 1 
week 0.01 -0.19 -0.20 -0.24 -0.23 1.00  
Visit Supp 
Weekly 0.14 0.21 0.16 -0.01 0.11 -0.06 1.00 
% inputs 
<1km 0.00 -0.07 -0.06 -0.28 -0.18 0.19 0.02 
% Inputs 
Import -0.01 -0.10 -0.15 0.04 0.51 -0.15 0.10 
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Visit 
Supplier at 
Least Once 
b/f 1st sale 
Trade 
Credit (0/1)
TradeCredit 
% 
Have Other 
Supp 
Lock-in: a 
day or less 
Lock-in: 
more than 
1 week 
Visit Supp 
Weekly 
Other Supp 
Find Out 
About 
Cheater -0.08 -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 -0.16 0.27 0.24 
Belief in 
Courts 0.05 -0.02 -0.04 -0.16 -0.07 0.25 -0.32 
Court* 
Exporter -0.04 0.04 -0.03 0.15 0.02 0.00 -0.21 
Dispute 
Leads 
Higher Adv 
Pay -0.07 0.12 0.11 0.03 -0.17 0.26 0.13 
Talk Weekly 
w/Other 
Firms 0.35 0.42 0.38 0.12 -0.11 -0.20 0.39 
  
  
% inputs 
<1km 
% Inputs 
Import 
Other Supp 
Find Out 
About 
Cheater 
Belief in 
Courts 
Court* 
Exporter 
Dispute 
Leads 
Higher Adv 
Pay 
Talk 
Weekly 
w/Other 
Firms 
% inputs 
<1km 1.00       
% Inputs 
Import -0.09 1.00      
Other Supp 
Find Out 
About 
Cheater 0.22 -0.01 1.00     
Belief in 
Courts 0.28 0.05 0.17 1.00    
Court* 
Exporter 0.20 0.19 0.13 0.63 1.00   
Dispute 
Leads 
Higher Adv 
Pay 0.27 -0.13 0.06 0.07 0.25 1.00  
Talk Weekly 
w/Other 
Firms -0.09 -0.14 -0.18 -0.18 -0.05 0.18 1.00 
 
  153 
 
Table F16: Correlation Table for Joint Action Variables 
 
  Emp Emp-sq Age Age-sq 
SellProducts 
Own Name 
Sell to 
hospitals 
Emp 1.00      
Emp-sq 0.93 1.00     
Age 0.12 0.02 1.00    
Age-sq 0.09 0.01 0.96 1.00   
Sell Products Own 
Name -0.01 0.00 -0.15 -0.17 1.00  
Sell to hospitals -0.01 -0.02 -0.10 -0.10 0.11 1.00 
Would do joint action -0.13 -0.14 0.05 0.09 0.27 0.30 
Duration oldest cust 0.10 -0.01 0.73 0.68 -0.26 -0.01 
Dur-Sq 0.06 -0.02 0.66 0.66 -0.27 -0.04 
Talk weekly other 
firms 0.08 0.07 0.17 0.21 -0.01 0.11 
CreditAccess 0.18 0.07 0.03 0.04 -0.20 -0.16 
 
  
Would do 
joint action 
Duration 
oldest cust Dur-Sq 
Talk weekly 
other firms CreditAccess 
Would do joint 
action 1.00     
Duration oldest cust -0.06 1.00    
Dur-Sq 0.03 0.95 1.00   
Talk weekly other 
firms 0.19 0.11 0.09 1.00  
CreditAccess -0.07 0.07 0.03 -0.20 1.00 
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Appendix G: Additional Information on Survey Instrument and Data Gathering 
 
The field work for the survey was carried out by Shamyla Chaudry, a faculty member of 
the Lahore School of Economics in Lahore, Pakistan between April and August 2002.  
Ms. Chaudry visited Sialkot a number of times during the field work.  The first step was 
to obtain permission and the support of SIMA, the Surgical Instrument Manufacturers 
Association to conduct the survey.  The surveys (in English) were mailed to the 180 
exporting firms found to be operating at the time.  The interviewer followed up with 
phone calls to the exporters to collect the surveys.  99 returned the surveys, out of which 
76 were at least partially filled out.  Since this was a smaller sample size than originally 
foreseen, Ms. Chaudry supplemented the results with additional data obtained from the 
vendor firms, which are mainly sub-contractors for the exporting firms.  For this purpose, 
the survey was translated in Urdu.  Face-to-face interviews were conducted of 47 vendor 
firms. 
 
 
Sialkot Firm Questionnaire  
 
 
Name of Firm being interviewed:____________________________ 
 
 
 
 
Note to interviewer:  Please ask interviewee to answer questions as to conditions before 
September 2001. 
 
This survey is being conducted as part of a thesis on clusters or groups of firms that are located 
close together and produce similar products.  Sialkot is an important cluster, and I have written 
about it extensively in my thesis.  The purpose of the survey is to understand better how surgical 
instrument firms like your own interact with your customers and suppliers.  Thank you very much 
for taking the time to complete this survey.  
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Part 1: GENERAL QUESTIONS about interviewed firm: 
 
1. What is the name of your firm? _________________________________________________ 
 
2. How many employees do you have in August 2001? ________________________________ 
 
3. When did your firm start to operate? ____________________ 
 
4. How many different products does your firm manufacture? ____________________________ 
 
5. What percentage of your firm is owned by: 
(a) the top manager or his family? _______% 
(b) other private individuals? _______% 
(c) other private firms? ______% 
(d) other ______% 
 
 
 
Part 2: Questions about cooperation and marketing 
 
6. Does your largest customer 
(a) sell the surgical instruments you produce only under their own brand name 
(b) sell the surgical instruments you produce only under your company’s name  
(c) sell some items under their brand name and others under your company’s name 
 
7. Does your second largest customer 
(a) sell the surgical instruments you produce only under their own brand name 
(b) sell the surgical instruments you produce only under your company’s name  
(c) sell some items under their brand name and others under your company’s name 
 
8. Do you currently sell any surgical instruments directly to hospitals? (0) No (1) Yes  
If yes, do you use the internet/world wide web to market your products? (0) No (1) Yes  
 
9. If other firms in the cluster were forming a cooperative to sell surgical instruments directly to 
hospitals rather than selling to surgical instrument companies in the U.S. and Europe, would you 
join it?   
(0) No (1) Yes    (if answer is yes, continue to next part of question, otherwise, go to question 10) 
Would you still want to do that if it meant you lost your business relationship with the surgical 
instrument companies that currently buy from you?  (0) No (1) Yes   
 
10. Would you join in a cooperative with other manufacturers in Sialkot to market your products 
directly to hospitals or doctors rather than selling to surgical instrument companies in the U.S. 
and Europe if: 
(a) the price that hospitals paid for surgical instruments rose 10%? (0) No (1) Yes  (if answer is 
no, continue to part (b), otherwise go to question 11) 
(b) the price that hospitals paid for surgical instruments rose 25%? (0) No (1) Yes  (if answer is 
no, continue to part (c), otherwise go to question 11)  
(c) the price that hospitals paid for surgical instruments rose 50%? (0) No (1) Yes (if answer is 
no, go to question 12, otherwise go to question 11) 
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11. If the price that hospitals paid for surgical instruments rose and you were considering joining 
the cooperative, would you still want to join the cooperative if it meant you lost your business 
relationship with the surgical instrument companies that currently buy from you?  (0) No (1) Yes   
 
12. If the minimum quality standards demanded by surgical instrument companies rose, would 
you  join a cooperative with other manufacturers in Sialkot to market your products directly to 
hospitals? (0) No (1) Yes  (if answer is yes, continue to next part of question, otherwise, go to 
question 13)    
Would you still want to join the cooperative if it meant you lost your business relationship with 
the surgical instrument companies that currently buy from you?  (0) No (1) Yes   
 
13. If hospitals were willing to buy surgical instruments directly from Sialkot firms through the 
internet, would you consider doing that? (0) No (1) Yes   (if answer is yes, continue to next part 
of question, otherwise, go to question 14) 
Would you still want to joint the cooperative if it meant you lost your business relationship with 
the surgical instrument companies that currently buy from you?  (0) No (1) Yes   
 
14. Would you be more likely to join such a cooperative if the other firms joining were mostly 
large firms? (0) No (1) Yes 
 
15. Would be more likely to join such a cooperative if the other firms joining were mostly small 
firms? (0) No (1) Yes 
 
16. Additional comments: Has the idea of a cooperative among Sialkot firms to avoid the 
middleman and sell directly in the U.S. and Europe ever been discussed?  What factors would 
influence your decision? 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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Part 3: Questions about CUSTOMERS of the interviewed firm: 
 
(The “First Customer” refers to your largest customer at the time your firm started as a private 
firm.) 
 
   
  
 First Customer  Newest Customer 
17. Are quality specifications  (1) written in a 
contract/order? (0) discussed 
orally?  
(1) written in a 
contract/order? (0) discussed 
orally? 
18. Do you sell this good 
only to this customer, or do 
you produce the same good 
for other customers? 
(0) unique (1) same for other (0) unique (1) same for other 
19. Do you maintain 
inventories of this good, or 
do you produce it only to fill 
orders? 
(0) to order (1) inventory (0) to order (1) inventory 
20. What percentage of your 
sales go to this customer? 
  
21. Is he currently a 
customer?  
(0) No   (1) yes (0) No   (1) yes 
22. How long has he been a 
customer? 
_____Years ______Months _____Years ______Months 
23. How did you first make 
contact with this customer? 
(a) through a government 
agency 
(b) SIMA 
(c) previously unknown to 
you and 
      (c1) they contacted you 
      (c2) a third party  
              introduced you 
       (c3) you advertised 
(d) other________________ 
(a) through a government 
agency 
(b) SIMA 
(c) previously unknown to 
you and 
       (c1) they contacted you 
       (c2) a third party   
               introduced you 
        (c3) you advertised 
(d) other _____________ 
24. What type of firm is this 
customer? 
(a) a domestic middleman 
(private trader) who resells the 
good to: 
      (a1) domestic customer 
      (a2) foreign customer 
(b) government firm 
(d) a foreign firm (from what 
country?_______________, 
and is this a large foreign 
firm?__________________) 
(a) a domestic middleman 
(private trader) who resells the 
good to: 
      (a1) domestic customer 
      (a2) foreign customer 
(b) government firm 
(d) a foreign firm (from what 
country?_______________ , 
and is this a large foreign 
firm?__________________) 
25. Before you began 
working with him, what were 
your sources of information 
about this customer?  
(circle all that apply) 
(a) have no information 
(b) other businesspeople who 
make products similar to 
yours 
(c) other suppliers 
(circle all that apply) 
(a) have no information 
(b) other businesspeople who 
make products similar to 
yours 
(c) other suppliers 
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(d) credit bureau/business 
association (SIMA) 
(e) a government agency 
(f) your own research 
(g) family 
(h) other (specify) _________ 
(d) credit bureau/business 
association (SIMA) 
(e) a government agency 
(f) your own research 
(g) family 
(h) other (specify) _________ 
 
26. Do you give credit to the 
customer? (In other words, 
do you allow the customer to 
make payment after 
delivery?) 
(1) yes  
(0) no  
(1) yes  
(0) no  
27. If yes, how long did you 
work with this customer 
before you offered credit? 
_____Years _____Months _____Years _____Months 
28. When does the 
customer pay you?  
(a) ___% when the order is 
placed 
(b) ___% on delivery 
(c) ___% after delivery 
(a) ___% when the order is 
placed 
(b) ___% on delivery 
(c) ___% after delivery 
29. If this customer refused 
to accept delivery of an 
order, how long would it 
take you to find another 
customer for these goods?  
(a) a day or less  
(b) more than a day, less than 
a week  
(c) more than a week, less than 
a month  
(d) more than a month 
(e) would be impossible 
(a) a day or less  
(b) more than a day, less than 
a week  
(c) more than a week, less 
than a month  
(d) more than a month 
(e) would be impossible 
30. If you failed to deliver an 
order, how long would it 
take this customer to find 
replacement goods? 
(a) a day or less  
(b) more than a day, less than 
a week 
(c) more than a week, less than 
a month 
(d) more than a month 
(e) would be impossible 
(a) a day or less  
(b) more than a day, less than 
a week 
(c) more than a week, less 
than a month 
(d) more than a month 
(e) would be impossible 
31. Currently, do you talk 
with other suppliers of this 
customer?  
(a) no  
(b) yes, daily  
(c) yes, weekly  
(d) yes, monthly 
(e) yes, but infrequently 
(a) no  
(b) yes, daily  
(c) yes, weekly  
(d) yes, monthly 
(e) yes, but infrequently 
 
 
GENERAL QUESTIONS ABOUT CUSTOMERS of the interviewed firm: 
 
32. Has a customer ever failed to pay for a product after you have delivered it? ______________ 
If so, describe the incident and the actions you took to resolve it: 
[Note to interviewer: please make general notes about the case, including information such as: 
 a) the final outcome (write off debt or recovered some money), b) if an outside agency assisted in 
the case (such as courts or local government), c) when the incident occurred, d) how long the 
Sialkot firm had worked with this customer when the dispute occurred, e)  where the customer 
was located, and f) if the Sialkot firm still works with this customer.] 
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______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
33. What percentage of your shipments are returned by customers because the quality is 
defective? __________% 
 
34. How do you resolve disputes with customers over the quality of goods delivered? 
(a) I accept the returned merchandise  
(b) negotiate a partial settlement without outside assistance 
(c) take them to court  
(d) appeal to the local government authorities  
(e) appeal to SIMA 
(f) other (specify_____________________________________) 
 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statements:  
  
35. If I had a dispute with a customer, my other customers would surely find out about it.  
(0) Agree (1) Disagree (2) Indifferent 
 
36. Businesses will refuse to deal with a customer who has dealt unfairly with me.  
(0) Agree (1) Disagree (2) Indifferent 
 
37. Local government is important in resolving disputes with customers.  
(0) Agree (1) Disagree (2) Indifferent 
 
38. If a customer of mine cheats another firm, I will surely find out about it.  
(0) Agree (1) Disagree (2) Indifferent 
 
39. If a customer cheated me, all of the other firms producing the products I produce would hear 
about it. (0) Agree (1) Disagree (2) Indifferent 
 
40.Courts are very important for resolving disputes with customers. 
(0) Agree (1) Disagree (2) Indifferent 
 
41. Industry trade associations (such as SIMA) are a good source of information about the 
reliability of potential customers. (0) Agree (1) Disagree (2) Indifferent 
 
42. SIMA helps to resolve disputes with customers. 
(0) Agree (1) Disagree (2) Indifferent 
 
 
 
Part 4: Questions about the SUPPLIERS of the interviewed firm: 
 
(For this section, consider only those suppliers accounting for 3 % or more of your procurement 
bill. If more than one supplier has been a supplier for the same length of time, answer the 
questions with reference to the biggest supplier in this group. Oldest continuous supplier refers to 
the supplier that you worked with for the longest time) 
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 Oldest Continuous 
Supplier 
Newest Supplier  
43. What input is provided by 
this supplier?  
  
44. Does this supplier make the 
exact same product for other 
firms, or is the input specific to 
your firm? 
(1) unique  
(0) same for other 
(1) unique  
(0) same for other 
45. How long has he been a 
supplier? 
_____Years ______Months _____Years _____Months 
46. Does the supplier maintain 
inventories of this product, or 
produce it only to fill your 
orders? 
(1) to order (0) inventory (1) to order (0) inventory 
47. Are quality specifications (1)written in a 
contract/order? 
(0)discussed orally? 
(1)written in a 
contract/order? 
(0)discussed orally? 
48. How did you first make 
contact with this supplier? 
(a) managed/owned by 
family or friend 
(b) you used to work in this 
firm 
(c) a previous business 
acquaintance 
(d) previously unknown to 
you and 
(d1) they contacted you 
(d2)a third party introduced 
you  
(d3) you advertised 
(d4) other 
(a) managed/owned by 
family or friend 
(b) you used to work in this 
firm 
(c) a previous business 
acquaintance 
(d) previously unknown to 
you and 
(d1) they contacted you 
(d2) a third party 
introduced you 
(d3) you advertised 
(d4) other 
49. Is this supplier located (1) in Sialkot? 
(0) outside Sialkot? 
(1) in Sialkot? 
(0) outside Sialkot? 
50. Is this supplier  (a) a state enterprise?  
(b) a private enterprise? and 
   (b1)an individual or 
household 
    (b2)private trading 
company 
    (b3)manufacturing firm 
    (b4)other private 
enterprise 
(a) a state enterprise?  
(b) a private enterprise? and 
     (b1)an individual or 
household 
     (b2)private trading 
company 
     (b3)manufacturing firm 
     (b4)other private 
enterprise 
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 Oldest Continuous 
Supplier 
Newest Supplier  
51. Before you began 
working with him, what were 
your sources of information 
about this supplier? 
(circle all that apply) 
(a) other businesspeople who 
make products similar to 
yours 
(b) other suppliers 
(c) SIMA 
(d) a government agency 
(e) your own research 
(f) you used to work there 
(g) family 
(h) other (specify) _________ 
(circle all that apply) 
(a) other businesspeople who 
make products similar to 
yours 
(b) other suppliers 
(c) SIMA 
(d) a government agency 
(e) your own research 
(f) you used to work there 
(g) family 
(h) other (specify) _________ 
52. How many times did you 
visit this supplier’s factory 
before you purchased from it? 
(a) never  
(b) 1-3 times 
(c) 3-6 times  
(d) more than 6 times 
(a) never  
(b) 1-3 times 
(c) 3-6 times  
(d) more than 6 times 
53. Does the supplier give 
you credit? (meaning, are you 
allowed to pay part of the bill 
after the supplies are 
delivered? 
(1) yes  
(0) no 
(1) yes  
(0) no 
54. If yes, how long did you 
work with this supplier before 
he offered credit? 
_____Years _____Months _____Years _____Months 
55. When do you pay the 
supplier? 
(a) ___% when the order is 
placed 
(b) ___% on delivery 
(c) ___% after delivery 
(a) ___% when the order is 
placed 
(b) ___% on delivery 
(c) ___% after delivery 
56. The first year you worked 
with this supplier, when did 
you pay him? 
(a) ___% when the order is 
placed 
(b) ___% on delivery 
(c) ___% after delivery 
(a) ___% when the order is 
placed 
(b) ___% on delivery 
(c) ___% after delivery 
57. Do you have other 
suppliers of this input? 
(1) yes  
(0) no 
(1) yes  
(0) no 
58. If this supplier failed to 
deliver an order, how long 
would it take you to find 
replacement supplies? 
(a) a day or less 
(b) more than a day, less than 
a week 
(c) more than a week, less 
than a month 
(d) more than a month 
(a) a day or less 
(b) more than a day, less than 
a week 
(c) more than a week, less 
than a month 
(d) more than a month 
59. How often do you visit 
his factory? 
(a) daily  
(b) weekly 
(c) monthly 
(d) less often 
(a) daily  
(b) weekly 
(c) monthly 
(d) less often 
60. How often does he visit 
your factory? 
(a) daily  
(b) weekly 
(c) monthly 
(d) less often 
(a) daily  
(b) weekly 
(c) monthly 
(d) less often 
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 Oldest Continuous 
Supplier 
Newest Supplier  
61. Currently, do you talk 
with other clients of this 
supplier? 
(a) no 
(b) yes, daily  
(c) yes, weekly 
(d) yes, monthly  
(e) yes, but infrequently  
 (a) no 
(b) yes, daily  
(c) yes, weekly 
(d) yes, monthly  
(e) yes, but infrequently 
62. If another firm you have 
never purchased from 
offered to supply this input 
for a price 10% less than this 
supplier, would you 
purchase from the new firm 
instead of this supplier? 
(a) yes 
(b) no 
(c) buy from both 
(a) yes 
(b) no 
(c) buy from both 
 
 
GENERAL QUESTIONS about SUPPLIERS of the interviewed firm: 
 
63. What portion of your supplies in 2001 were purchased from firms located: 
(a) within 1 km of your firm ______% 
(b) further than 1 km, but within Sialkot _______% 
(c) outside of Pakistan (imports) _______% 
 
64. Has a supplier ever failed to deliver supplies AND not returned your advance payment? 
______________.  If so, describe the incident and the actions you took to resolve it: 
[Note to person conducting survey: please make general notes about the case, with information 
such as: 
a) the final outcome (write off debt or recovered some money), b) if an outside agency assisted in 
the case (such as courts or local government), c) when the incident occurred, d) how long the 
Sialkot firm had worked with this supplier when the dispute occurred, e)  where the supplier was 
located, and f) if the Sialkot firm still works with this supplier.] 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
65. What percentage of supplies do you return to the supplier because the quality is defective? 
______________% 
 
66. How do you resolve disputes with suppliers over the quality of goods delivered? 
(a) I accept the low-quality supplies  
(b) negotiate a partial settlement without outside assistance 
(c) take them to court  
(d) appeal to the local government authorities  
(e) appeal to SIMA 
(f) other (specify________________________________________________________________) 
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67. Have you ever tried to buy inputs from a supplier but couldn’t because the supplier had 
already sold his inputs to another customer? (1) yes   (0) no.  If yes, what did you do in this 
situation?______________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
68. What determines the decision to make your own inputs instead of buying inputs from 
suppliers?  Rank these in order of importance. 
 
(a) changes in demand for your product 
(b) uncertainty that supplier will have enough inputs to satisfy your needs 
(c) other. 
Explain__________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
 
69. A trade dispute with one of my suppliers causes serious problems with my relationships with 
other suppliers. (0) Agree (1) Disagree (2) Indifferent 
 
70. I would never purchase from a supplier if I heard they had cheated another firm.  
(0) Agree (1) Disagree (2) Indifferent 
 
71. The only way I can be sure of having good quality supplies is to have long-term relationships 
with suppliers. (0) Agree (1) Disagree (2) Indifferent 
 
72. Local governments are a good source of information about the reliability of potential 
suppliers.  
(0) Agree (1) Disagree (2) Indifferent 
 
73. If I have a dispute with one of my suppliers, my other suppliers will surely find out about it.  
(0) Agree (1) Disagree (2) Indifferent 
 
74. The only reliable suppliers are firms owned or managed by my relatives.  
(0) Agree (1) Disagree (2) Indifferent 
 
75. The only reliable suppliers are firms owned or managed by members of my biraderi.  
(0) Agree (1) Disagree (2) Indifferent 
 
76. Courts are very important for resolving disputes with suppliers. (0) Agree (1) Disagree (2) 
Indifferent 
 
77. Businesses will refuse to deal with a supplier who has dealt unfairly with me.  
(0) Agree (1) Disagree (2) Indifferent 
 
78. SIMA is a good source of information about the reliability of potential suppliers.  
(0) Agree (1) Disagree (2) Indifferent 
 
79. SIMA helps to resolve disputes with suppliers. 
(0) Agree (1) Disagree (2) Indifferent 
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80. If one of my suppliers cheated another firm, I would find out about it.  
(0) Agree (1) Disagree (2) Indifferent 
 
81. If I have a dispute with one of my suppliers, my other suppliers will demand a bigger 
advanced payment. (0) Agree (1) Disagree (2) Indifferent 
 
82. Fluctuations in demand for surgical instruments would make me to buy inputs from suppliers 
rather than to make my own inputs. (0) Agree (1) Disagree (2) Indifferent 
 
83. Fear that my supplier will not have enough supplies to fulfill my needs causes me to make 
some of my own inputs. (0) Agree (1) Disagree (2) Indifferent 
 
Part 5: FINAL GENERAL QUESTIONS 
 
84. How often do you talk with other surgical instrument manufacturers in Sialkot? 
(a) daily 
(b) weekly 
(c) monthly 
(d) less frequently / not at all 
 
85. If yes, what do you talk about? (all that apply) 
(a) suppliers 
(b) customers 
(c) technology 
(d) product design 
(e) government regulations 
(f) labor 
(g) pricing 
(h) other _____________________________ 
 
86. What benefits do you get from SIMA? 
(a) information about technology 
(b) information about the identity and location of new customers/suppliers 
(c) information about the trustworthiness of customers/suppliers 
(d) contract and/or dispute arbitration 
(e) other ____________________________________ 
 
87. Do you currently receive state or private bank financing? (1) yes (0) no 
  
88. Do you belong to any sort of credit or saving association? (1) yes (0) no 
 
89. What are the two most important factors in determining the price you charge for your 
products? (rank the two most important factors) 
(a) cost of inputs _____ (rank) 
(b) Relationship with the customer_____ 
(c) competitors prices_____  
(d) bargaining power of buyer_____ 
(e) seasonal demand of product_____  
(f) Other (___________) _____ 
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